In addition, the Gulf countries and Egypt had been calling for the West to exert maximum pressure on Iran. Some Arab leaders, for example, had urged Chirac to refrain from sending his foreign minister, Philippe Douste-Blazy, to Iran.
I understood that the French, the tenth-largest oil consumers in the world, wanted to protect both their friends and their interests in the Gulf.[1] But it was disheartening to hear that Arab countries were opposing diplomacy instead of taking a role in mediating the dispute. The EU’s Javier Solana passed on that he, too, was being pressed by Arab leaders not to make concessions or provide incentives to Iran.
The United States had been doing its best to fan the fear of Iran in the Gulf. But to me the actions of the Arab regimes were predominantly a sign of their impotence. For all of Tehran’s considerable faults, the Iranians were working on every front, well beyond just nuclear technology, to become more scientifically advanced, to improve their educational standards, and to assert their leadership in the region. The Arab regimes, apparently, were envious and afraid. Rather than working to catch up, to enhance their own knowledge and technology base, and to establish equilibrium across the region—or even to agree on common policies on how to deal with Iran—they were working through their Western allies to bring down the Islamic Republic.[2]
In a meeting with French foreign minister Douste-Blazy, he suggested that I go public and propose the idea of a “double-suspension” as the trigger for all parties to enter into negotiation: Iran would suspend its enrichment activities and the Security Council would suspend its sanctions. The idea was not new, in fact; it was embedded to some extent in the council’s most recent resolution. But it had gotten no traction.
I told Douste-Blazy I would be happy to make the call for a “pause” but wanted to avoid using the word suspension. The World Economic Forum in Davos, scheduled for the next week, would be a good place to unveil the initiative. “You are the only person who can do this,” Douste-Blazy said, “because you are not part of the negotiation, and also because of your status as a Nobel Peace laureate.”
This conversation was followed by a call from Sergei Kislyak, the Russian deputy minister of foreign affairs. The Russians were concerned that the Iranians no longer appeared to be talking to anyone. I floated the ideas from my talk with Douste-Blazy, and Kislyak pledged support for such a proposal. Further refinement came from talking to Ursula Plassnik, the Austrian foreign minister and a close friend, who suggested using the term time-out instead of pause. A time-out might sound a bit softer, she said, and therefore appeal more to the Iranians.
That was, in fact, the term I used in Davos, in interviews with both CNN and the BBC. I proposed that Iran take a time-out from its enrichment activities and the international community take a time-out from its implementation of sanctions. Official expressions of support followed from President Putin,[3] the Germans, and the French. The Chinese also lent their support, but they preferred to wait to air their views publicly at the March IAEA Board meeting. The Americans did not reject the proposal but simply said that the latest Security Council resolution[4] was clear on what Iran needed to do. Ali Larijani, chairman of the Iranian Parliament, called to say the Iranians needed some clarification through informal talks before formally pursuing the idea, but they were definitely interested.
While at Davos, I also ran into former president Khatami and took the time to tell him that some of Ahmadinejad’s statements—particularly about Israel and the Holocaust—were severely damaging Iran’s international image. These statements, together with uncertainty about Iran’s nuclear intentions because of inspection issues that remained unresolved, were fomenting distrust throughout the region. Khatami expressed regret about some of what we were hearing from Tehran and said he would carry back the message.
The forum was also an opportunity to meet with Swiss president Micheline Calmy-Rey and State Secretary Michael Ambühl, who were also seeking independently to bring Iran back to negotiations. For two years, I’d been working closely with Calmy-Rey and her team, sharing ideas on possible paths to compromise with Iran on its enrichment program. The Swiss were eager to see a peaceful resolution of the Iran nuclear file and since they represented the U.S. diplomatic interest in Tehran (the U.S. “interest section” in Iran is part of the Swiss embassy), they had a legitimate role to play as an intermediary.
One idea I put forward in Davos was whether Iran could simply stop feeding nuclear material into the centrifuges. This is referred to as “warm standby”: the machines continue to spin but without feedstock. I was not sure if the Americans and others would accept the proposal, which would allow me to report that Iran had suspended enrichment as requested by the Security Council and was only conducting R&D. The Swiss agreed to explore the idea with Iran.
A chaotic few weeks ensued, with a frenzied cycle of phone calls, meetings, and brainstorming sessions with various parties. I moved back and forth between Rice and others from the United States, trying to find some way for them to join the dialogue, and Larijani and other Iranians, seeking some form of suspension that would be acceptable on Iran’s domestic front.
The Swiss kept up their efforts at shuttle diplomacy. Ambühl met with Larijani in Tehran. Calmy-Rey invited Larijani to Bern. Kislyak called to say the political directors of the P-5+1 seemed supportive of “ElBaradei’s proposal,” as they called it. Mohammad Saeedi, Gholamreza Aghazadeh’s deputy, stopped by for clarification about the possible benefits of agreeing to a time-out to help convince the Iranian leadership. Sweden’s foreign minister, Carl Bildt, came to see me, as did Kim Howells, minister of state in the British Foreign Office.
Everyone wanted to get involved. Everyone wanted the same thing. But no one seemed able to find a way to talk sense into the hard-headed conservatives at opposite ends of the equation.
I reshaped the four “principles for negotiation” once again, trying to tailor them precisely to address the core concerns holding both sides back: trust, transparency, and future intentions. Now there were just three principles. First, explicit acknowledgement by all parties of Iran’s right to have the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment, with recognition that the focus of the time-out was only on the timing and modalities for exercising that right, to create a sufficient opportunity to rebuild trust in the international community regarding Iran’s intentions. Second, a commitment by Iran to working with the IAEA, in full transparency, to resolve any outstanding verification issues. And third, a commitment by both sides to work toward full normalization of relations between Iran and the West, including in the political, security, and economic fields.
I began peddling these three principles to the various diplomats working on the issue, including to Larijani. In a February meeting in Vienna, he said the principles seemed fair and should be put in writing. However, suspension, whether in the guise of a time-out or not, was in his view secondary. The primary issue was the distrust between Iran and the other parties, chiefly Europe and the United States. He cited a statement by Tony Blair made during a recent visit to the Gulf, that the West was building a coalition of moderate Arab countries against Iran.[5]
1
The French company Total SA is the fourth largest publicly traded oil producer in the world, with operations in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East.
2
The release of diplomatic cables from the WikiLeaks Web site in late 2010 pointed toward more efforts by Arab leaders behind the scenes, in which they allegedly urged the United States to conduct military strikes on Iran. See, for example, “Arab Leaders Urged U.S. to Attack Iran, WikiLeaks Says,” Mark Hennessy,
3
Putin expressed support for the proposal at the Munich Conference on Security Policy on February 10.
5
Daniel Dombey, “Blair Seeks Closer Ties with Moderate Arabs,”