Stories about the IAEA’s “secret annex” of information did not entirely disappear. A September Associated Press article referred to copies of this supposedly secret analysis.[12] And in October, the U.S.-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) published a paper on its Web site that included short excerpts from the document.[13] Clearly either the document had leaked—and there were only six people within the Department of Safeguards who had access to it—or it had been obtained via someone hacking the Agency’s computers.
More important, however, was that a chance for a dramatic breakthrough with Iran had been unfolding behind the scenes.
It had started a few months back, with a request from Tehran for IAEA support in getting a new fuel core for its research reactor, which was used to produce radioisotopes for medical purposes. The enrichment level needed for the reactor was 20 percent, significantly higher than the 4–5 percent enrichment needed for power reactors and higher than the level Iran had set for itself at Natanz. The old fuel core had been imported, but Iran was now under sanctions, so the request was a hot potato: while it was perfectly legal for the Agency to support a Member State in getting fuel for a facility under safeguards, Iran was currently in violation of Security Council resolutions.
To test the water, I decided to have Vilmos Cserveny share Iran’s request with only two countries at first: Russia and the United States, using their representatives in Vienna. I asked Vilmos to explain the delicacy of the situation. If Iran were denied a fuel core from abroad, it would have every justification to proceed with higher-level enrichment at home to satisfy its own fuel needs. Finding a way to help Iran secure nuclear fuel for this legitimate use could send a positive signal.
A proposal put together by the United States and Russia was brought to the IAEA in early September. The proposal supported Iran’s request, but with a twist: Tehran would receive a research reactor core that would run on fuel converted from Iran’s newly accumulated stockpile of low-enriched uranium. The LEU would be sent abroad, converted into fuel in Russia and France, and then returned to Iran in the desired form of a research reactor core. The United States would provide political and financial support.
It was ingenious. After all that had passed, an opening had been found for the United States to elegantly reengage with Iran. By removing most of the accumulated LEU from Iran, tension over Iran’s uranium enrichment would be defused, or at least postponed. Iran would be demonstrating that its enrichment program was being applied to peaceful purposes. The international community would receive reassurance that Iran’s LEU stockpile was not being reserved for or channeled toward nuclear weapons. Diplomacy would at last get its foot in the door.
Then, on September 12, 2009, I received a call from President Obama. He began by graciously saying that he admired my work and believed we shared a vision on many issues. He wanted personally to invite me to speak at the UN Security Council Summit on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament, where he would be presiding as president of the council.
I was elated by the invitation and of course accepted. The conversation then shifted to Iran. Obama said he was committed to addressing the concerns about Iran’s nuclear program while respecting fully Iran’s rights under the NPT. The fuel proposal, which, he added, also had Israel’s support, would be a way to defuse the current crisis and gain time for diplomacy and negotiation.
When I had learned that President Obama was going to call, I had touched base with Ali Salehi, who had replaced Aghazadeh as the vice president of Iran and the head of its Atomic Energy Organization.[14] I had asked Salehi whether the Iranian leadership wanted to convey anything to Obama. A message had come back from Ahmadinejad saying that he was “ready to engage in bilateral negotiations, without conditions and on the basis of mutual respect.” There were additional details, related to Iran’s willingness to help in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
I now passed these messages along and gave Obama my view that the United States should focus as soon as possible on the bilateral track, rather than reaching out purely through the mechanism of the P-5+1. Obama listened and thanked me for my advice.
The next day, I invited Salehi and the Iranian ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh to my home for a briefing. Vilmos Cserveny was also present. I gave the Iranians a copy of the U.S.-Russia fuel proposal and explained its multiple benefits. Iran would be using its own LEU for its own reactor fuel—an implicit recognition of Iran’s right to enrich. The United States would be sending a strong signal of its readiness to help Iran in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. And Iran was not being asked to stop or suspend its enrichment; on the contrary, this proposal would help defuse the enrichment standoff and provide time for negotiation.
On the other hand, if Iran refused the proposal, I said, it would raise concerns. They now had a significant quantity of LEU. Why would they refuse to use it for their own research reactor?
Salehi smiled as he read the paper. “This is a very smart proposal,” he said. “I wonder, would they give us yellowcake in return?” He asked this rhetorically, not really directing the question at me.[15] He also mused that the Iranians could be independently clever by enriching their own uranium to 20 percent and then manufacturing their own fuel. “But we will not do that,” he added quickly. He knew that such a move would inflame the issue. He was clearly intrigued and, from what I could tell, trying to consider all the possibilities at once.
“You should not look at this only as a technical proposal,” I told Salehi. “It is that, but it is also a political gesture that could open the door for negotiation.”
Salehi agreed, saying he would wait to answer until after he returned to Tehran. Worried about getting a negative answer over the phone, he wanted to explain the proposal in detail, in person, to Ahmadinejad. The atmosphere in Tehran, according to Salehi, remained tense.
I recalled that a senior Iranian official had recently told me in confidence that a power shift had taken place in Tehran. Ahmadinejad had challenged Ayatollah Khamenei on a number of fronts. While Khamenei remained the Supreme Leader in the public view, Ahmadinejad had really taken charge of the executive power.
The good news, from my perspective, was that Salehi had direct access to the Iranian president. I knew Salehi well, and as a former ambassador to the IAEA and graduate of MIT, he was sophisticated both in his technical background and his cross-cultural diplomatic skills. He knew Iran’s nuclear issues intimately. While an absolute loyalist to Iran, he was also determined to find a solution to the nuclear issues. From what I was told, his appointment to the vice presidency had been a surprise, since he had worked closely with Rafsanjani and Khatami before Ahmadinejad’s rise to power and was considered part of the liberal faction.
If ever there was to be a breakthrough, I thought, now was the time. With Obama and his team in the White House and Salehi acting as chief nuclear negotiator, both sides were genuinely interested in rapprochement. Ahmadinejad was the wild card. The constant flux in Iranian domestic politics meant that he would remain sensitive to every perceived slight. And the passing of the Bush administration did not mean that neoconservative ideology had gone away to die. Its advocates would still do their best to wreak havoc on any deal.
But at least, I thought, we finally stood a fighting chance.
News of the first wrench being thrown into the works came from French ambassador Florence Mangin. At the IAEA General Conference she told me that France agreed to fabricate the fuel for Iran after Russia would enrich it to 19.5 percent. But she said that because of its relevance to the sanctions, the fuel proposal should go to the Security Council and be woven into the political framework of the P-5+1’s deliberations. I groaned inwardly but said nothing. The approach was excessively legalistic, sure to gum up the process.
12
George Jahn, “Nuke Agency Says Iran Can Make a Bomb,” Associated Press, September 17, 2009.
13
“Excerpts from Internal IAEA Document on Alleged Iranian Nuclear Weaponization,” ISIS, October 2, 2009. Retrieved at www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_info_3October2009.pdf.
14
I was told that Aghazadeh had resigned because he was apparently quite close to Mousavi, Ahmadinejad’s primary opponent in the 2009 presidential elections. Salehi was later appointed as foreign minister in December 2010.
15
The Iranians were always on the lookout for ways to increase their stock of natural uranium, since they had very little of their own, and it was unlikely that anyone would sell them more under the current circumstances.