HEIM: What did you do during the fighting for WERTHEIM?
PFUHLSTEIN: Watched it through my field-glasses. I sent my own and other children down into the cellar.
Document 75
CSDIC (UK), GRGG 289
Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 27–8 Apr. 45 [TNA, WO 208/4177]
HEIM: May I ask one question which interests us all very much? I would like to refer back to a remark you made earlier on: ‘We thought, it’s a good thing, if the fellows desert, for then we are rid of the swine.’ At that time we, here, considered it would be more to the point if everyone were to desert. We even went so far as to say that a commander who didn’t do so was was either a fool or a scoundrel, afraid either of being shot or of the SS. Now we are interested to know whether such thoughts were entirely impossible to German commanders?
VIEBIG: The desire to terminate hostilities is, I think, not yet acute. As I saw from my own troops, even if comparisons with the spring offensive of the great battle in FRANCE (1918) were inevitable: ‘This is the final attempt,’ the troops and junior officers attacked with tremendous fervour, just because we were finally advancing again. Each man told himself that everything had been saved up for this, we, too, were told at the conference with the FÜHRER[158] that everything that we have had now been scraped together, there were so-and-so many tank ‘Korps’ there, the plan simply must succeed. It was clear to me that it had been very hurriedly arranged and in many respects badly prepared, the artillery preparation for instance. They had staked everything on one card, placing all their hopes on the element of surprise. But even I hadn’t reckoned with supplies breaking down so completely that eventually the artillery had no ammunition and the tanks no petrol.
HEIM: Did you think that if things had worked out as you expected, it would have resulted in a reversal of the war situation?
VIEBIG: No, I didn’t believe that, nor did I consider it possible that there would be a definite change in the course of the war.
EBERBACH: But perhaps you thought that as a result of it the way for political opportunities would be opened up again?
VIEBIG: Well, that under certain circumstances a compromise peace might have been arranged.
HEIM: In other words, it didn’t seem entirely without point to you.
VIEBIG: Not as far as I could foresee, no.
BASSENGE: When you say a compromise peace had you reckoned on the enemy negotiating with the Nazi regime at all? That is one question which was quite clear to us here: there never was a basis for negotiating. Unconditional surrender was the only basis for negotiation.
VIEBIG: Our government would never have been prepared to do that, even if they had only had the most meagre success.
HEIM: You mean, therefore, that up to December there was hardly a person who said that we really ought voluntarily to make peace, rather here in the West than in the East.
ROTHKIRCH: Perhaps I should remark here that just as the attack started I was with the ‘Heeresgruppe’, with Generaloberst REINHARDT, who, as High Priest of the ‘Heeresgruppe’ was bound to be in the know. He had learnt about the attack twenty-four hours before, through conversation with the OKH, and was of the same opinion as VIEBIG, in the sense that it was believed that it could bring about a decisive turning point in the war; that if the attack succeeded in reaching the objective they had in mind it would be possible to win a basis for concluding a bearable peace.[159]
HEIM: And REINHARDT is without doubt one of the most sober and sensible men that we have.
VIEBIG: Things became very different after the end of January/February of course. After that every ‘Divisionsführer’ and ‘Regimentskommandeur’ told himself that it was madness what we were being forced to do.
Document 76
CSDIC (UK) GG-REPORT, SRGG 1171 (C)
CS/1952 – Generalmajor BRUNS (Heeres-Waffenmeisterschule 1, Berlin) – Captured 8 Apr. 45 in Göttingen – and other Senior Officers (PW), whose voices could not be identified.
Information received: 28 Apr. 45
FRANZ: I had just crossed the RHINE and reached SPEYER and then I telephoned the C of S of the ‘Armee’.[160] He asked: ‘How many men have you left?’ ‘Only a few officers,’ and with them I was to form a ‘Kampfgruppe FRANZ’. We went on to KARLSDORF(?) and collected about forty men from the surrounding villages. At half-past nine the telephone rang: ‘OBERMEYER(?) speaking: I belong to the FÜHRER’s court martial. General HÜBNER[161] is in the village here and has orders to see you tonight.’ I knew there was something of the sort and also what it meant for me. Well, I lit a good Havana cigar, sat down on the sofa and waited for him. Suddenly there was a knock and General HÜBNER entered and said to me: ‘I am the FÜHRER’s flying court martial.’ (Laughter) ‘and have authority to shoot officers, including Generals, on the spot, if I ascertain that anything has been neglected or not carried out.’ The moon was shining and it was quite light out-of-doors. (Laughter). Thereupon I said to him: ‘Sir, I am at your disposal; you can shoot me on the spot if you wish.’ He said: ‘I have brought everything along; two officers and a firing squad consisting of twelve men, but first I want to discuss with you the fighting at TREVES, along the MOSELLE and up to the RHINE.’
