SON (re a future leader): In my opinion it is a very good thing. That is what would impress me so favourably about ROMMEL in such circumstances and seems to me such a good thing, that the fellow, in the opinion of the working classes, counts as an exponent of the old regime. We must bring in people like that, otherwise you won’t get the working classes round to it. The only chance the English have of winning over the working classes is not to say: ‘The entire previous system was rotten to the core’, but to include these men like ROMMEL and so on. A completely unknown man, a General EBERBACH wouldn’t appeal to the working man in the least. He would say: ‘He is one of the swine who took part in the 20 July affair, who wants to see which way the wind is blowing.’ Only men with a name, such as ROMMEL, or even PAPEN,[95] are the ones who, to the worker, even if they don’t like them personally, are capable men, recognised by the old regime.
FATHER: It will be useless to put forward proposals. The Allies will never agree to them. Where are you going to set up a ‘Freikorps’?
SON: In the west, I should say.
FATHER: Under the eyes of the English and Americans, what weapons are you going to use?
SON: We’ll already have them when we are demobilised.
FATHER: Where will you get your money and supplies? It’s not as simple as all that. In those days after 1918, such a thing was possible in a GERMANY that was mainly unoccupied. It will be quite impossible in a completely occupied GERMANY.
SON: Well, not in big numbers, of course. It won’t be a ‘Freikorps’ like the ‘Eiserne Division’ and the ‘Oberland’ (Post-1918 group of partisans in Eastern Germany[96]) marching through the district with bands, but groups of partisans who will support the East German population in large numbers and the refugees. In every village at the moment, and afterwards too, there will be some old ‘Ortsgruppenleiter’ or an old SS man, or something odd like that. There are people who will give the partisans shelter for a night and who will slip them some food. We belong to a GERMANY which is still National Socialist today, and 10 per cent of the population, or we’ll say 50 per cent, will continue to be National Socialist.
FATHER: Well, I believe that when this collapse occurs their own population will beat the ‘Ortsgruppenleiter’ and so on to death.
SON: Yes, but those are the unsavoury elements, my dear father. I was severely shaken by the effect of 20 July on the German population, amongst, for instance, the work people in my father-in-law’s business, where I was; they were staunch Nazis – that was very pleasing but showed themselves against the officers in that they said: ‘We killed too few officers in 1933.’ These work-people are out and out radical National Socialists, perhaps too radical. It almost borders on the National Bolshevist. But they are definitely people who would wring the necks of the small time local ‘Gruppenleitern’. There are, of course, any number amongst them who would swing round purely on account of external circumstances and who would say: ‘I must earn my money and support my family’ – but there are others amongst them, foremen, for example, in whom I would have complete faith; not that they will make much fuss outwardly, of course, but… a sort of movement – active member, let’s say, who will work in secret.
FATHER: What good is that?
SON: There are many farmers and so on who, in my opinion would do the same. It depends, of course, on the district.
SON (re demobilisation of German units): Take the best mountain ‘Divisionen’, take the paratroop ‘Divisionen’, the ‘Waffen-SS-Divisionen’, the better ‘Panzerdivisionen’, those are all units which mainly have considerable fighting spirit left, and to a certain extent still have capable, young, idealistic officers, the greater number of whom are experienced, old mountain troops, paratroops and so on, and who are mainly or exclusively volunteers. How are you going to demobilise these units when you can’t even promise them decent treatment at the hands of the occupying troops? You can rely on it that I wouldn’t give up my tommy-gun either, even though I didn’t know at the moment for what purpose I needed it. I should stick a few thousand rounds of ammunition in my dispatch case and also my tommy-gun, nicely taken apart, and take it with me. Who knows for what I may need it. If I were demobilised I should collect so-and-so many Swabian soldiers from the neighbourhood and say to them: ‘Come along, we don’t know what’s going on down there, but it’s quite possible that we can do something in one way or another, and if there are a few tommy-guns lying around, take them along by all means. My men would have done that.’
[…]
Document 38
GRGG 201 (c) [TNA, WO 208/4364]
Provisional report on CS/443 Generalleutnant HEIM (Commander, Boulogne) – Captured 23 Sept. 44 in Boulogne.
RAMCKE: We know perfectly well that if we capitulate now, we should experience the same consequences, whether from the east or from your side, as are expressed in the old Roman saying ‘vae victis’ (woe to the conquered!). For that reason I maintain that it is better to go down with honour, that’s to say, better to fight to the end, and then you can wipe us off the face of the earth. But in my frank opinion I should consider it to be a mistake to capitulate without more ado. I did not just capitulate in BREST, but fought to the last round of ammunition, and I hope from the bottom of my heart that my German people at home will maintain sufficient strength to the end to defend every foot of ground, every bridge, every mountain ridge, and every town to the last. Then, as far as I’m concerned you can blot us off the map and destroy us, that would not matter, as then at least we should have gone down with honour. That’s my personal point of view. I hope that my people and nation at home – regardless of whether they are under the leadership of Adolf HITLER or some other statesman – will find the strength to defend themselves to the last under these conditions, because from the situation in 1918 we learnt the lesson that if we capitulate we are supervised and have everything taken away from us anyhow.
ELSTER: It is time for us to make peace. What are we still fighting for?
HEYKING: I’ll tell you. We are in the same position as CHURCHILL was when the English were having such a hell of a time. CHURCHILL couldn’t make peace either, because he knew only too well that he would be in for it then, and the Party, which does actually constitute our command now, HIMMLER etc, can’t make peace either, because they know for a fact that they will be hanged if they do.
ELSTER: Nobody would make peace with them anyhow.
HEIM: I am absolutely convinced that we shan’t get home for a long time after the war is over.
RAMCKE: That applies to me most particularly. In the eyes of the people here I am branded ‘a diehard Nazi’. I wonder if I shall ever get home?
Document 39
CSDIC (UK), GRGG 203
Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 26–7 Sept. 44 [TNA, WO 208/4363]
THOMA: RAMCKE is a fervent Nazi.
HEYKING: He’s abusing them now, though.
THOMA: ‘Now’ is too late. However, he is a good soldier, a courageous NCO!
95
Franz von Papen (29.10.1879–2.5.1969) belonged to the conservative wing of the Centre; 1921–32 Member of Reichstag, 1.6.1932–17.11.1932 Reich Chancellor, until mid-1934 Vice-Chancellor in Hitler’s first Cabinet, then envoy in Vienna and from April 1939 ambassador to Turkey.
96
On 19 April 1919 Rudolf von Sebottendorf obtained approval to form a Freikorps from members of the Thule Society and other volunteers. Its purpose was to put down the revolutionary republic in Munich. By the end of the month Freikorps