The Indian government was also deeply appreciative. When I came to Delhi at the invitation of Prime Minister Singh in October 2007, the agreement was facing strong internal opposition from the Communists, who were part of the ruling coalition. There was also ideological opposition by many within the Indian elite, due to their inherent antipathy toward the United States and their fear that the agreement would compromise India’s policy of independence.
Prime Minister Singh broke with normal protocol and hosted a lunch for me at his residence, a beautiful old colonial house that was simply furnished. An extraordinarily courteous man, kind and soft-spoken, Singh had lived the first ten years of his life in a village without electricity, clean water, or a sewage system. Yet he had been educated at Oxford and Cambridge and attained a PhD in economics. As India’s finance minister in the 1990s, he was the individual most responsible for the policies that transformed his country into an open, free-market economy, with a middle class of three hundred million, a thriving technology export base, and a steady growth rate of roughly 9 percent. And still he remained humble and shy. We shared almost identical world-views. Of all the world leaders whom I came to know, Manmohan Singh is among those I most admire.
The final steps to make the U.S.-India deal practically effective began at the IAEA, where, after extensive back-and-forth discussions with India, the Board adopted the India safeguards agreement on August 1, 2008, the most extensive such agreement ever with a non-NPT state. The Nuclear Suppliers Group adopted the necessary waiver of restrictions one month later, opening the door for India to import nuclear technology. The final agreement was signed soon thereafter by Condoleezza Rice and Indian external affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee.
The Pakistanis were quite upset by the U.S.-India agreement, because they were not offered the same opportunity. Although I urged them to bide their time and then ask for a similar deal, the problem was that Pakistan’s track record was less than stellar; the activities of A. Q. Khan and his network were fresh in everyone’s mind. Still, it did not help that Bush, on a trip to Islamabad, made the somewhat pointed statement that “Pakistan and India are different countries with different needs and different histories.”[7]
It was important that Pakistan not be seen to receive different treatment because it was a Muslim country. “It would be helpful,” I told Condoleezza Rice, “if you could say that, once conditions are created, the United States could also envisage a similar agreement with Pakistan.” I pointed out that it would be a positive gesture, even without an agreement in place, to offer nuclear safety assistance to upgrade Pakistan’s aging reactor in Karachi.
Years earlier, the United States had blocked an opportunity to improve the safety of the Karachi reactor. Belgium had been ready to provide relevant equipment to Pakistan in 1999, after the IAEA certified that this equipment was needed for reactor safety, and I had written to the Belgian prime minister in support of this effort. Belgium’s offer was derailed by Washington, and I received an angry phone call from my friend Norm Wulf, the U.S. special representative for nuclear nonproliferation. Nuclear safety should not be politicized, I told him; an unsafe reactor could have disastrous consequences for everyone. Wulf answered that Pakistan could shut down the reactor if it was not safe.
This was not a serious response, because Pakistan badly needed the energy. Rather than shutting it down, they did their best to fix it themselves. The result was a less-than-optimal safety situation, which was in no one’s interest. The United States had in effect cut off everyone’s nose to spite their face. Now there was an opportunity to begin this type of interaction with Pakistan, not by offering them the equivalent of the India deal, which no one was ready to do, but in more limited ways that would have safety benefits and simultaneously begin moving them closer to partnership in the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
One of the strangest and most striking examples of nuclear hypocrisy, multilateral and multifaceted, must surely be Israel’s bombing of the Dair Alzour installation in Syria in September 2007, and the aftermath of that attack. Speculation began almost immediately that the site had housed a nuclear facility. Syria denied the accusations. Israel and the United States remained officially silent, although American officials talked anonymously on the subject to the media. I spoke out strongly, noting that any country with information indicating that the bombed facility was nuclear was under a legal obligation to report it to the IAEA. But no one came forward with such a report. For the six weeks following the bombing—the most crucial period in terms of our seeing inside the facility—we were unable to obtain any high resolution imagery from commercial satellites.
On October 28, in New York, I gave an interview on CNN’s Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer. In response to Blitzer’s question as to whether the Syrian facility was a nuclear reactor, I said we had not seen any evidence to conclude one way or the other. But I was clear on one point: that “to bomb first and then ask questions later,” as Israel had done, was deliberately undermining the system.[8] Only the IAEA, I pointed out, had the means to verify allegations of clandestine nuclear activity. In another interview, with Charlie Rose two days later, I pointed out that Israel’s 1981 attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor had only served as motivation to accelerate Saddam Hussein’s clandestine nuclear program.[9]
Israel obviously did not like the criticism. What followed was a tirade of attacks on me by Israeli officials. Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz called for me to be sacked: “The policies followed by ElBaradei endanger world peace. His irresponsible attitude of sticking his head in the sand over Iran’s nuclear programme should lead to his impeachment.”[10] The outspoken and radical Avigdor Lieberman, at the time minister for strategic affairs,[11] said I was part of the problem: “Instead of criticizing Iran, he finds it right to criticize Israel.”[12] Deputy Foreign Minister Majalli Whbee also called on me to step down, accusing me of “criminal negligence.”[13] The overt focus of these tirades was my handling of the Iran nuclear file, which did not meet their policy objectives of hyping the Iranian threat, but it was clear that my condemnation of the bombing at Dair Alzour had touched a nerve.
John Bolton was openly supportive of Israel’s action. In an interview on CNN’s Late Edition, Wolf Blitzer asked Bolton what he thought of my public assertion that Israel should have brought its “evidence” to the IAEA. “If you believe that,” Bolton retorted, “I have a bridge to sell you. The notion that Israel or the United States would put their national security in the IAEA’s hands is just delusional.”[14] To hear these sentiments coming from the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations was dreadful.
Attacks notwithstanding, the Agency remained focused on its efforts to get to the bottom of the matter. I met with Ibrahim Othman, the head of the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission. If their denials were factual, I told him, the Syrians should make a categorical public statement to that effect and should invite an Agency team to the site, just to put an end to the nuclear speculation. Othman said he would convey my proposal to the Syrian authorities. I said I also found it strange that no Arab country had made a statement denouncing the Israeli attack on Syria.
8
Transcript retrieved from CNN archives at www.archives.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0710/28/le.01.html.
9
12
“Israel Minister: ‘Apocalyptic Scenario’ If Egypt, Saudi Arabia Go Nuclear,”
14
Interview on CNN’s