I understand that. What happened when the radio devices separated?
We’d more or less expected something like that. Obviously he’d taken the money out of our containers and transferred them to something else. As it turned out, he also switched cars, but that had no effect because we’d planted the bug on his belt, not his car. That bug-the one on his belt-moved away. The other two bleepers-on the suitcases-stayed put. We let him get some distance away before our men moved. One team followed the moving signal-Ryterband. The other moved in on the stationary signals. They found the empty suitcases in a private two-car garage, along with his car, which he’d left there. Meanwhile the second team of agents followed Ryterband north toward the shore of Long Island Sound.
At what time did this take place?
He reached the garage, where he made the switch, at approximately four fifteen. He left the garage at four twenty-three.
Was he in communication with Craycroft throughout that time?
Yes. We’d brought a radio up to the bank; we were monitoring their communications. They kept it very brief-maybe they didn’t want us homing in on Ryterband’s transmissions. Anyhow, he simply reported the successful conclusion of each step of his operation. He’d say something like, “Step two, completed.” Craycroft would say, “Affirmative.” That was about the sum of it.
At what time did Ryterband reach his destination?
The bleeper stopped moving at four fifty-six.
Grofeld (Cont’d)
Captain, you’ve made a thorough study of Harold Craycroft-his background, to some extent his motivations. In the course of this detective work have you interviewed psychiatric experts?
Yes, I have.
Now, as the time drew close to the five ten deadline on that Wednesday, May twenty-second, the most crucial question in your minds must have been, “Will he drop those bombs, or won’t he?”
That’s it in a nutshell, yes.
The ransom had been paid, not much more than a half hour late, as it turned out. You then had to use your best judgment as to whether Craycroft would accept that or whether he would bomb the city anyway. Now, you’ve just stated that you’ve obtained psychiatric opinions on Craycroft. You must have asked these experts whether in their judgment Craycroft intended to drop the bombs.
I did, naturally. But it was like the parable about the blind men trying to describe the elephant. I talked to four shrinks and got four opinions. They could have been talking about four different guys. I’d expected that, actually. When you go to trial, you can always find experts to give testimony on both sides of the case. It doesn’t mean anybody’s lying. They have different opinions, that’s all. Nobody except a clairvoyant could have told us what was actually going on inside Craycroft’s head at that particular time.
Then you really had no way to be absolutely certain of his intentions?
None at all.
You had to rely on judgment and intuition, then.
You could put it that way.
Is there some other way you’d prefer to put it, Captain? I’d like to be as clear as possible on this point.
Look, we’d been monitoring conversations between Ryterband and Craycroft for several hours that afternoon. We hadn’t heard Craycroft say, “I’m not going to drop the bombs.” Everything we heard led to exactly the opposite conclusion. Add to that the fact that Ryterband himself was obviously afraid of Craycroft’s intentions-he didn’t seem to know either, any more than we did. But he knew Craycroft a lot better than the rest of us did, and if Ryterband was scared, we had to be scared, too. Add to that the fact that Craycroft was obviously deranged. I mean, nobody ever really questioned that. The point is we knew just one thing for certain: that he was unpredictable. He couldn’t be depended on to do the sensible thing or the logical thing or the compassionate thing. He was listening to the sound of his own private drummer; we couldn’t hear the beat of that drum, and we had no way of anticipating his moves.
Therefore, I take it, you reasoned that you had to assume the worst.
Mr. Skinner, if a stranger points a loaded gun at you, you don’t know for sure that he’s going to pull the trigger. But if you get a chance, you’ll sure as hell duck out of his line of fire. Or, given the chance, you’ll shoot him first.
The law of self-defense.
I’m not talking about the law. I’m talking about natural reaction-common sense. He had a loaded gun pointed at us. And we couldn’t get out of the way. If we could be sure he wouldn’t shoot, that would be one thing. But all we knew was what we could see. We took steps designed to remove the threat. Defend ourselves. Whatever you want to call it. We had to try. Craycroft had a screw loose. He might let fly at any time. We had no guarantee he’d wait until ten minutes after five. We had no guarantee of anything. The sooner we tried to neutralize him, the better-in terms of odds.
Mr. Toombes acquiesced to that line of reasoning?
Yes. But I was the one who talked him into it. If you’re looking for someone to pin the blame on.
I’m not, Captain. I’m only trying to get the facts.
You’ve got to remember, I think, that we had Adler and the FBI chief breathing down our necks, too. They wanted to blow him out of the sky regardless. The difference between our scheme and theirs was at least we were trying to insure that innocent bystanders wouldn’t get hurt.
Yes, I think the record makes that abundantly clear.
And actually there wasn’t much point holding off until the deadline. Suppose we’d waited until ten after five? What were we supposed to do? Let him drop the bombs and then go after him? It was pointless, really. We had to go after him. It was best to do it as fast as possible.
Doesn’t this contradict your earlier statement that you’d decided to wait until the last possible minute in order to feel out Craycroft’s intentions before taking action?
Maybe it does. All of us were rattled. I imagine a lot of people said and did contradictory things that day.
What changed your mind?
The passage of time. Don’t forget, we started talking about neutralizing him quite early that afternoon. At that point it would have been premature to try and shoot him down. I don’t know, maybe we should have tried to get to him before three o’clock. We never had that choice, though. We didn’t have enough time. But the five ten deadline gave us time to set things up, or at least time to try. It was a very simple proposition, actually. Craycroftwas going to do one of two things. He was going to fly away harmlessly at five ten, or he was going to bomb New York City.
And you’d been trying, as we said before, to feel out his intentions?
Absolutely. We’d been on the horn with him constantly, trying to get a rise out of him, trying to prod him into giving us a clue to his decision.
But he gave you no clues.
He gave us nothing at all. He never answered us. Once Ryterband left the bank and drove away with the money, we never heard another word out of Craycroft. I’m sure he could hear us if he wanted to, but it was quite possible he’d simply switched his receiver off. There was another transmitter aboard Ryterband’s boat, of course, and probably around four thirty or four forty-five Craycroft would be listening to pick up Ryterband’s signal that he’d made his getaway clean with the money. But between three thirty and four thirty, he had no reason to be listening to the radio. We probably were talking into a dead phone. But we did try.
Very well. Now, as to the attempt to neutralize the threat, as it was carried out in the air, you’ve indicated that the idea for the scheme came from Sergeant O’Brien and Mr. Harris and that you concurred in the plan, and you then approached Mr. Toombes with it. What was his first reaction?