Initially, Stalin's views on the development of the revolution corresponded closely to those of Kamenev, but after Lenin's return to Russia he swung sharply leftward. By the middle of June he could be counted among the ultramilitants within the Bolshevik leadership. (As a gesture of protest against cancellation of the June 10 demonstration he, along with Smilga, submitted his resignation to the Central Committee; it was subsequently rejected.)
The honor of representing the Central Committee at the Second City Conference was a mixed blessing for Stalin since, as was soon apparent, the views embodied in the Central Committee conference resolution described above did not fully represent his own thinking. His task was further complicated by the fact that some delegates were already aware of and sympathetic to Lenin's views on the prevailing situation and the appropriate course for the party, and anxious that they be given a hearing. In these circumstances, Stalin adopted an ambiguous, sometimes contradictory, middle-of-the road tactical stance, unsatisfactory to practically everyone.
Thus in his main report, "On the Current Moment," using words that might have been borrowed from Lenin, Stalin announced that the peaceful period in the development of the revolution had ended, that the counterrevolution had emerged triumphant in the wake of the July days, and that the Central Executive Committee had aided and abetted this development and was now powerless. In amplifying these statements, however, Stalin differed with Lenin in defining "the triumph of the counterrevolution"; he also departed from Lenin in his views on the nature and condition of the Provisional Government, the character and attitudes of the petty bourgeoisie, the significance of the July experience for the development of the revolution, and the prospects for the immediate future. According to Stalin, the Provisional Government was greatly influenced, but certainly not controlled, by the counterrevolution. The petty bourgeoisie still wavered between "the Bolsheviks and the Kadets." The political crisis of which the July days was a part had not ended. The country was engulfed in a period of "sharp conflicts, clashes, and collisions" during which the immediate goal of workers and soldiers would remain the exclusion of capitalists from government and the creation of a "petty bourgeois and proletarian democracy." In this situation, Stalin further explained, the main job of the party would be to urge "restraint, fortitude, and organization on the masses," to rebuild and strengthen Bolshevik organizations, and "not to neglect [activity in] legal institutions."32
In short, while Lenin called on the party to break decisively with more moderate political groups and to point the masses toward an armed seizure of power independently of the soviets, Stalin's main emphasis was on the need for restraint and consolidation. Yet if in this sense his ideas were less than satisfactory to those sympathetic to Lenin's views, Stalin's statements regarding the triumph of the counterrrevolution and the powerlessness of the Central Executive Committee, as well as his assertion that the immediate course of the revolution was bound to be violent, were understandably vexing to people sharing the outlook of the Central Committee conference majority. Moreover, Second City Conference delegates across the board were apparently troubled by Stalin's failure to discuss the future of the soviets (the foremost question on everyone's mind) and by his relatively passive view of the party's future political role among the masses.
This predominantly negative reaction to Stalin's remarks was revealed during the heated debate that followed the speech. Taking part in this argument were, among others, S. D. Maslovsky, Vasilii Ivanov, Moisei Kharitonov, Gavril Veinberg, Viacheslav Molotov, Anton Slutsky, and Maximilian Saveliev. Maslovsky began the discussion by inquiring to what extent the party ought to promote conflicts with the government and whether it would assume direction of armed protests in the future. To this Stalin replied noncommittally, "We can expect that these actions will be armed, and we must be ready for anything." Ivanov then asked what the party's attitude was toward the slogan "All Power to the Soviets," implying that the slogan had reached a dead end. Pinned down, Stalin answered that from now on "we speak the language of the class struggle—all power to the workers and poorer peasants, who will pursue revolutionary politics."33
Kharitonov, a long-time Bolshevik and former emigre, criticized Stalin for not touching on the international situation as it affected the development of the revolution in Russia. "We have been saying that if there is no revolution in the West our cause is lost," he declared. "Well, the West European revolution did not come to our aid in time, and our revolution could not expand further." Nonetheless, Kharitonov was not without optimism for the future. Scoffing at Stalin's suggestion that the counterrevolution was victorious in Petrograd, he insisted that from the time of the February revolution there had been a gradual shift of power to the soviets, which would continue. "There were moments when we had to fear the dispersal of the soviets," he said, referring to the days immediately preceding. "But this time has definitely passed." He added: "Without the soviets our bourgeoisie would not be able to retain power for more than a few days."34
When his turn to speak came, Volodarsky seconded Kharitonov's contention that Stalin exaggerated the strength of the counterrevolution. "People who claim the counterrevolution is victorious are making judgments about the masses on the basis of their leaders," he explained, with both Stalin and Lenin in mind. "While the [top Menshevik-SR] leaders are shifting right- ward, the masses are moving leftward. Kerensky, Tsereteli, and Avksentiev are caliphs for an hour. . . . The petty bourgeoisie will swing to our side. Bearing this in mind, it is clear that the slogan 'All Power to the Soviets' is not obsolete,""he concluded. Added Veinberg: "The present government won't be able to do a thing about the economic crisis; the soviets and political parties will swing leftward. The majority of the democracy is grouped around the soviets and so rejecting the slogan 'All Power to the Soviets' can have very harmful consequences."35
Among those now venturing opinions on "the current moment," Molotov, Saveliev, and Slutsky came closest to expressing Lenin's sentiments. Molotov insisted that before the latest events "the soviets could have taken power without violence had they desired to do so. . . . They didn't. [Instead] the developments of July 3 and 4 impelled the soviets on a counterrevolutionary course. . . . Power has slipped out of the hands of the Soviet into the hands of the bourgeoisie. We can't fight for soviets that have betrayed the proletariat. Our only solution lies in the struggle of the proletariat accompanied by those strata of the peasantry capable of following
For his part, Slutsky chastised Volodarsky for shutting his eyes to the counterrevolution's great success. "If we think of the term counterrevolution as meaning transfer of power to a specific group, a change in which the group previously in power can't get it back," he explained, "then what we are witnessing is plainly the trimph of the counterrevolution." Obviously not completely familiar with Lenin's thinking, however, he added that "no one is suggesting that we should simply throw away the 'All Power to the Soviets' slogan like worthless rubbish."
"At a time when the workers' revolution is expanding and the soviets are struggling against it," contended Saveliev, "the slogan 'All Power to the Soviets' just sows confusion." "We have two choices," he declared. "Either we expand the revolution or we stop. The party of the proletariat cannot stop. The winner will be up to history. The revolution goes on, and we are headed for the final assault."36