GOERDELER heard about that remark. He hoped that that utterance meant the time was ripe for him to get in touch with ZEITZLER, the Chief of the General Staff.[442] A meeting between GOERDELER and ZEITZLER didn’t however, come off. ZEITZLER refused, saying: ‘I have no desire for it.’ He wasn’t in a position, in any case. I said to GOERDELER: ‘What do you expect to achieve?’ He answered ‘I want to explain things to ZEITZLER and if, after that, the wretch still has the courage to denounce me, well, I can’t help it!’ I think ZEITZLER was quite capable of denouncing him.
HITLER was very suspicious of ZEITZLER and there seems to be some connection between him and 20 July. JODL said to me: ‘That man ZEITZLER laid the foundations of that dirty business of the 20th by his miserable grumbling.’ No interview between GOERDELER and him took place. I am glad, as it wouldn’t have made any difference. I know for certain that ZEITZLER wouldn’t have done it. Even if a ‘Leutnant’, a ‘Kompaniechef’ or a ‘Bataillonskommandeur’ were to say: ‘We’ve arrived at the stage when we must have peace; we must rid ourselves of HITLER’ a ‘Kompanie’ of the ‘Grossdeutschland’ would appear on the one hand, a ‘Kompanie’ of the SS ‘Adolf Hitler’ on the other; they’d attack the ‘Bataillon’ and kill them all. The time isn’t ripe yet.
They didn’t trust FROMM and he was the only one who didn’t participate. FROMM really didn’t take part in the ‘Putsch’.[443]
BADINSKY: He’ll have said: ‘What do you think I am?’ He had OLBRICHT shot, didn’t he?
CHOLTITZ: Yes, he was killed. FROMM himself gave BECK the ‘coup de grace’ with his own pistol. You know, the peculiar thing is that BECK shot his own eyes out but didn’t manage to kill himself even by his second shot; then FROMM gave him the ‘coup de grace’.[444] HIMMLER appeared at BERLIN an hour later[445] and was bitterly sorry that they were already dead; the reason why he arrested FROMM was because he suspected FROMM had killed all his accomplices.
Document 155
CSDIC (UK), GRGG 187 [TNA, WO 208/4363]
Provisional report on information obtained from (amongst others) CS/223 – General der Panzertruppe EBERBACH (GOC VII Army) – Captured 31 Aug. 44 in Amiens – before arrival in camp No. II.
This report contains information obtained from the above PW […] in conversation with a low-rating British Army Officer.
EBERBACH: I remember my last conversation with ROMMEL, where he stated his attitude perfectly clearly: that there was nothing else to be done but to make an armistice, at once if possible, and if necessary to take steps against the present government, in case they weren’t sensible enough to give the order.
BAO: Did he really speak out as openly as all that?
EBERBACH: Yes, to me. Similarly, I knew that Feldmarschall von RUNDSTEDT would have been willing to make an armistice with you here in the West – if necessary also against the German government. For MANSTEIN any practical step was out of the question, because he no longer held his command on the Eastern Front; but I think I can assure you that MANSTEIN was and still is also one of those soldiers who thinks for himself and who is not carried along by the National Socialist Party.[446]
[…]
Document 156
CSDIC (UK), SR Report SRGG 1018 (C) from 2 Sept. 44
[TNA, WO 208/4368]
Generalmajor Alfred GUTKNECHT (Higher Commander of Kraftfahrtruppen West) – Captured 29 Aug. 44 in Soissons-Rheims.
General der Panzertruppen Heinrich EBERBACH (GOC 7th Army) – Captured 31 Aug. 44 in Amiens.
[…]
EBERBACH: Of those who took part in it, I know STAUFFENBERG and OLBRICHT best, and all I can say is that I am firmly convinced that STAUFFENBERG and OLBRICHT really acted out of idealism, in the belief that they were thereby doing the best thing for the REICH. Apart from that, the way they did it was undoubtedly childish and stupid.
GUTKNECHT: Yes, of course it was. It was something like the KAPP ‘Putsch’.[447] There were no preparations at all, so that right from the start it was doomed to failure.
EBERBACH: One would really never expect such intelligent people as those two to be as naïve as all that.
GUTKNECHT: I wondered afterwards what would have happened, supposing the attempt had been successful. What would have happened then? I believe absolutely no preparations of any kind were made at all.
EBERBACH: They were so stupid that they didn’t even take over the telephone exchanges, so that while it was actually going on, officers could ring up the FÜHRER’s HQ from BERLIN. They had no business to tackle it so idiotically.[448]
Document 157
CSDIC (UK), GRGG 195
Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 16–17 Sept. 44 [TNA, WO 208/4363]
CHOLTITZ: STAUFFENBERG put the question to me: ‘Is it necessary for the FÜHRER to be killed or not?’ I replied: ‘The thing’s impossible without getting rid of the root of the trouble.’
EBERBACH: ROMMEL also convinced me of that, he said:[449] ‘The FÜHRER must be killed. There’s nothing else for it, the man really has been the driving force in everything.’
CHOLTITZ: I was at POSEN, and saw HITLER there. He was quite mad. From that moment on I knew complete physical destruction was the only answer. But I shouldn’t have thought that ROMMEL would have reach the same conclusion.
EBERBACH: Yes, ROMMEL was very emphatically of that opinion. He said: ‘Heaven knows, I’ve experienced it personally in TUNIS and TRIPOLI. The man must go!’ He was most emphatic. GAUSE, who was my Chief of Staff, and who was formerly ROMMEL’s Chief of Staff,[450] confirmed and amplified… in every detail.
