Joaquín Aguirre Bellver, ‘Al galope’, El Alcázar, 2.12.1980, reprinted in El ejército calla, Madrid, Ediciones Santafé, 1981, pp. 129–130. On the various political operations mentioned, see for example Xavier Domingo, ‘Areilza aspira a la Moncloa’, Cambio 16, no. 456, 31.8.1980, pp. 19–21; Miguel Ángel Aguilar, ‘Sectores financieros, militares y eclesiásticos proponen un “Gobierno de gestión” con Osorio’, El País, 27.11.1980; José Oneto, ‘La otra Operación’, Cambio 16, no. 470, 1.12.1980, p. 21.
Pilar Urbano, ABC, 3.12.1980.
Fernando Latorre, under the pseudonym Merlín, in his usual section ‘Las Brujas’, Heraldo Español, 7.8.1980. Fernando de Santiago, ‘Situación límite’, El Alcázar, 8.2.1981. Antonio Izquierdo, under the pseudonym Telémetro, ‘La guerra de las galaxias’, El Alcázar, 24.1.1981. The three artícles by Almendros, all published in El Alcázar, were: ‘Análisis político del momento militar’, 17.12.1980; ‘La hora de las otras instituciones’, 22.1.1981; and ‘La decisión del mando supremo’, 1.2.1981. Footnote See Manuel Fraga, En busca del tiempo servido, p. 232. Information on the police informant’s report can be found in Prieto and Barbería, El enigma del Elefante, p. 233. The article from Spic is reproduced by Pilar Urbano, in Con la venia. ., p. 363.
Emilio Romero, ‘Las tertulias de Madrid’, ABC, 31.1.81.
Francisco Medina, 23-F, la verdad, Barcelona, Plaza y Janés, 2006, pp. 89–117. Armada, Al servicio de la Corona, p. 92. The suspicions of connivence between Anson and Armada actually began to circulate immediately after the coup; see José Luis Gutiérrez, ‘Armada & Ansón’, Diario 16, 2.3.1981. As for Armada’s government, see footnote to p. 286. On the relationship between Suárez and Anson, see Gregorio Morán, Adolfo Suárez, pp. 40–42, 189, 297–298 and 305–306, and Luis María Anson, Don Juan, Barcelona, Plaza y Janés, 1994, p. 403.
‘. . his diaries of the time abound in notes about dinners. .’ See Manuel Fraga, En busca del tiempo servido, pp. 225–226 (22 November: ‘I’ve received reliable information that General Armada would be prepared to lead a government of national unity’) or 231 (3 February: ‘Political lunch during which the importance of Armada’s promotion [to Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff] was emphasized; several pushing him as “the solution”’). Juan de Arespacochaga, Carta a unos capitanes, Madrid, CYAN, 1994, pp. 274–275. Fraga is quoted in Juan Blanco, 23-F. Crónica fiel. ., p. 135.
‘. . it’s very likely that the nuncio and some bishops were informed. .’ Juan de Arespacochaga claims that they were in Carta a unos capitanes, p. 274. See also, for example, Cernuda, Jáuregui and Menéndez, 23-F. La conjura de los necios, p. 191; or Palacios, El golpe del CESID, p. 385.
Armada’s version of his interview with Múgica is in Al servicio de la Corona, p. 224; Múgica’s version is in El Socialista, 11–17 March 1981, and in El País, 13.3.1981. Armada states that he notified his Captain General, who in turn informed the Zarzuela, and the Palace told Suárez: see Prieto and Barbería, El enigma del Elefante, p. 92. Some time later Múgica told Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo that at the meeting in Lérida Armada explained his idea of a government of unity and that, when the general wondered who might lead it, Raventós interrupted: ‘Who’s going to lead it? You are.’ Calvo Sotelo interviewed by Rosa Montero, in Santos Juliá et al, eds., Memoria de la transición, p. 522. As for the Socialists’ contacts with the leaders of the minority parties — specifically the PNV and Convergència i Unió — see Prieto and Barbería, El enigma del Elefante, pp. 93–96, or Antxon Sarasqueta, De Franco a Felipe, Barcelona, Plaza y Janés, 1984, p. 137. The interview between Jordi Pujol and a member of PSOE is reported by Andreu Farràs and Pere Cullell in El 23-F a Catalunya, Barcelona, Planeta, 1998, pp. 53–54. On the rumours of another no-confidence motion by the PSOE and its plans to enter an interim government, see section 10 of this same chapter and ‘. . because at that time the leaders of the PSOE often discussed the role the Army. .’ One example: on 9 January Múgica gave a speech at the Club Siglo XXI in the presence of leading right and centrist politicians involved in different operations against the Prime Minister — Alfonso Osorio and Miguel Herrero de Miñón among others; according to Miguel Ángel Aguilar’s write-up for El País, the Socialist leader ‘described the conditions that would have to exist for legitimately constituted power to find itself obliged to call on its armies to maintain individual rights and the security of the state’; he also ‘made a constitutional excursion to article 116, which deals with the proclamation of the state of siege and the guarantees that should apply’.