I had something with which he hadn’t reckoned. I had a map scale 1:300,000 which showed the Battle HQs of my ‘Division’ up to the RHINE – the whole thing took place within twenty-eight days – none of them were farther apart than 2 or 3 cm, which is equal to 8–9 km on a 1:300,000 map. This showed that we must have fought at least a day in each of them along this line, else there would have been a big jump. I laid down the map on the table in front of him and said: ‘Sir, would you like me to hold a long lecture or shall I tell you in a few words?’ He said: ‘Make it short.’ Very well, I started: ‘Here are the HQ’s. This is how we fought.’ Then he suddenly exclaimed: ‘But that is totally different from what we assumed at OKW. We thought it had been a major catastrophe, at which everything was swept away in a body. That is a most interesting report you have given me. We thought a mess had been made. You will not be shot. (Laughter). I only have one request: have this map copied immediately. I shall show it to the FÜHRER myself in order to show him how the troops have actually fought.’ Then he looked for a second culprit: General UTZ(?)[162] whom he had also intended shooting. I had explained everything to him within an hour. He said I should not be shot, whereupon I said: ‘Orderly, bring me a bottle of champagne!’ I thanked him for allowing me to live (laughter) and gave him the map. In the meantime a teleprint message arrived, saying I was to take over the TAUNUS front near WIESBADEN forthwith. I said to him: ‘Yours is a very difficult task, having to institute proceedings of such a nature with Generals.’ He answered: ‘Believe me, it gives me great satisfaction to shoot a General who has been proved to have neglected his duty.’
?: Wait till he arrives as PW at this camp!
?: We should like to meet him!
FRANZ: For example: he also shot the REMAGEN people.[163] He didn’t do it just out of blind obedience to an order but because of a fanatical faith in the cause. The FÜHRER had so much faith in him that he personally entrusted him with this difficult task.
158
On 11 and 12.12.1944 at FHQ Adlerhorst near Bad Nauheim, Hitler addressed between 20 to 30 generals. A part of his speech has survived. Domarus, ‘Hitler’, Vol. 2, p. 2171f. Viebig was present at Bad Nauheim in his capacity as CO, 277.Volksgrenadier-Division.
159
Generaloberst Hans-Georg Reinhardt (1.3.1887–22.11.1953) was C-in-C, Army Group Centre from 16.8.1944, relieved by Hitler for insubordination, 26.1.1945. On 16.12.1944 he noted in his diary, ‘Counter-attack in the West is beginning. Marvellous.’ (BA/MA N245/3) Reinhardt was a gifted and courageous panzer general who, despite many doubts over Nazi aggression, knuckled down and expressed no open criticism of Hitler to his face until January 1945. By doing so Reinhardt rose above the mass of German generals who followed Hitler’s orders to the end either through cowardice, self-deception or fanaticism. Clasen, ‘Reinhardt’.
160
The Chief of 7.Armee General Staff was Generalmajor Rudolph Christoff Freiherr von Gersdorff (27.3.1905–26.1.1980).
161
Generalleutnant Dr (Dentistry) Rudolf Hübner (29.4.1897–1965) was an infantry officer who distinguished himself (Knight’s Cross) as a regimental commander. September 1943 – January 1945, Head Section P2, Army Personnel Bureau, then CO, 303.Inf.Div., Döberitz. On 9.3.1945 Hitler ordered the setting up of a ‘Flying Court Martial’ under Hübner’s command. In this capacity he answered to the Führer directly and received his orders from him personally. The Flying Court Martial was competent to try all charges involving members of the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS, and could carry out its sentences immediately. The first victims of these mobile murder squads were four officers held responsible for the loss of the bridge at Remagen on 7.3.1945. The enabling order appears at Müller/Ueberschar, ‘Kriegsende 1945’, p. 163f.