Lenin learned of the warrant for his arrest and of the search at Elizarova's at the apartment of Sergei Alliluev (Stalin's future father-in-law), Lenin's fifth hiding-place in three days.42 As he moved from hideout to hideout, Lenin weighed the pros and cons of surrender. Within his immediate entourage, opinion on the proper course to follow was sharply divided. Apparently, Kamenev, Trotsky, Lunacharsky, and Viktor Nogin, along with a significant number of Moscow Bolsheviks, felt that the Soviet could be relied on to assure Lenin's personal safety, and that under the Soviet's protection he would receive a fair and open trial which could be used as a forum for exposing the rottenness of the existing regime. They consequently urged that Lenin submit to the authorities.43
Several Petrograd party leaders, whose overriding concern seems to have been the negative impact of Lenin's flight on factory workers and soldiers, were of like mind. Volodarsky expressed this view during an intraparty debate over the issue of Lenin's appearance in court: "This question is just not as simple as it seems. Up to now we have been able to capitalize on all developments. The masses have understood us. But in this thing [Lenin's going underground] they don't."44 Dmitrii Manuilsky, who, like Volodarsky, had particularly close ties to workers and soldiers, commented: "The question of Lenin and Zinoviev appearing for trial can't be looked at exclusively from the point of view of their personal safety. It is necessary to consider the problem from the perspective of the interests of the revolution and the interests and dignity of the party. We are forced to deal with the masses and can all observe the trump the bourgeoisie will play when the subject of our comrades ducking trial arises. . . . We must make a Dreyfus case out of the proceedings against Lenin."
According to the Bolshevik trade union leader Alexander Shliapnikov, the friendly advice of many comrades that Lenin submit to trial greatly upset Lenin's sister Maria, who favored her brother's attempting to reach Sweden.45 Many other Bolshevik leaders, a majority of those participating in the Sixth Party Congress, which met in Petrograd at the end of July, also feared for Lenin's safety in the event that he turned himself in. They contended that the proceedings against Lenin were part of a plot by the party's class enemies to destroy the Bolsheviks and that in the prevailing climate Lenin could not receive a fair trial, indeed, that he would probably be assassinated before his case reached court. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the July days these leaders urged that Lenin go into hiding. Subsequently, amid a storm of criticism from both inside and outside the party, they staunchly defended Lenin's behavior. As late as the end of July, Stalin occupied a middle position in this argument, contending that Lenin and Zinoviev ought not turn themselves in while the political situation was still fluid, but implying that the two should submit if a government with some degree of integrity was established that would guarantee Lenin's safety.46
At the outset, Lenin apparently leaned toward submission to the authorities.47 On the afternoon of July 7 he dashed off a note protesting the search of his sister's apartment and expressing his readiness to present himself for arrest if his detention was sanctioned by the Central Executive Committee.48 Sergei Ordzhonikidze, a long-time Georgian Bolshevik recently arrived in Petrograd, and Nogin were sent to the Taurida Palace with this message and with oral instructions to negotiate the terms of Lenin's imprisonment. They were to obtain from V. A. Anisimov, an official of the Bureau of the Central Executive Committee, ironclad guarantees of Lenin's safety and the promise of a quick, fair trial. The two met with Anisimov later that afternoon. While unable to give any absolute guarantees, Anisimov evidently assured them that the Soviet would do what it could to protect Lenin's rights. According to Ordzhonikidze, after this weak response even Nogin was uneasy about Lenin's fate were he to turn himself in.49
These apprehensions were immediately conveyed to Lenin. At the same time, Lenin also learned of the All-Russian Executive Committees' decision to abort their inquiry into the July days, and this information appears to have had a bearing on his thinking. At any rate, on July 8 Lenin made a firm decision not to surrender. In a letter that he now prepared for publication he explained:
We have changed our plan to submit to the government because ... it is clear that the case regarding the espionage of Lenin and others has been intentionally constructed by the forces of counterrevolution. ... At this time there can be no guarantee of a fair trial. The Central Executive Committee . . . formed a commission to look into the espionage charges and under pressure from the counterrevolution this commission has been dissolved. . . . To turn ourselves in to the authorities now would be to put ourselves into the hands of the Miliukovs, Aleksinskys, Pereverzevs —that is, into the hands of dyed-in-the-wool counterrevolutionaries for whom the charges against us are nothing more than an episode in the civil war.50
On July 9, under cover of darkness, Lenin left the Alliluevs and, together with Zinoviev, fled to the village of Razliv near the small resort town of Sestroretsk, on the Gulf of Finland twenty miles northwest of the capital.51 Lenin remained there until August 9, when he moved to Finland. At first he and Zinoviev ensconced themselves in the loft of a barn on the property of a Sestroretsk factory worker and long-time Bolshevik, Nikolai Emelianov. But since there was some danger of being spotted in this refuge by curious villagers, the fugitives soon moved to an isolated straw hut on the bank of a neighboring lake. Years later Zinoviev remembered that one day he and Lenin were frightened by the sound of gunfire nearby. As the two hid in some bushes, Lenin whispered, "The only thing left now is to die properly."52 The shots, it turned out, had been fired by passing hunters. By and large, such unnerving incidents were not repeated. Until rain and cold made their hut uninhabitable in August, attacks by mosquitoes were the fugitives' greatest logistical problem. At Razliv Lenin rested, swam, and went for long walks. According to Alexander Shotman, who, along with Eino Rakhia and Ordzhonikidze, maintained communications between Lenin and the party leadership in Petrograd, Lenin was most of all concerned with receiving up-to-date newspapers from Petrograd. He pounced on each fresh batch of papers as soon as it arrived. Seated on the grass, he would mark up the papers and begin scribbling comments in his notebooks. During this period Lenin wrote regularly for the Bolshevik press, prepared pamphlets and draft resolutions for consideration by his colleagues in Petrograd (most importantly for an expanded Central Committee meeting on July 13 and 14 and for the Sixth Congress), and worked on a major theoretical treatise, The State and Revolution.53
Throughout this time criticism of Lenin's behavior and speculation in the press concerning his whereabouts continued. On July 7 Zhivoe slovo triumphantly headlined the erroneous news that Lenin had fallen into government hands, having been caught during the raid on the Kshesinskaia mansion. The same day, Petrogradskaia gazeta, not to be outdone, supplied its readers with further details. Basing its report on information from Mathilde Kshesinskaia's lawyer, who had rushed to inspect his client's home as soon as it was liberated, the paper revealed that some soldiers from the Volynsky Regiment had recognized Lenin, who was trying to pass as a sailor.
On July 13 Lenin's flight was the center of attention at a meeting of the All-Russian Executive Committees.54 Coming in the wake of news of still more disasters at the front and increasingly unrestrained activity on the part of rightist organizations hostile to the revolution, this meeting quickly turned into yet another public demonstration of the Soviet's commitment to the Provisional Government and its hostility toward the Bolsheviks. More a political rally than a business session, the meeting began with Kerensky, just back from another trip to the front, delivering an impassioned plea for the Soviet's support and for a decisive break with Bolshevism. This was Kerensky's first appearance in the Taurida Palace since his accession to the post of prime minister, and the galleries were packed for the occasion. Waves of applause greeted the prime minister's appeal, as well as Chkheidze's response: uNo sacrifice is too great for the defense of the revolution!" According to news accounts, Kerensky sprang from his chair at this point and embraced Chkheidze. Applause and shouts of "Long live the republic!" and "Three cheers for the motherland!" reverberated in the hall.