Norbanus and Saxa had marched across Macedonia unopposed, and took up a position east of Philippi, trying to block the narrow passes; but the much larger force of Brutus and Cassius outflanked them, and reached Philippi at the beginning of September. Norbanus and Saxa fell back upon Amphipolis, where they linked with the main army under Antony: Octavian, weakened by illness, was following some way behind. Brutus and Cassius then occupied a strong position across the Via Egnatia. Within a few days Antony came up and boldly camped only a mile distant, in a much weaker position in the plain. Octavian, still sick, joined him ten days later. Despite the strength of their position, the Liberators at first sought to avoid a battle. They controlled the sea, the triumvirs' land communications to Macedonia and Thessaly were exposed, and Antony and Octavian would find it difficult to maintain a long campaign. But Antony's deft operations and earthworks soon began to threaten the Liberators' left, and Cassius and Brutus decided to
11 Plut. Brut. 32.4.
accept battle. There was not much difference in strength between the two sides: the triumviral legions had perhaps nearly 100,000 infantry, the Liberators something over 70,000; but the Liberators were the stronger in cavalry, with 20,000 against 13,000.[8]
Cassius commanded the left, Brutus the right, facing Antony and Octavian respectively. The battle began on Cassius' wing, as Antony stormed one of his fortifications. Then Brutus' troops charged, apparently without orders; but they were highly successful, cutting to pieces three of Octavian's legions and even capturing the enemy camp. Cassius fared much worse: Antony's personal gallantry played an important part, it seems, and he in turn captured Cassius' camp. In the dust and the confusion Cassius despaired too soon, and in ignorance of Brutus' victory he killed himself. So ended this first battle of Philippi (early October 42). On the same day (or so it was said) the Liberators won a great naval victory in the Adriatic, as Murcus and Ahenobarbus destroyed two legions of triumviral reinforcements.
Then there were three weeks of inaction. The first battle had done nothing to ease the triumviral problems of supply, and Antony was forced to detach a whole legion to march to Greece for provisions. But Brutus was under pressure from his own army to fight again; he was a less respected general than Cassius, and after the first battle he feared desertions; and he also soon found his own line of supplies from the sea threatened, for Antony and Octavian occupied new positions in the south. He felt forced to accept a second battle (23 October). His own wing may again have won some success, but eventually all his lines broke. The carnage was very great; and Brutus too took his own life. With him died the republican cause. Several of the surviving nobles also killed themselves, some were executed, others obtained pardon; a few fled to Murcus, Ahenobarbus, or Sextus Pompeius. Most of the troops came over to the triumvirs.[9]
Antony had long been known as a military man, but until now his record was not especially lustrous. His wing had played little part at Pharsalus, he had been absent from most of Caesar's other battles, and the outcome at Mutina had been shameful. All that was now erased. Octavian had given little to this victory; he had indeed been absent from the first battle — hiding in the marsh, and not even his friends could deny it.14 Before the fighting the forces had appeared equally matched: it was Antony's operations that forced the battles, his valour that won the day. He took the glory and the prestige. Now and for years to come, the world saw Antony as the victor of Philippi.
iii. the east, 42-40 b.c.
Antony's strength was reflected in the new division of responsibility and power. His task would be the organization of the East; he was also to retain Further Gaul, and take Narbonensis from Lepidus; he would lose only the Cisalpina, which was to become part of Italy. Italy itself was nominally left out of the reckoning, but Octavian was to be the man on the spot, with the arduous and unpopular task of settling the veterans in the Italian cities. He was also to carry on the war against Sextus Pompeius; he would retain Sardinia; and he too was to gain at Lepidus' expense, taking from him both provinces of Spain. Lepidus himself would be allowed only Africa; and there was some doubt even about that.15 Already, clearly, he was falling behind his colleagues. Antony was also to keep the greater part of the legions. A large number of the troops in the East had served their time, and were to be demobilized; the rest, including those who had just come over from Brutus and Cassius, were to be re-formed into eleven legions. Antony was to take six of these, Octavian five; he was also to lend Antony a further two. The position concerning the western legions is more obscure, but there too Antony's marshals seem to have controlled about as many legions as Octavian.[10]Antony promised that Calenus would transfer to Octavian two legions in Italy to compensate for the two he was now borrowing: but such promises readily foundered. The legions stayed with Calenus.
In Antony's lifetime two generals had successfully invaded Italy from their provinces, Sulla from the East and Caesar from Gaul. Both Gaul and the East would now fall to Antony. The menace was clear. The case of Gaul is particularly interesting. So much of the fighting and diplomacy of the last two years had been, in one way or another, a struggle for Gauclass="underline" and the province's strategic importance was very clear.[11] With hindsight, we always associate Antony with the East; Octavian's propaganda was to make great play with his oriental degeneracy. But nothing suggests that Antony yet planned any extended stay in the East. Naturally, he eyed its riches and prestige; he might of course have to play Sulla over again; but it was just as likely that he would return peaceably, as Pompey had returned in the sixties, to new power and authority in the West. In that case, and in the likely event of the triumvirs eventually falling out, Gaul would prove vital. Its governor would be Calenus, with eleven legions: Antony could rely on him. And, even if the Cisalpina were technically part of Italy, that too would not be out of Antony's controclass="underline" Pollio was to be there, and he too had veterans under his command. The trusty Ventidius would also be active in the West, perhaps in Gaul, perhaps in Italy.[12] In the event Antony's possession of Gaul came to nothing, for Octavian took it over bloodlessly on Calenus' death in 40. It was that important historical accident that would turn Antony decisively towards the East. But, for the moment, possession of Gaul kept all his important options free.
The East came first. Its regulation would be a massive task, but a rewarding one; and it also offered the possibility of a war against Parthia. King Orodes had helped Cassius and Brutus,[13] and vengeance was in order; indeed, the republican commander Labienus was still at the Parthian court. No one yet knew what to expect of that; but, whether or not Parthia attacked Roman Asia Minor again, a Roman general could always attack Parthia, avenging Crassus' defeat, tickling the Roman imagination and enhancing his own prestige. He might even appear a second Alexander, if all went welclass="underline" that always had a particular appeal to Roman fancy.
Antony spent the winter of 42/1 in Greece, where he made a parade of his philhellenism.[14] In spring 41 he crossed to Asia; it seems that he visited Bithynia, and presumably Pontus too, before returning to the Aegean coast.[15] At Ephesus, effectively Asia's capital, he was greeted as a god — such acclamations were by now almost routine in the East;[16] but exuberance soon turned sour, as Antony addressed representatives of the Asian cities and announced his financial demands. Yet again, the East found it had to fund both sides in a Roman civil war: and this time vast sums were needed to satisfy the legions — perhaps 15 0,000 talents if all the promised rewards were to be paid.[17] That was well beyond even the East's resources, especially after the exactions of Dolabella, then Cassius and Brutus. Antony eventually demanded nine years' tribute from Asia, to be paid over two years;[18] and he would be fortunate if the province could manage that. Asia's normal tribute was probably less than 2,000 talents a year.[19] Even allowing for contributions from the other eastern provinces and for extra sums from client kings and free cities,26 Antony could scarcely hope for more than 20,000 talents, the amount which Sulla raised in a similar levy after the Mithridatic War. And not all of that could be spent on rewards. There were the running costs of Antony's army and staff; there was a fleet to build, for Murcus, Ahenobarbus and Sextus were still worryingly strong;27 there were preparations to be made for war with Parthia. The troops were still calling for their rewards a year later.28