Document 158
CSDIC (UK), GRGG 196
Report on information obtained from Senior Officers (PW) on 18–19 Sept. 44 [TNA, WO 208/4363]
[…]
CHOLTITZ: When STAUFFENBERG said to me: ‘I am ready; it can start for all we care,’ I said to him: ‘STAUFFENBERG, that sounds so flippant. Are things really prepared? Can such matters ever be fully prepared?’ Incidentally there were four officers in the room whilst we were speaking.
EBERBACH: Well, except for one, who with a collection of twelve armed clerks, arrested them all, a thing which shouldn’t have happened—
CHOLTITZ: Who was that? The ‘Major’?
EBERBACH: An ‘Oberstleutnant’, who had only just been promoted.[451] I knew it from my people, who sent an officer out to me to give me all the information.
CHOLTITZ: That is sure to have been the man who always reported the situation and who was with FROMM.
EBERBACH: No. The man who did it belonged to STAUFFENBERG’s staff; he was from the AHA(?). He arrived with twelve clerks, armed with rifles and hand grenades and took them all into custody.
CHOLTITZ: That ‘Major’ must have shot STAUFFENBERG on the spot. STAUFFENBERG was the first to be shot.
EBERBACH: No, they apparently didn’t shoot them on the spot but put them into a room first. FROMM was set free and he ordered that STAUFFENBERG, MERZ and OLBRICHT should be shot immediately and that BECK should be handed a revolver. FROMM seems to have been liquidated in the meantime as well. I believe it is in one of the English newspapers. I am sorry because FROMM behaved very decently in this affair. He must have known that it would end tragically for him. In having those people shot on the spot and sending BECK a pistol he saved them a lot of suffering; he behaved like an officer and a gentleman. I never cared much for FROMM but that action of his pleased me.
442
Goerdeler made numerous attempts to obtain an interview with Zeitzler. Beck and Stauffenberg considered these efforts useless. Choltitz, to whom Goerdeler had been introduced in the autumn of 1943 through the mediation of Choltitz’s cousin Baron Palombini, apparently promised to arrange that Goerdeler and Zeitzler should meet but then decided against it. Ritter, ‘Goerdeler’, p. 383.
443
Generaloberst Friedrich Fromm (8.10.1888–12.3.1945), Chief of Army Armaments and C-in-C Ersatzheer from the outbreak of war, knew of the coup plot by his Chief of Staff, Stauffenberg, but refused any involvement once he knew that Hitler had survived the assassination attempt. On the early morning of 21.7.1944 he had the four conspirators Stauffenberg, von Haeften, Olbricht and von Quirnheim shot in the Bendler-Strasse courtyard. Fromm himself was executed by shooting at Brandenburg-Görden Penitentiary on 12.3.1945. There is a very recent, monumental biography on Fromm: Kroener, ‘Fromm’.
444
After the failure of the coup, Fromm gave Beck the oportunity to kill himself. Beck made two attempts, both of which failed. Fromm then ordered that he be ‘put out of his misery’, which was probably carried out by a Feldwebel. Kroener, ‘Fromm’, pp. 702–8.
445
Himmler, nominated Fromm’s successor on 20.7.1944, made his appearance at the Bendler Block for the first time on 22.7.1944. Choltitz’s account must have been obtained from one of two other SS-Führer. Just after midnight on 21.7.1944 SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny (12.6.1908–5.7.1975) arrived at the Bendler Block with a company of SS to support the Wachbataillon under Major Ernst-Otto Remer (8.8.1912–5.10.1997). SS-Obergruppenführer and General der Polizei Dr Ernst Kaltenbrunner (4.10.1903–15.10.1946), from 30.1.1943 Chief of RSHA and SD, had arrived there shortly before. Kroener, ‘Fromm’, p. 708f.
446
Manstein was certainly an independent thinker, but he had never been prepared to become involved politically against Hitler and had developed no major political ideology. He satisfied himself with the hope of achieving a ‘stand-off’ with the Russians on the Eastern Front. There is no academic biography. For general reading see Syring, ‘Erich von Manstein’.
447
The poorly prepared Kapp putsch of 13–17.3.1920 cannot be compared to the coup attempt of 20.7.1944 because of the difference in the prevailing conditions. There is comprehensive documentation on the former, ‘Der Kapp-Lüttwitz-Ludendorff Putsch. Dokumente’. From the older existing literature, the best account is Erger, ‘Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch’.
448
There is no doubt that the conspirators attempted to isolate the communications at FHQ Wolfsschanze, but this was frustrated by the complexity of the installation. The failure to shut down the distribution network run by the Reichspost was caused mainly by the refusal of Telegraphy Senior Inspector Senor to cooperate. Peter Hoffmann, ‘Staatsstreich’, pp. 415–28, 504, 508–11.
449
Eberbach was referring here to the brief conversation he had on 17.7.1944 at HQ, Pz.Gr. West shortly before Rommel was seriously wounded.
450
Genertalleutnant Alfred Gause (14.2.1896–30.9.1967) was from September 1941 to 7.5.1943 (with a short break) Chief of Staff, Pz.Gr./Pz.Armee/Heeresgr.Afrika, from 15.6.1944–10.9.1944 Chief of Staff, Pz.Gr. West and 5.Pz.Armee.
451
Meant here is Oberstleutnant (from 1.8.1944 Oberst) Franz Herber, Chief, Abt.Ib, General Army Bureau, who towards 2100hrs appointed himself leader of the counter-coup at the Bendler Block and, together with other officers of the General Army Bureau, helped put down the Stauffenberg putsch and released Fromm. Kroener, ‘Fromm’, p. 697.