An article in Haaretz, the Israeli daily, made much the same claims.[7] An editorial the same day said that I had, for years, intentionally downplayed evidence of Iran’s nuclear program “by using vague language and barely comprehensible jargon intending more to conceal than to reveal.” It also implied that Olli and I were in sharp disagreement over whether such information should be published:
It is no secret that Heinonen does not see eye to eye with his boss. There have been many cases in which he would have preferred the reports to use clear, unequivocal language, and he has said so periodically. But like any good diplomat, he accepts ElBaradei’s decisions, even if with gritted teeth.[8]
At the crux of these accusations was the willingness, on the part of Israel and the West, to treat allegations as fact. The alleged studies were, in truth, an unprecedented challenge for the Agency. We were equipped to verify operations involving the use of nuclear material, where we could establish the facts through measurements and environmental sampling. We did not have the tools or expertise, however, to verify the authenticity of documents.
The second part of the media accusations, what the Associated Press called the “secret IAEA summary,” referred to an internal analysis, a rolling text compiled by the Agency’s Department of Safeguards that included all the various pieces of information that had come in from different intelligence organizations, most of which IAEA inspectors had been unable to verify or authenticate. As such, by definition it was a series of best guesses, as if to say, “If all these claims were true, what would they mean?” It was not something that Olli Heinonen, head of the safeguards department, had assessed, signed off on, or even suggested for inclusion in my Board reports. Nor had it been vetted by relevant IAEA offices responsible for other dimensions of safeguards verification—legal and policy aspects, for example.
Providing this kind of preliminary analysis to the Board would have gone against every principle of due process and would have lent an aura of credibility to unverified accusations. The key missing ingredient—for which we had been pressing for months—was the ability to corroborate the allegations. The critical information on which the analysis was based was all paperwork. We had no “green salt” to examine, no components to inventory or trace, no high explosives tunnels or missile reentry vehicles to measure or inspect.
Absurdly, we were limited with regard to what documentation we were permitted to show Iran. I constantly pressed the source of the information to allow us to share copies with Iran. How can I accuse a person, I asked, without revealing the accusations against him? The intelligence crowd refused, continuing to say they needed to protect their sources and methods.
Iran, for its part, continued to dismiss most of the allegations as fabrications. Since the Iranians’ cooperation on the work plan had been rewarded with yet more Security Council sanctions, their cooperation on the alleged weaponization studies had been minimal. Their predicament, they said, was that proving the studies were unrelated to nuclear activities would expose a great deal about their conventional weaponry, particularly their missile program. They suspected this was what some of the inspectors were after. The inspectors, of course, rebuffed this line of reasoning.
Was this really the reason for the Iranians’ reticence? Or were they intent on hiding something because the timing was not right for a confession? Or was it a combination of both? I could not tell. It was undeniably frustrating to be caught in the middle, unable to get to the bottom of the issue. I continued to press both sides, but no one was budging.
In the late summer of 2009, the Israelis provided the IAEA with documents of their own, purportedly showing that Iran had continued with nuclear weapon studies until at least 2007. Unlike with the U.S. intelligence, the Israelis said we could share these documents with Iran, with no restrictions about protecting their sources. The Agency’s technical experts, however, raised numerous questions about the documents’ authenticity, and we sent Israel a list of questions.[9]
From what I could tell, Israel’s purpose in bringing these allegations to the IAEA was threefold. First, they wanted to contradict the conclusion of the December 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, which said that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, but they could not publicly undermine the United States, so the IAEA was the most credible secondary vehicle. Second, they wanted to exert pressure on China and Russia to agree to tighten the sanctions on Iran. Third, and most worrisome, they wanted to create the impression that Iran presented an imminent threat, perhaps preparing the grounds for the use of force.[10]
This was the background for the September Board meeting. A few days ahead of the meeting, Bernard Kouchner took a shot at me, telling journalists that I had documents in my possession, “annexes” to the Iran report showing Tehran was working to develop nuclear weapons.[11] He was referring, of course, to the IAEA internal analysis.
My opening speech to the Board addressed the issue head on. These dismaying accusations made by Member States and fed to the media were baseless and politically motivated. I was clear that “All information made available to the Agency relevant to Iran’s nuclear programme which has been critically assessed by the Agency in accordance with its standard practices has been brought to the attention of the Board.” In effect, I said, the allegations were attempts to influence the Secretariat and undermine its objectivity and independence.
The French tried to have the last word, asserting that some information had been presented by the Agency in a technical briefing that was not reflected in the report.
I threw down a direct challenge: “Here are the people who supplied the information available to us,” I declared. “If any of you have any information that we have not shared with the Board, please step up right now, or forever hold your peace.” No one responded.
I could not understand for the life of me, I said, how any information that might have been presented at a technical briefing with 150 Member States present could be regarded as “withheld.” I then focused on our limitations in authenticating the alleged weaponization studies. If all the documents provided to us were authentic, I said, choosing my words carefully, then there was a high probability that Iran had engaged in nuclear weaponization studies. “But I have to underline this if three times,” I stressed, “and that is why we are stuck.”
It was something of a relief that, the day after this unpleasant confrontation, the Board conferred on me the title of Director General Emeritus. The tone shifted entirely, and for me this was a deeply moving experience. There were tributes from forty-one speakers in all. Together they represented the entire membership of the Agency. I will always remember two tributes in particular: “We are here to honor honor,” the Cuban ambassador said, quoting the poet Alphonse de Lamartine; while the Brazilian ambassador said I had “used the power of argument, and not the argument of power.”
7
Barak Ravid, “Sources: UN Watchdog Hiding Evidence on Iran Nuclear Program,”
8
Yossi Melman, “Israel, U.S. Lost Faith in IAEA Long Ago,”
9
The accuracy of these accusations has never been verified; however, it is significant that the conclusions of the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate were not changed, indicating that they, at least, did not buy the “evidence” put forward by Israel.
10
In January 2011, the outgoing Mossad chief Meir Dagan said he did not believe that Iran would have a nuclear weapon for at least another four years. Yossi Melman, “Outgoing Mossad Chief: Iran Won’t Have Nuclear Capability Before 2015,”
11
“France Accuses UN Watchdog of Hiding Iran Nuclear Evidence,” Agence France-Presse, September 3, 2009.