One of the most widely circulated post-July days indictments of the Bolsheviks was written by the famous old populist Vladimir Burtsev. Notorious years earlier for his relentless pursuit of police spies in revolutionary organizations, Burtsev was, in 1917, an ultranationalist close in political outlook to Plekhanov. On July 6, in an open letter subsequently printed in many Petrograd papers, he joined the onslaught against the Bolsheviks. As to whether or not Lenin was a German agent, Burtsev commented: "Among the Bolsheviks, provocateurs and German agents have played and continue to play a great role. In regard to the Bolshevik leaders about whom we are now asked, we can say: No, they are not provocateurs. . . . [But] thanks to them—to Lenin, Zinoviev, Trotsky, etc.— during those damnable days, July 3, 4, and 5, William II achieved what he had previously only dreamed about. ... In those days Lenin and his comrades cost us no less than a major plague or cholera epidemic."5
Rech\ the organ of the Kadets, was relatively cautious in its treatment of the Aleksinsky-Pankratov accusations. While affirming the principle that the Bolsheviks ought not to be judged guilty until the charges against them had been proven, writers for Rech\ in their insistence on strong measures against the left, tacitly accepted the validity of the charges.6 A front-page account of the scandal in the right Menshevik Den' on July 6 was similarly circumspect.
It bears recording that, unlike Edinstvo and Den\ several moderate socialist papers in Petrograd (Izvestiia, Golos soldata, and Volia naroda, for instance) heeded the admonitions of the Central Executive Committee to refrain from commenting, directly or indirectly, on the merits of the treason charges against Lenin and his followers. This provided the party scant relief, however. For with the lone exception of Maxim Gorky's Novaia zhizn\ the entire socialist press rejected Bolshevik claims that the July movement had been spontaneous and called for decisive measures to deal with extremism as insistently as did liberal and rightist papers.
Typical of anti-Bolshevik editorials appearing in moderate socialist papers in the aftermath of the July days was one in Izvestiia, the main organ of the Central Executive Committee, on July 6:
According to Pravda, the goals of the July 3-4 demonstrations have been achieved. [In reality] what did the demonstrations and the Bolsheviks (the official leaders of the demonstrations) accomplish? They [the demonstrations] caused the deaths of four hundred workers, soldiers, sailors, women, and children. . . . They resulted in the wrecking and looting of private apartments [and] stores. . . . They brought about a weakening of our forces at the front. . . . They engendered dissension, . . . shattering united revolutionary action, which is the main source of the revolution's strength. . . . During July 3-4 the revolution was dealt a terrible blow. ... If this defeat is not fatal for the entire revolutionary cause, the disorganizing tactics of the Bolsheviks will be least responsible for this.
A similarly hostile editorial, "To the Pillory," appeared in Golos soldata, a military-oriented organ of the Central Executive Committee, on July 6. "Gentlemen fr om Pravda" observed its author. "You could not have been unaware of what your appeals for a 'peaceful demonstration' would lead to. . . . You slandered the government; you lied and cast aspersions on the Mensheviks, SRs, and soviets; you created panic, frightening people with the specter of the still unreal danger of the Black Hundreds. . . . And now, according to the custom of all cowards, you are covering your tracks, hiding the truth from your readers and followers." A day earlier, a writer for the right SR paper Volia naroda had declared emphatically: "The Bolsheviks are openly acting contrary to the will of the revolutionary democracy. The revolutionary democracy [i.e., the socialist parties, soviets, trade unions, cooperatives, etc.] has enough power to force everyone to obey its will. It must do this. ... In these feverish days, any procrastination might prove fatal."
The Provisional Government had contemplated the use of force to suppress militant leftist groups for the first time after the April crisis. During the late spring and early summer, mounting pressure for such action had been exerted by the military high command and by conservative and liberal political circles thoroughly alarmed by expanding anarchy at home as well as by apparent chaos among soldiers at the front. Prior to the July days, however, the government's capacity to move against the extreme left was limited by its lack of authority among the Petrograd masses and by the reluctance of many deputies in the central Soviet organs to countenance repression so long as any hope remained that such measures could be avoided.7
The July uprising strengthened the determination of the government to take whatever action was necessary to prevent similar outbreaks in the future; at the same time, a number of factors militated against the Soviet's continued opposition to the application of force against the left. For one thing, as we shall see, the July experience triggered an indiscriminate reaction against all leftist groups, moderate socialists included, thus putting the Soviet, as well as the Bolsheviks, on the defensive. Of course, the capacity of the Soviet leadership to influence the government's behavior was closely related to the authority that the Soviet enjoyed among the masses. Following the July uprising, workers, sailors, and soldiers in the capital were confused and dispirited. Whom they would follow in the future remained to be seen, but in the short run the Soviet's power base was, at best, uncertain. Meanwhile, troops dispatched from the front to the capital provided the government, at long last, with a sizable military force upon which it could depend.
Further decreasing the likelihood that the Soviet would interfere in the Provisional Government's adoption of repressive measures was the fact that the events of July 3-5 persuaded heretofore wavering Soviet deputies of the need to act quickly and decisively to restore order and, in this connection, to take a firm stand against the Bolsheviks. While reluctantly acknowledging the necessity of repression, most moderate socialists did not give up striving for reform and immediate peace. They insisted that repression be kept to a minimum, and, most important, that "exceptional measures" be taken only against individuals accused of specific crimes, not against "whole groups." In contrast to the liberals, the Mensheviks and SRs were genuinely alarmed by the danger that the reactionary wave following the July days posed for the revolution. But their response to the threat of counterrevolution (like their earlier response to attacks from the extreme left) was to rally more closely behind the government and to insist on coalition with the liberal parties.
It is ironic that the Soviet leadership had become most receptive to closer cooperation with the government at a time when the latter was in a shambles. It will be recalled that three Kadet ministers withdrew from the cabinet on the night of July 2. They were followed into retirement three days later by Pereverzev, who resigned in the wake of criticism of his unauthorized release of the Aleksinsky-Pankratov documents. Prince Lvov himself left the government on July 7 after socialist ministers presented him with a list of "general principles" intended as the basis of a political program for a new coalition. Modeled after proposals for reform adopted by the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets, these principles were simply too radical for Lvov. Unable to accept them, he resigned. The remaining cabinet members now named Kerensky acting prime minister and entrusted him with the formation of a new government.