[…]
EBERDING: The FÜHRER has no eye for the right powers: we made an error of judgement over both RUSSIA and ITALY. Today of course one can say – as quite a number here are doing – that we should never have started the war but, in my opinion, how else were we to get rid of the VERSAILLES Treaty?[117]
Document 49
CSDIC (UK), GRGG 226
Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 20–1 Nov. 44 [TNA, WO 208/4364]
MEYER: Of one thing I’m certain, that a lot has altered as a result of my being taken prisoner… has altered as regards the actual facts.
BASSENGE: If I’d been as wise five years ago as I am today.
MEYER: I must say that my eyes were only opened after the FALAISE encirclement.
If this partition plan really is put into effect then I’m afraid that the Russians will take the whole of the area east of the ELBE and the Western Powers will take the western area. I think, therefore, one can write off the area east of the ELBE.
BASSENGE: Well, they won’t exterminate the people, because they won’t be able to populate the area.
MEYER: It’s not a question of the space, but of the people. We know that the Russians can be just as ruthless with people as they would be with the clearing of a forest.
I’m certain of one thing, even if it’s purely instinctive rather than reasoned, and that is that the fate of the German people is closely linked with that of the British people. I’ll go further: I believe that one fine day not only the British people, but the so-called Western Democracies will have to stand with us against Bolshevism. I think the Democracies already have their worries on that point.
MEYER: There is no one who could take HITLER’s place.
BASSENGE: Yes, but what does the majority of the Party, including the SS, Gestapo and whatever else there is, think about things? Are they unanimous in their outlook?
MEYER: I can judge as little as you can, because we two have been away from home for years and are not in close contact with the Party. During the few days I spent in the REICH I didn’t see any signs of divergences of opinion within the Party or the Government. Everyone was abusing the next higher authority. The ‘Gauleiter’ groused about the Home Secretary, who was FRICK at the time[118] – HIMMLER is Home Secretary at present – they complained that the Home Office sabotaged everything, all measures; and the troops groused but you’ll know that yourself. We complained as much as any other ‘Division’.
BASSENGE: I didn’t actually mean measures, but just in general. We are living under a dictatorship which can only be maintained as long as there is Praetorian guard who give it their unconditional support. It works only within limits as is proved by history.
MEYER: They hold different views though. The FÜHRER has actually succeeded in retaining the faith of the German people in him: not the FÜHRER as much as his ‘Gauleiter’ etc., who have made a demi-god of the FÜHRER and the German people – I was last on leave in May and above all my realisation in PW camps – has utmost faith in the FÜHRER. As long as this faith exists no-one in the REICH, whether he is a member of the Armed Forces, an industrialist or a politician, or a member of the Party – it makes no difference at all – is in a position to change the system as long as the FÜHRER is alive. It’s impossible.[119]
BASSENGE: That was what those, who wished to do away with the FÜHRER on 20 July, realised.
MEYER: It is just as crazy to say that the Army would repudiate HITLER and the ‘Waffen-SS’ take his part.[120] That’s utter madness! The simple soldier, the majority of them have faith in the FÜHRER and are prepared to carry out any order he gives. I established that fact for myself in the PW camps too. The people have no longer any faith in anything. We mustn’t forget that the people heard the FÜHRER’s call when in the depths of despair; they were lifted from their misery and led; all they’ve ever heard is: the FÜHRER, that great man, have faith etc.; the greatest man in our history. If someone wished to succeed after all that, he’d have to have an even better gift of the gab than GOEBBELS of the FÜHRER. It would take years, perhaps even decades, before the masses would recognise this new personality. He might become a go-between or an administrator for the people, but nothing more, without full support of the people. After the collapse the German people will be entirely—
BASSENGE: Yes, the most significant feature of the German people today is their complete apathy.
Document 50
CSDIC (UK), GRGG 231
Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 6–7 Dec. 44 [TNA, WO 208/4364]
WILDERMUTH: The only hope is that our army will say to the enemy: ‘Look here, we’ll pack up now in our common interest, so that we shall have some peace and quiet as soon as possible.’
WILCK: In my opinion that will only be possible when at least a third of GERMANY is actually occupied, and the whole thing is carried into GERMANY from outside, with the help of German forces. It won’t work any other way.
