The Russians did not carry our a ‘Blitzkrieg’ quite to extremes. They adopted a great many things we used in our ‘Blitzkrieg’: the use of tank corps, the idea of large encircling movements, the formation of pockets etc., they adopted those, but in contrast to us they were commanded in a much more reasonable, substantial way, and did not set themselves such enormous aims[172] which were fulfilled in FRANCE in a way which no soldier would have believed possible. That was one of HITLER’s ideas,[173] and he was right about it. The Russians took from us the idea of fighting with large tank armies, and how to carry out large outflanking movement, but they did it more slowly and carefully; with us it always immediately overran all bounds and that was because HITLER’s ideas were always like that: in FRANCE he was right, in RUSSIA he made the fundamental mistake of thinking that it was only necessary to attack the enemy properly and penetrate his front, and that we should then have more or less complete freedom of movement. In FRANCE that was the case![174]
It was incredible what the Russians achieved in the way of reserves. We realised that in the winter of 1941/42 when the roads were just mud tracks. If I remember right we had about a hundred different types of trucks manufactured by a variety of firms,[175] each having its own special spare parts; so the spare parts of one couldn’t be used for others, and those were vehicles naturally intended for use on European roads; the Russians only had three types of Ford trucks, a small one, a medium one and a large one; consequently all spare parts could be used for any of them.[176] One of the most amazing features is that the Russians were an out-and-out peasant nation up to the outbreak of the World War; they were an agricultural people; Bolshevism transformed their Soviet Nation of peasants into a nation of technicians within a period of 20 years; so the Russians must possess a natural technical talent. People who knew RUSSIA well told me that the Russians, even the peasants were always very handy craftsmen who used their primitive means to fabricate things, motivated by an inner urge to create. For instance in RUSSIA, at the time of those large pockets when thousands of their trucks and vehicles were either completely destroyed or damaged, two or three Russians used to be got together and told to make one vehicle from the wreck of four others. They achieved it too. One reason of course was that any part of one vehicle could be used for another and because they had a natural talent and were undoubtedly trained for the job. It was one of the major surprises. The Ford vehicles probably with cooperation from FORD, were constructed along entirely different lines from the ordinary ones in EUROPE. They were higher off the ground, giving them more freedom of movement; they all had two rear wheels and two rear tyres each side, besides which they had a special peculiarity; you know the so-called snow-chains used here; they had similar mud-chains which were somewhat different; the Russians, knowing what their winter is like, had organised them accordingly. We didn’t do that. We went there with absolutely normal central European vehicles and consequently we got stuck everywhere.
Our Air Force made terrific efforts to destroy enemy transport by attacking big railway marshalling yards or railways in narrow valleys. Undoubtedly these attacks were effective for quite a time but it was incredible how quickly repairs were carried out; our recce aircraft reported that the entire population of the neighbourhood was being collected, given spades and pickaxes and everything was put in order again. Sometimes our pilots were quite desperate because they realised that the damage they had once more caused would be repaired within two or three days, and the trains would be running as usual everywhere. In this respect the Russians had recognised the meaning of total warfare, and put it into practice to a far greater extent than we had, we who talked such a lot about it.
