As soon as he could be heard above the noise, Fedor Dan rushed forward to speak. "We have already done what Kerensky asks us to do," he declared. "Not only have we delegated full support to the Provisional Government, we insist that the government make use of its power." Dan now proposed a bluntly worded majority-socialist-sponsored resolution accusing the Bolsheviks of crimes against the people and the revolution. The resolution branded Lenin's evasion of arrest "absolutely intolerable," insisted that the Bolshevik fraction initiate a discussion of its leaders' behavior, and provided for the suspension from membership in the Executive Committees of all persons under indictment. In vain Nogin protested. "You are being asked to adopt a resolution regarding the Bolsheviks before they have been tried," he warned. "You are asked to place outside the law the leaders of the fraction that prepared the revolution together with you." Dan's resolution carried by an overwhelming margin, and as the meeting went on, the condemnation of the Bolsheviks became even harsher. To roars of approval and stormy applause from the floor and the gallery, A. A. Bulat, a Trudovik,55 delivered an emotional speech attacking remarks in defense of the Bolsheviks made by the trade union official David Riazanov moments earlier. Riazanov had drawn a parallel between the Provisional Government's demands for Lenin and the tsarist government's insistence, in June 1907, that the Duma cooperate in placing members of its Social Democratic Party fraction under arrest. Turning first to Tsereteli and then to members of the Bolshevik fraction, Bulat declaimed: "You have the gall to make such an analogy! . . . [You say] now the demand is for Lenin, then it was for Tsereteli. . . . Let me compare how Tsereteli acted then with how Lenin is behaving now. On this very platform Tsereteli came forward and declared for all to hear: We stand for an end to the present regime, for the destruction of the tsarist system, and for the creation of a democratic republic. . . . How is Lenin behaving? The only thing to say to him is 'gutless Lenin!' "
Reports of this sensational meeting appeared in the press on July 14, and on that day as well Petrogradskaia gazeta had some fresh news regarding Lenin's location. "Lenin Tracks Found!" proclaimed its headline. "The hiding-place in which Lenin is staying has been definitely established. . . . Lenin fled to Kronstadt through Lisy Nos."56 The next day Zhivoe slovo disclosed that summer residents in Lisy Nos had seen a man resembling Lenin in sailor's clothes get out of a big car and board a cutter bound for Kronstadt on July 5. "At the present moment Lenin is in Stockholm," announced Gazeta-kopeika on July 15, quoting "an absolutely impeccable source." On July 15 Birzhevye vedomosti, citing "semi-official sources," maintained that Lenin had indeed been in Stockholm. However, with the help of the German ambassador to Sweden and the "not unknown Ganetsky- Furstenberg," he had already resettled in Germany. Finally, on August 8 Zhivoe slovo revealed that information placing Lenin in Germany had been planted by the Bolsheviks themselves to throw authorities off the track. "Lenin is actually only a few hours from Petrograd, in Finland," explained the report with somewhat greater accuracy. "Even his house number is known. But making an arrest won't be easy. . . . Lenin has a powerful, highly armed bodyguard."
Reading such farfetched reports in his hut at Razliv, Lenin often became convulsed with laughter.57 But for the most part, during the remainder of July and the beginning of August the Petrograd newspapers must have been anything but pleasant reading. Maria Sulimova, a Bolshevik staff worker
Cartoon from Petrogradskaia gazeta, July 8, 1917, headed "Lenin in the Role of Nicholas II." The caption reads: "On the streets of Petrograd 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 July. Lenin: 'I don't mind spilling Russian blood ... so long as there's gold jingling in my pockets.' " (An exact copy, redrawn for this volume.)
with whom Lenin stayed on July 6, recalls that when she brought Lenin up to date on the news, he reflected: "You, comrade Sulimova, they might arrest. But me, they will hang." Lenin expressed similar apprehension in a note he scribbled to Kamenev: "Entre nousy if they do me in, please publish my notebook, 'Marxism and the State.' "58
The memoirs of Shotman and Zinoviev provide valuable glimpses into Lenin's state of mind during this period. Shotman remembered that for a time Lenin exaggerated the scope and impact of the reaction and was pessimistic about the short-term prospects for revolution in Russia. There was no use talking further about a Constituent Assembly, Lenin felt, because the "victors" would not convene it; the party ought therefore to marshal what strength it had left and go underground "seriously and for a long time." The dismal reports that Shotman initially passed to Lenin in Razliv reinforced these convictions; it was several weeks before the news began to improve.59
Lenin's pessimism in the wake of the July days is confirmed by Zinoviev. Writing in the late twenties, he recalled that at the time Lenin assumed that a longer and deeper period of reaction lay ahead than actually turned out to be the case.
Even socialist newspapers were full of outlandish stories about the conspiracy of July 3-5 and about Lenin himself. Such a sea of lies and slander was never thrown at any other man in the world. Lenin's espionage, his connections with the German General Staff, his receipt of funds, etc., were the subjects of articles, poems, and cartoons. It is difficult to transmit
the feeling we experienced when it became clear that the "Dreyfus" case was a reality, that lies and slander were being spread in millions of copies and circulated to every village, to every workshop. . . . But although the lies kept snowballing, there was no way to respond. The enemy became ever more insolent and inventive. . . . Already the slander had spread to the far corners of the country and throughout the world. . . . These were dark, difficult days.60
PETROGRAD DURING THE REACTION
T
he great contrast between the political atmosphere prevailing in Petrograd before the July crisis and the dominant mood in its aftermath was nowhere more evident than in an event of otherwise minor importance—the government-sponsored funeral of seven cossacks killed fighting insurgents at the height of the July days.1
Saturday, July 15, was the day designated by the Provisional Government to pay tribute to the slain cossacks; several days before, government officials, the central Soviet organs, the Provisional Committee of the State Duma, and the Petrograd City Duma (municipal council) began working to stimulate public interest in the event, viewed by its sponsors as yet another means of further discrediting the Bolsheviks and demonstrating support for law and order. On behalf of the City Duma, Grigorii Shreider, the mayor of Petrograd, appealed to "all those loyal to the revolution and all those infused with its spirit" to pay homage to the fallen cossacks. Meanwhile, the Central Executive Committee directed that every factory in the capital appoint a thirty-man delegation to participate in the funeral. Fearing a repetition of the June 18 fiasco, the committee ordered workers not to carry banners or placards.