Alfonso Guerra cited in Abella, Adolfo Suárez, p. 421.
‘. . it perhaps hastens the departure from the government of Deputy Prime Minister Abril Martorell. .’ Relations between Suárez and Abril, however, had already deteriorated seriously by that point, and it’s likely that Suárez would soon have replaced his Deputy Prime Minister in any case; see Abella, Adolfo Suárez, pp. 432–434; Luis Herrero, Los que le llamábamos Adolfo, p. 196; and Julia Navarro, Nosotros, la transición, Madrid, Temas de Hoy, 1995, p. 17. Miguel Herrero de Miñón’s article is called ‘Sí, pero. .’, El País, 18.9.1980, reprinted in Memorias de estío, pp. 211–213.
‘. . in the middle of January the rumours that have been circulating with variable intensity since the summer proliferate. .’ See for example articles by Fernando Reinlein and Abel Hernández, in Diario 16 and Ya respectively, published on 24 January. Reinlein writes: ‘The far-right offensive against the democratic institutions can back up a soft alternative regression [. .] A few days ago in political circles Diario 16 was told that two involutional alternatives were being assessed, one “soft” and the other “hard” [. .] According to these sources, the second hypothesis being ruled out as not very viable and unnecessary, the first may still be alive in the minds of many.’ Hernández is undoubtedly alluding to this latter alternative when he states that, ‘according to reliable sources’, the hypothesis of a government of national unity or salvation or ‘authority’ with a soldier in charge is being strongly considered (‘and, according to these sources, they have one already prepared’), a government formed basically of centrists and Socialists; according to Hernández, ‘it seems beyond doubt that senior military officers have held and are holding conversations with prominent Socialist leaders, as well as those from the centre and other parties’ with a view to a manoeuvre that, as the journalist describes it, seems to resemble the soft coup: ‘All the sources consulted insist they’re not talking about an actual military coup, but a very well-planned attempt to bring order to the situation precisely to avoid a military coup. According to prominent politicians who are involved in the conversations, the “operation” is inevitable and is practically finalized’ (Five days after this article Hernández reports again on the pressures to form a government of salvation in ‘La tregua’, Ya, 29.1.1981). That Suárez knew that General Armada was at the forefront of this operation is confirmed by, for example, Fernando Álvarez de Miranda — one of the Christian Democrat leaders in the UCD most critical of the Prime Minister — who held a long conversation with him around that time: ‘I told him again, finally, that, in my opinion, the situation was very bad, that the warning lights had been flashing for democracy for a while now and that, not having an absolute majority in Parliament, he should seek a coalition with the opposition party. He looked at me sadly, saying: “Yes, I know full well they all want my head and that’s the message even from the Socialists: a coalition government, led by a soldier — General Armada. I won’t bow to such pressure even if it means me leaving Moncloa in a coffin”’; Del ‘contubernio’ al consenso, p. 145. (Also in Paul Preston, Juan Carlos: A People’s King, p. 451.) As for the rumours of a no-confidence vote, years after his resignation Suárez said to Luis Herrero — a personal friend of his and son of his political mentor Fernando Herrero Tejedor — ‘I discovered there was a conspiracy at the heart of the parliamentary group to make me lose a no-confidence vote, the second in a few months, which the PSOE was about to table. Several UCD deputies had already stamped their signatures on it and the papers were kept in a safe’; Los que le llamábamos Adolfo, p. 213. Furthermore, Miguel Herrero de Miñón admits that they initiated procedures to table the no-confidence motion. See Prieto and Barbería, El enigma del Elefante, p. 116.