Russian women are far better and more reliable workers than Russian men. For that reason the Russians usually recruited great numbers of women to carry out road work. This system was capable of coping with the circumstances; our system as it gradually developed would have been equally efficient if it had gone the whole way and regarded human beings as cyphers. It was exactly the same under the Czars. The terrific problems of road and rail transport were thus solved by the Russians throwing in all their forces with relentless energy.[177]
From the point of view of actual fighting the German soldier always felt superior to the Russian on account of his knowledge, his efficient handling of weapons and his tactics. Tactics on both sides were probably equal but German soldiers were more highly trained in the various things and knew more about them. Especially after 1941, the great shortcomings of rapid training became apparent in the Russian soldiers, besides which Slavs are doubtlessly not as intelligent or receptive as Germans. However the Slavs have one immense advantage over Western Europeans: death means nothing to them, nothing at all! This attitude towards death is entirely different from ours, even the European Slavs. He inclines towards the oriental attitude and consequently is incredibly steadfast. He’ll fight until the last as a matter of course much more readily than we Western Europeans. We used to shout and shout about it but in practice it was difficult to carry out. It wasn’t so hard for the Russians; they really did allow themselves to be slaughtered. In addition the so-called commissar system which meant there were commissars in every army branch, right down to the individual companies,[178] proved a great main-stay. Even if a simple soul, a peasant who doesn’t know much more about Bolshevism than we do, faltered, there was always someone who, by iron energy, persuasion, punishments or rewards, was able to save the situation. Thus, on the whole, the Russians were quite excellent soldiers.
German arms were superior to Russian ones in 1941. From 1942 onwards the Russians came along with their masses of T-34s – which were the best tanks in the world for a long time, there’s no doubt about it in spite of their many disadvantages.[179] Above all these tanks had the advantage of a slanting shape which caused shells to bounce off them unless fired under exceptionally favourable conditions. Its disadvantage was its relatively poor field of vision which was much worse than ours. However, they produced them in large quantities. In that respect we also made a huge mistake. We didn’t believe Russian industry capable of holding out – I can’t judge to what extent they were aided by ENGLAND and AMERICAN – and of recuperating so quickly from their collapse in 1941 when they lost the whole of the DONETZ basin, STALINGRAD etc. which contained gigantic factories. This was probably due to the fact that no one knew what was going on beyond the URALS. We only realised later, in retrospect, that they must have a terrific industrial area there which enabled them to produce such quantities of war materials in spite of everything.[180] Then they brought out their so-called STALIN ‘Orgeln’, rocket-launchers, ‘Katuschkas’. At any rate they were most unpleasant as new weapons. Gradually we grew accustomed to them. They’re like this: contrary to artillery shells they approach so slowly you can’t hear them; in the case of artillery fire you can usually hear each shell being fired and can throw yourself down and take cover but you cannot do that in the case of these rockets because they approach so slowly they make no noise; suddenly they land all round you in the field where you happen to be standing, driving or riding, all in the course of a minute. First and foremost is their moral effect! Their actual effect wasn’t as great. We also had a rocket-launcher but it couldn’t be thrown in on that scale. The principle was the same. As regards anti-tank weapons, they hadn’t any more than we had, the so-called ‘Pak-Kanone’, but they were mainly on the defensive then and were forced to bring out a slightly larger calibre than we had. We had the ‘3.7’ which proved completely useless after some time. The Russians soon switched over to ‘5.6’; nowadays ‘7.5s’ are preferred as a rule. You never use anything smaller than ‘7.5’ nowadays.[181] They were very effective as they penetrated everything. The Russian campaign was interesting in as far as one observed the continual battle between tanks and defence weapons. When the Russian brought out their new weapon we had to alter our tank tactics. We could no longer dash into an attack in a straight-forward manner as we used to do, reckoning that we might lose a tank or two; we couldn’t do that but we had by cautiously creeping forward to try and locate the weapons and attempt an attack from the side. That was the continuous struggle. The Russians then developed a new method of using their weapons; they attempted to form ‘Pak’ nests in order not be be surrounded; that sort of thing is always in a continuous state of development.
172
Despite the great operational successes of the Red Army from the winter of 1942 onwards, one should not overlook the fact that in its offensives it received repeated bitter setbacks to inspire caution. Tank corps which pushed too far forward were wiped out between the Donetz and Dnieper in February 1943, at Warsaw in August 1944 and at Grosswardeien in September 1944. For the superiority of the Wehrmacht over the Red Army in armoured tactics see Karl-Heinz Frieser, ‘Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg’, Vol. 8.