WILDERMUTH: We can’t wait until a third of GERMANY is occupied. The commanders at the front would have to—
WILCK: No, none of them would do that. It’s quite out of the question that it will come from inside. It can only come from outside.
WILDERMUTH: RUNDSTEDT would have to do it.
WILCK: No, he won’t do it.
WILDERMUTH: He was quite ready to do other things! The question is rather that he won’t be able to do it!
WILCK: All right, even if he wanted to he couldn’t. But he won’t do it. I mean the German people and the troops have been too much caught up by all our propaganda.
WILDERMUTH: Well, those from the rank of ‘Korpskommandeur’ upwards must see a little further now.
WILCK: Yes.
WILDERMUTH: You know, half the army knew before 20 July—
WILCK: No, no!
WILDERMUTH: Yes, that something was going to happen. Then there was incredible amount of talk about it.
WILCK: Well, I don’t believe it, but—
WILDERMUTH: All the ‘Armeeführer’ were asked beforehand.[121]
Document 51
CSDIC (UK), GRGG 233
Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 12–16 Dec. 44 [TNA, WO 208/4364]
MEYER: What would happen suppose we were to say now in the east and west: ‘This is the end; we surrender’?
WILDERMUTH: In any case the end of the war means the occupation of GERMANY, the loss of frontier districts—
MEYER: The eradication of the German race!
WILDERMUTH: The immediate need, Herr MEYER, is to put a stop at last to the eradication of the German race which is being brought about by the wrong policy of the National Socialists.
HEYKING: Whether National Socialism would be done away with even if HITLER did abdicate now, to which we are agreeable, then the question will also arise—
WILDERMUTH: Would these people who are now in power in GERMANY – would there be any place at all left in their hearts for the Fatherland? Would this idea have any other meaning for them at all than as a phrase to be used in their propaganda?
HEYKING: Even if the Nazis did retire, do you think we would lay down our arms, we would give in? You can bet your life that they (Allies) would eradicate us just the same, and would lay down exactly the same terms. We must hold out; there’s only one way now.
117
Even in captivity, Eberding did not understand that the purpose of the war was not simply to repeal the Versailles Treaty, but pursued far more wide-reaching aims. He had also not read ‘Mein Kampf’, where Hitler had condemned the 1914 frontiers as completely inadequate. For the Treaty of Versailles and its application between the wars see e.g. Krumeich, ‘Versailles 1919’.
118
Wilhelm Frick (12.3.1977–16.10.1946), founding National Socialist, involved in Hitler putsch, 8/9.11.1923; 30.1.1933–24.8.1943 Reich Interior Minister.
119
The Hitler myth received its first substantial blow with the defeat at Stalingrad. Up to immediately before the invasion – Meyer is speaking here of May 1944 – the hope was still widespread that a decisive turn in the war was imminent and that Hitler would then quickly usher in ‘Endsieg’. Even Meyer’s assessment that the German people still ‘believed in’ Hitler is plausible on the basis of numerous other sources, but is not capable of empirical proof. The final break with Hitler did not occur until the spring of 1945. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Mythos’.
120
Meyer refers here to the political-ideological assimilation of Army and Waffen-SS in 1944. This process has not been researched conclusively. The early premise has been that only sections of the three Wehrmacht services and the Waffen-SS felt especially bound to Hitler. An exact quantification cannot be made on the basis of what was known at the time. An interesting indication is provided by Peter Leeb in his dissertation ‘Das Deutsche Westheer’, where he states that while the Waffen-SS in the West kept fighting even when a situation was hopeless, Army units had already surrendered earlier. Förster, ‘Geistige Kriegführung’.
121
The Army C-in-Cs were not implicated in the coup attempt of 20.7.1944. In the run-up there were consultations that confirmed the conspirators in their belief that if successful they could count on the support of field marshals Rommel and von Kluge. Heinemann, ‘Der militärische Widerstand’, pp. 863–71. On 17.7.1944 Stauffenberg learned of a rumour that FHQ would be blown up in the next few days. This was ‘a leak from his closest circle’. Ibid., p. 832.