On August 27, 2007, Olli called to say they had agreed on a three-month timetable for resolving all the outstanding inspection issues. To circumvent resistance by the hard-liners in Tehran, the plan used indirect or vague language on certain topics—a little too vague, for my taste as a lawyer. But we had the upper hand, in that we would be the judges of Iran’s implementation of the work plan. We also had an understanding with Larijani that he would do whatever he could to ensure a successful outcome.
Larijani called shortly after the terms of the plan were concluded and adopted by Tehran. His tone was upbeat—more so than I had heard in some time. He thanked me for the hard work of Olli and his team. That Tehran’s leadership had signed on to the work plan was obviously a victory for Larijani’s advocacy of cooperation with the Agency and rapprochement with the West. He also asked me to continue to speak out about the importance of Iran resuming negotiations with the P-5+1.
I told Larijani that the important thing now was to implement the work plan in good faith and according to schedule. Otherwise it would backfire, strengthening the arguments of those who would inevitably insist that Iran was just trying to buy time.
The Americans were quick to do just that. They belittled the importance of the work plan and nitpicked at its more awkwardly worded provisions. They cast doubt on the sincerity of Iran’s commitment. The plan made them nervous: an uptick in Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA weakened the chance of prodding China and Russia into imposing any further sanctions. Plus, if Tehran succeeding in resolving the outstanding issues about its past and present nuclear program, the Security Council’s demand for Iran to suspend uranium enrichment would lose any logical basis.
A full-on blitzkrieg ensued in the media. The Washington Post published an editorial entitled “Rogue Regulator.”
ElBaradei has made it clear he considers himself above his position as a UN civil servant. Rather than carry out the policy of the Security Council or the IAEA board, for which he nominally works, Mr. ElBaradei behaves as if he were independent of them, free to ignore their decisions and to use his agency to thwart their leading members—above all the United States.[12]
It went on to accuse me of “freelancing,” and condemned the IAEA for “striking its own deal with the Iranian regime.”
The Economist was also criticaclass="underline"
ElBaradei is using the deal with Iran to intervene directly in the policy debate, rather than limiting himself to an impartial look at the safeguards facts. Mr. ElBaradei may think he is making space for diplomacy. But easing the squeeze on Iran may well make it harder to find a diplomatic solution.[13]
Predictably, the Jerusalem Post took the attack one step further, with quotes such as “ElBaradei is a man of dubious integrity” and “ElBaradei has been Iran’s primary international defender” and even “ElBaradei has used his power to facilitate the proliferation of nuclear energy for military purposes.”[14] A columnist in Al-Hayat, one of the leading newspapers in the Arab world, charged that I was acting in defiance of the Security Council resolutions, trying to give Iran a way to avoid additional sanctions and perfect its technology. Even the New York Times took a shot, in a lengthy profile that portrayed me as somewhere between “everyone’s best hope” and “drunk with the power of [the] Nobel.”[15] One journalist thought that the Times article had characterized me as a “dictatorial loon.”[16]
In Vienna, the Americans reportedly gave their irritation more concrete expression. Abdul Minty, the South African ambassador, said he had heard from a journalist that the Americans were planning to orchestrate a campaign with the Board for a vote of no confidence in me for exceeding my mandate. The journalist had in his notes the names of twenty countries the Americans had targeted to lobby for their support. I was told that the media had received this information from Chris Ford, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for arms control. In any case, after the rumor reached the Associated Press,[17] the U.S. Mission publicly denied that any such campaign was under way.
There was a great deal of irony to these attacks. It was not new for me to be castigated for speaking or acting beyond my brief. On most such previous occasions, the accusation came in response to my calls for more rapid progress on disarmament or my comments on the limited value of Security Council sanctions as a stand-alone diplomatic strategy. This time I was accused of freelancing for attempting to implement the IAEA’s core verification mission. As early as August we were able to report progress to the Board due to the work plan: a number of nuclear verification issues had been resolved, because Iran had provided long-sought information. But this success was condemned. The truth was that the Americans wanted only to portray Iran as a noncooperative pariah state, in violation of its international obligations and therefore deserving continued punishment. My reports were getting in the way of the Americans’ preferred course of action.
For anyone who cared to see, the cards were now on the table. The hard-liners in the West were not concerned with clearing up these outstanding issues. Their focus was denying Iran technology through isolation, confrontational rhetoric, and ideological games. That might have been their business, but it was not mine. And I would not stand idly by while extremists planted the seeds for another devastating war in the Middle East.
The willingness of the press to be manipulated was particularly worrisome. Some of the key phrases used to criticize the Agency were repeated in the mainstream U.S. media, making me wonder whether the American government was behind an orchestrated campaign. I was reminded of the period leading up to the Iraq War. I found it interesting that, in all the analysis, there was not one substantive refutation of the policies or steps I had endorsed. The arguments were focused on casting doubt on my character and motivations.
I hit back. I gave several interviews making it clear that the IAEA had not seen any undeclared facilities in Iran nor any weaponization activities. Therefore, I said, in our assessment Iran did not constitute a clear and present danger requiring any kind of action beyond diplomacy. What was needed across the Middle East was more “soft power”: education, intercultural dialogue, good governance, and development. Any use of force, I declared, would turn the Middle East into a ball of fire.
Negotiations with the P-5+1, meanwhile, were going nowhere. Despite Larijani’s efforts to get back to “prenegotiations,” Solana was blocked by the Americans from continuing. He told Larijani they could meet after the work plan was completed. On the other hand, the Russians and the Chinese told the other members of the P-5+1 that they would not support another set of sanctions. So the only game in town, for the moment, was the IAEA’s work with the Iranians on the outstanding issues.
During the September Board meeting, I had an advance view of the EU-3’s planned statement. It was quite negative. It omitted, pointedly, the customary expression of support for the Agency and its Director General as impartial and professional. I knew the French had been trying to delete this phrase for the last couple of Board meetings. This time they had managed to do it. I decided the best response was to walk out during the delivery of their speech, which I did. My seemingly simple act was widely reported in the media. The effect was to send a message to the rest of the Europeans that they should resist being lured into imprudent behavior by one or two countries inside the European Union, in this case, France.[18]
12
“Rogue Regulator: Mohamed ElBaradei Pursues a Separate Peace with Iran,”
15
Elaine Sciolino and William J. Broad, “An Indispensable Irritant to Iran and Its Foes,”
16
Katrina vanden Heuvel, “Proponent of Diplomatic Solution for Iran Smeared by White House,”
17
“IAEA Chief ElBaradei Being Pressured on Iran—Diplomats,” Associated Press, September 9, 2007.
18
In fact, it was not uncommon for me to hear other members of the European Union express private resentment of the “big three”—France, the United Kingdom, and Germany—and particularly the first two. The other European countries seldom felt they were genuinely consulted on what were nonetheless characterized as joint political stances on Iran. In particular, some viewed the United Kingdom as a sort of U.S. Trojan horse inside the European Union.