173
The plan for the French campaign was an idea of Generalleutnant Manstein. Hitler realised that it fitted in with his own concept and adopted it. Frieser, ‘Blitzkrieg-Legende’, pp. 71–116.
174
Heim is right if he doubts that the Blitzkrieg experience in France was transposed on Russia. It was hoped to break the backbone of the Red Army by means of great encirclements near the border. The German military leadership vastly underestimated the enormous resources and will to resist of the Soviets. ‘Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg’, Vol. 4.
175
In all, 62 different types of lorry of German manufacture were used by the Wehrmacht. Oswald, ‘Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer’, p. 169f. The Army in the East was chronically short of lorries from the summer of 1941 onwards so that captured vehicles were increasingly pressed into service, which augmented the varieties. Although Armaments Minister Speer decided in 1942 to concentrate on producing only three weight classes of lorry, the problem of the variety of types remained unresolved. In the spring of 1943 on the Eastern Front there were 110 types of lorry identified with one particular division. Rolf-Dieter Müller, ‘Albert Speer’, p. 633f.
176
The Red Army had only two standard lorries, the GAZ-AA and ZIS-5. Most of the Lend-Lease vehicles were Studebaker US-6s.
177
To make up for the enormous losses in manpower due to the huge areas of territory falling under German occupation, the remainder of the workforce was obliged to perform compulsory overtime. An 11-hour day was required, all holidays were discontinued, many concerns went over to 24-hour production. Concerns vital to the war effort increased the workforce by employing women and teenage children and by taking workers away from non-essential occupations. Zverev, ‘Ekonomika Vajuscich Derzav’, p. 316. For the construction of bunkers and firefighting duties etc., a local Air Raid Precaution (MPO) was formed, run by the NKVD (see note 213 below), which mobilised all local residents aged between 16 and 60 for civil defence. If the military situation demanded it, MPO would also assemble a Home Army (Narodnoe Opolocenie). Its members would frequently be volunteers, although occasionally press-gang methods would be employed. Löwe, ‘USSR’, p. 1228. Also Barber/Harrison, ‘Soviet Home Front’.
179
Between June 1940 and June 1941, 950 T-34/76As were built. These were succeeded by 9,290 T-34/76Bs between January 1941 and mid-June 1942. Deployed at the front in August 1941 for the first time, the production figures prove that by 1942 it had become the standard Soviet tank. Zaloga/Grandsen, ‘Soviet Tanks’.
180
As a result of the German advance, by the autumn, significant centres of industry fell under German control. Production from iron ores fell in 1942 by between 32 and 38 per cent in comparison to pre-war levels, cast iron by 32 to 49 percent, steel 26 to 35 per cent. More than 80 per cent of all armaments factories, including 94 per cent of all aircraft factories, were close to the areas of war interest or not far from the front. In the regions east of the Urals a total of 3,500 major industrial projects were commenced and running in the 1941–45 period. Zverev, ‘Ekonomika’, p. 315ff. In the third quarter of 1941, 1,360 major concerns, mostly armaments, were evacuated east of the Urals. By the end of the year the number had risen to 1,523, by mid-1942 more then 1,200 were in operation at the new locations. Hildermeier, ‘Geschichte der Sowjetunion’, p. 634f.
181
The Geman 3.7-cm PAK36 anti-tank gun was the standard weapon of the Army from 1936 to 1941; 20,000 were built before production was halted in March 1942. In France in 1940 it was observed that the round did not penetrate the armour of British and French heavy tanks, and the gun was also found to be ineffective against Soviet tanks of the types T-34, KW-1 and KW-2. It was replaced during 1942 by the 5-cm and eventually 7.5-cm PAK40, delivered from February 1942. Hogg, ‘Deutsche Artilleriewaffen’, pp. 289–305; Hahn, ‘Waffen’, pp. 99–103. In the summer of 1941 the Soviet Army introduced the 5.7-cm ZIS-2 anti-tank gun, which in its various further developments remained in service to the end of the war.