Nonetheless, with the possible exception of the Vyborg District Soviet, it appears that none of these soviets were effectively controlled by the Bolsheviks. The Mensheviks and SRs, more accurately their Menshevik- Internationalist and Left SR offshoots, retained influence in most district soviets at least until the late fall of 1917, and even those local soviets in which the Bolsheviks had majorities preserved their essentially democratic character. In early August a Menshevik-Internationalist, Alexander Gorin, was elected chairman of the Interdistrict Conference. Under his direction a compatible coalition of Bolsheviks, Menshevik-Internationalists, and Left SRs steered the assembly along an independent, revolutionary course.64
The protocols and resolutions of the Petrograd district soviets lend support to the idea that immediately after the July days anti-Bolshevik feeling on the part of workers and soldiers in some areas of the capital ran high. On July 13, for instance, the Okhtinsky District Soviet, located on the right bank of the Neva, adopted a resolution endorsing the condemnation of the Bolsheviks and the unqualified pledge of support to the government that the All-Russian Executive Committees had issued a few days earlier.65 At about the same time, the highly independent Rozhdestvensky District Soviet, just across the river, passed a resolution declaring that the events of July 3 and 4 "force the whole conscious organized revolutionary democracy to fear for the fate of the Russian revolution. An irresponsible minority, injecting the uneducated masses with slogans abhorrent to the representatives of the all-Russian democracy, is unconsciously but definitely leading us to civil war. . . . We declare that responsibility for the bloodshed on the streets of Petrograd on July 3-4 falls completely on those irresponsible persons and parties who consciously or unconsciously continually pursued politics that disorganized the force of the revolution."66
Apparently, only the consistently militant Vyborg District Soviet attempted to buck the tide at this juncture, publicly continuing to call for transfer of power to the soviets and attempting to defuse criticism of the Bolsheviks. For example, on July 7, the day the All-Russian Executive Committees first endorsed repressions by the government, the Vyborg District Soviet defiantly insisted that the effective solution of the government crisis, the regulation of the shattered economy, and the promulgation of reforms were dependent on the transfer of power to the soviets.67
What the relevant documents indicate most clearly is that in the aftermath of the July uprising, most district soviets were not interested in either condemning or defending the Bolsheviks. Their primary concern was with such matters as the government's effort to disarm workers and to transfer radicalized soldiers from the capital, the reinstitution of capital punishment at the front, the apparently indiscriminate attacks on the left, and the resurgence of the extreme right. Each of these developments was perceived by almost every district soviet as a serious threat to the revolution.
The Interdistrict Conference met for the first time in a month and a half on July 17, partly to discuss the question of whether or not district soviets should cooperate with the government in the campaign to confiscate arms from the population. This meeting opened with appeals by soldiers from the front that the deputies endorse this campaign in the interest of national defense. The soldiers added that they were all dedicated to defending the revolution and hence that their demands ought not to be interpreted as hostile to workers. In response, a highly skeptical deputy observed diplomatically that while workers might be willing to trust the composite detachment that had just arrived from the front, there was no way of predicting what might happen tomorrow. Workers had no assurance that someone else might not take advantage of their helplessness. "Entire caches of arms are still in the hands of the Black Hundreds and nothing is being done about it," another deputy interjected angrily at this point. Someone else then suggested that while workers might be prevailed upon to turn in machine guns, bombs, and perhaps even rifles, under no circumstances would they part with their revolvers. Ultimately, the conference effectively evaded cooperation with the government and for all intents and purposes thwarted any significant coordinated effort by district soviets to help disarm workers by voting to leave the matter up to the discretion of each district soviet.68
A few district soviets subsequently agreed to help disarm workers. On July 28, for example, after listening to a plea for aid in procuring arms by a Don Cossack, the Admiralty District Soviet passed a resolution declaring that military weapons were completely unnecessary for personal defense and that in view of the government's frequent appeals, retaining them was a crime against liberty and the Russian army.69 However, there were almost no factories and few workers in the Admiralty District, an area in central Petrograd with numerous military-administrative agencies and army barracks. District soviets in heavily working-class sections of the city, reflecting the mood of their constituencies, tended to view with the greatest suspicion the efforts of the government to confiscate weapons.
Thus on July 20, after listening to some front representatives and discussing the arms question at length, the relatively moderate Petrograd District Soviet, while endorsing the turning in of rifles and machine guns, declared firmly that the confiscation of revolvers and sidearms would be considered "a counterrevolutionary assault on the working class" which it would be necessary to oppose by every possible means.70 When the Peterhof District Soviet considered the question of disarming workers on July 29, deputies protested that it was not the workers who should be disarmed but "the counterrevolutionary and hooligan elements that have been shooting from rooftops and windows of houses . . . and that have come out openly and brazenly against the revolution and its triumphs."71 Obviously, the government would get little help from the Peterhof Soviet in taking arms from workers. As nearly as one can tell, this was the position of all but a few district soviets.
The Provisional Government's restoration of the death penalty met with similar hostility from the district soviets. Typifying their response to this step was the following declaration by the Rozhdestvensky District Soviet, in which the Bolsheviks were still a small minority:
One of the dearest victories of the Great Russian Revolution, the abolition of capital punishment, has been eliminated by a stroke of the Provisional Government's pen. ... In the name of "saving the revolution," military courts knowing only one sentence, execution, will be convened.
And soldiers designated for the roles of executioners will hurriedly drag their worried sick, condemned comrades, tormented by three years of slaughter . . . into an isolated corner and shoot them like dogs for no other reason than because they were unwilling to selflessly sacrifice their lives for their class enemies. . . .
The result is a gross absurdity: a free country has eliminated the death penalty for high-ranking criminals, all those Nikolais, Sukhomlinovs, Shturmers, Prokopovichs, etc. [the last three were former tsarist ministers] but retains it for soldiers oppressed by three years of senseless carnage. . . .
It is a crime to kill tormented and desperate people, crazed by recognition of the futility of their suffering and unable to see the end of this endless war. It is a crime to be silent about this reactionary, impulsive step by the Provisional Government against one of the most priceless triumphs of the revolution. . . .
Down with Capital Punishment!
Down with Legalized Murder!
Long Live the Revolutionary International!72