Simultaneously, most of the measures rejected by Lvov were incorporated into a "Declaration of Principles" released for publication in the cabinet's name on July 8. Among other things, this declaration pledged the government to arrange an Allied conference in August for the purpose of working out the details of a compromise peace proposal, and to take all steps necessary to insure that elections to the Constituent Assembly would be held on September 7. The declaration acknowledged the importance of adopting, "at the earliest possible moment," local government reforms based on the principle of universal, direct, and secret suffrage, and promised the abolition of estates and of civil ranks and orders. Moreover, it pledged the government to the preparation of an overall plan for regulating the national economy and to the immediate passage of meaningful labor legislation. Finally, it committed the government to the preparation, for submission to the Constituent Assembly, of a basic land reform program transferring all land into the hands of the peasantry (to judge by Lvov's statements to the press at the time, this endorsement of revolutionary changes in landholding w as w hat disturbed him most of all). In deference to the liberals, the declaration made no reference to the dissolution of the Duma and the State Council, or to the immediate declaration of a republic—two demands that had been endorsed by the Congress of Soviets and that were included in the original list of principles drawn up by the socialist ministers.8
As the price of their participation in a new7 coalition, the Kadets now demanded that the government disavow the declaration of July 8. Confident that the bulk of the population shared their view that the July days had discredited the moderate socialists along with the Bolsheviks, and consequently that a propitious moment for the reestablishment of order and the preeminence of the government had finally arrived, the Kadets were adamant in demanding that in the future socialist ministers maintain complete independence from the Soviet. In internal affairs they insisted that the government abjure consideration of any further social reforms (in keeping with this position they demanded that Chernov be replaced as minister of agriculture because of his role in facilitating land reform); moreover, they called for an end to pluralism in governmental authority, i.e., to the political and administrative authority of soviets and committees. On the war issue, the Kadets insisted that the government be guided by the principle of total commitment to the Allies and that it take all steps necessary to reestablish traditional military discipline and to build a strong army. Negotiations aimed at somehow squaring these demands with the declaration of July 8 were naturally tortured and acrimonious; while they dragged on, Russia, more than ever, was without effective national leadership.9
Meanwhile, the initially successful offensive at the front had been turned into a most terrible rout of the Russian armies by the Germans, who launched a massive, devastating counterattack against the Russian Eleventh Army on the southwestern front. Boris Savinkov, government commissar for the southwestern front, now telegraphed Petrograd:
The German offensive ... is developing into an unprecedented disaster. . . . Most units are in a state of rapidly spreading disintegration.
There can be no talk of authority or discipline. . . . Some units are withdrawing from their positions on their own, without even waiting for the enemy to approach. There were cases when orders for immediate reinforcements were debated in meetings for hours, with the result that these reinforcements were as much as a day late. . . . Long columns of deserters stretch for hundreds of versts [a verst equals six-tenths of a mile] to the rear. . . . Let the entire country know the truth of what is happening here.10
Even before receipt of this oppressive news, the All-Russian Executive Committees had gathered in joint session on the night of July 7-8 to discuss the latest developments, the most important being the behavior of the Bolsheviks, the sudden explosion of counterrevolutionary sentiment, and the breakup of the cabinet. This meeting culminated in the passage of a resolution that characterized the July movement as "an adventurous, abortive armed uprising" by "anarcho-Bolshevik elements." While stressing that "exceptional measures" could be taken only against individuals, this resolution explicitly recognized the responsibility of the government to assure the protection of revolutionary freedoms and the maintenance of order. At the same time, it strongly endorsed immediate passage of the reform legislation called for by the Congress of Soviets.11
For most moderate socialists, word of the debacle at the front appeared to reinforce strongly the need for the creation of a representative national government powerful enough to halt expanding anarchy. A joint emergency meeting of the All-Russian Executive Committees was hurriedly convened late on the night of July 9-10, soon after the situation at the front became known. Here, bitterness toward the Bolsheviks for subverting the policies of the Soviet majority, as well as support for the creation of a strong revolutionary dictatorship, reached a new peak; a succession of speakers lashed out at the Bolsheviks for, among other things, precipitating an assault on the Soviet during the July days, being responsible for the conditions that had triggered counterrevolutionary activity, and, perhaps worst of all, contributing mightily to the collapse of the armed forces.
The influential Menshevik Fedor Dan spoke for the entire moderate socialist bloc on this occasion. A physician by profession and, along with Lenin, a veteran of the first major social democratic organization established in St. Petersburg, among Menshevik leaders in 1917 Dan was slightly left of center. After the abortive June 10 demonstration, for example, he had strongly opposed Tsereteli on the question of applying sanctions against the Bolsheviks and their followers, believing that the Bolshevik threat was exaggerated and that precipitous action against the extreme left would only undermine further the position of the government and strengthen Lenin's hand. Now, his usually mild face taut with anger, dressed in a shapeless military surgeon's uniform, he proposed that, in view of the prevailing civil and military emergency, the Provisional Government immediately be proclaimed a "government to save the revolution," and, moreover, that it be vested with comprehensive powers to restore organization and discipline in the army, wage a decisive struggle against any and all manifestations of counterrevolution and anarchy, and promulgate the reform program embodied in the cabinet declaration of July 8. The Executive Committees subsequently adopted a resolution to this effect by an overwhelming vote.12 "Let the government crush all anarchical outbursts and all attempts to destroy the gains of the revolution with an iron hand," declared a proclamation announcing this decision to the Russian public. "Let [the government] carry out all those measures required by the revolution."13
It is worth noting that the Menshevik-Internationalists and Left SRs (the extreme left groups within the Menshevik and SR camps), not to speak of the Bolsheviks, did not support the political resolution passed by the All- Russian Executive Committees on July 9, in effect a blank check for a government whose makeup and program were at this point completely unclear.
Bearded, frail Iulii Martov, his voice hoarse from endless speech-making, pince-nez drooping slightly on his nose, spoke for the Menshevik- Internationalists. The son of a russified, liberally inclined Jewish intellectual, Martov, in his mid-forties in 1917, had been propelled into the revolutionary movement by the injustices of Jewish life in tsarist Russia, by the fiercely repressive environment and virulent anti-Semitism he experienced in school, and by progressive ideas and "forbidden books" which he first encountered at home. Already a committed social democrat in the early 1890s and revered among his associates for his intellect, personal courage, high principles, and honesty, Martov had broken with Lenin, earlier a close friend and collaborator, at the time of the Bolshevik-Menshevik split in 1903. From then on he had been the Mensheviks' most prestigious and widely respected political figure. Following the outbreak of World War I, Martov had led the fight of Menshevik "internationalists" for an immediate, negotiated, compromise peace. Upon returning to Russia from exile abroad in early May 1917, he opposed the established Menshevik policies of limited support for the war and of participation in the government and headed a largely independent internationalist faction within the loosely structured Menshevik organization. Convinced that continued coalition government would lead to the destruction of the revolution, at the height of the July days Martov came out for the formation of an all-socialist government "capable of moving the revolution forward." Now, slightly less than a week later, he insisted emotionally that the Soviet's program for saving the country could not be realized if there were enemies on the left.