As at the Second City Conference, arguments relating to the current political situation in general and the Stalin resolution in particular centered chiefly on the seminal issue of the practical future of the soviets, heretofore the focal point of every delegate's political activity and hopes.14 Konstantin Iurenev, a close associate of Trotsky, began the debate by asking skeptically: "Up to now we have been consolidating our forces around one organ—the soviets; in what form are we to consolidate our forces now?" Iurenev also wondered why the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" was necessarily inappropriate for a violent stage in the revolution. The Stalin resolution proposed, he concluded, "that we adopt a course that would be disastrous for our revolutionary gains. ... If we adopt it, we will be headed in the direction of isolating the proletariat from the peasantry and the broad masses of the population. . . . Paragraphs eight to ten must be drastically revised."15
Volodarsky rushed to the speaker's platform after Iurenev had stepped down. "They tell us that since the peaceful period of the revolution has ended, the slogan 'All Power to the Soviets' is outdated. Is this really so?" he demanded, "Do we need to maintain the slogan 'All Power to the Soviets' in the same form as before July 3-5? Certainly not! But you can't throw out the baby with the bath water. We must simply modify our slogan 'All Power to the Soviets' roughly as follows: 'All power to the proletariat, supported by the poorer peasantry and revolutionary democracy organized in the soviets of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies.' "16
Alesha Dzhaparidze, leader of the Bolshevik organization in Baku who had been elected a candidate member of the Central Committee the previous day, spoke out in the same vein. At the time of the July days the Bolsheviks had been making significant strides in building support in the Baku Soviet, and Dzhaparidze was critical of Stalin for, as he put it, "equating soviets [in the provinces] with the Central Executive Committee." "If earlier the provincial soviets expressed the Central Executive Committee's views, they don't now," he said. "While we are living through a period of counterrevolution we must fight for the soviets and, as revolutionary defenders of the idea of [rule by] the soviets, we will acquire commanding importance in them."17
"After July 4 there was a change in the tactics of the proletarian party," Manuilsky pointed out. The party "found it necessary to shift from offense to the defense of positions won in the revolution. With this disadvantageous correlation of forces, to introduce maximalist slogans, as the left wing of our party is now doing, is to adopt tactics of desperation. Fixing mistrust upon the soviets, we risk facilitating their eviction from the Taurida Palace and the Smolny Institute. We have to recognize that in Russia 90 percent of the population is petty bourgeois, and consequently tactics which isolate the proletariat from the petty bourgeoisie must be acknowledged to be harmful."18
Fifteen congress delegates took the floor during this debate, most of them using every second of their allotted fifteen minutes of speaking time. Of these delegates, eight expressed themselves in favor of retaining the slogan "All Power to the Soviets," one (Bukharin) took an intermediate position,19 and six sided with Stalin. Among the most eloquent of those who took Stalin's position was Sokolnikov. Like Stalin, he pointed to the expansion of the counterrevolution after the July days. And he went on: "Before, we stood for the transfer of all power into the hands of the soviets. . . . [But] this is no longer a possibility. Heretofore the soviets were revolutionary organs and we could present them as organs of power. They stopped being revolutionary organs the moment artillery was moved against the working class."
In his comments, Sokolnikov seemed not to exclude the possibility that the soviets might be rejuvenated, in particular that they might again become organs of insurrection. In this sense his assessment of the prevailing situation differed from Lenin's. Nonetheless, Sokolnikov shared with Lenin the view that a popular mass uprising was next on Russia's revolutionary agenda. "We must explain [to the masses] that the main issue is not the soviets but organizing the masses for an uprising," he declared. At this point the audience burst into applause. He continued: "It is necessary to attract the peasant masses away from the petty bourgeois leaders, explaining to them that land will be transferred to them only with the support of a proletarian rising. . . . For the peasant masses, the road to a socialist revolution lies in support of the proletarian avant-garde."20
Ivar Smilga, earlier far and away the most militantly inclined member of the Central Committee, echoed Sokolnikov. Quoting extensively from "On Slogans," he declared, "Not only Volodarsky, but even an old social democrat like Nogin is mistaken; pow er is in the hands of a military clique. In order for power to come into the hands of those classes which will work for the expansion of the revolution, it is necessary to overthrow the existing government." Expressing the view that the soviets had "committed suicide" by rejecting power when they could have had it, he suggested that conditions for a new revolutionary eruption were developing rapidly and that the Bolsheviks would be obliged to take the initiative when the explosion came. "No one has the right to deprive us of this initiative if fate gives us another chance to stand at the head of the movement," he insisted. "Comrade Iurenev talks of caution," he added. "Let me remind him of Danton's words: 'In revolution, one needs boldness, boldness, and more boldness!' "21
One of the last to take the floor during the Sixth Congress debate over the current political moment was the newly elected Central Committee member from Moscow, Andrei Bubnov. Taking issue with Nogin, who had attempted earlier to minimize the significance of differences that had emerged over the issue of defining the current moment, he insisted that these were quite serious, mirroring the fundamental differences of opinion over the development of the revolution at the April Conference. Bubnov then went on to defend the arguments of the left. "The soviets have no power now," he affirmed. "They are rotting—there can be no illusions about this. ... If, previously, we spoke of the 'transfer of power,' that term is now obsolete. We must build up our strength for the decisive battle, for the seizure of power. The slogan of transferring power to the soviets has to go."22
On the afternoon of July 31, as soon as arguments on the current political situation were completed, Dzhaparidze moved that the Stalin resolution not be put to an immediate vote and, instead, that a committee be formed to draw up a new one. As provided for in Dzhaparidze's motion, the work of this committee was to be guided both by the Stalin resolution and by a statement on the current moment, embodying the views of the moderates, which had been adopted a few days earlier by Moscow Bolsheviks.23 Congress delegates, while accepting the idea of postponing a vote on the current moment and of having a committee study the problem further, stipulated that the Stalin resolution be the basis for the resolution which this committee would draft.24
Subsequently elected to the resolutions committee were Stalin, Sokolnikov, Bubnov, Miliutin, and Nogin, and two representatives of the Moscow Regional Bureau, Bukharin and Georgii Lomov. These seven delegates spent many hours attempting to resolve differing assessments of the prevailing situation, possibly receiving some advice from Lenin in Razliv. The resolution which they formulated and which was adopted by unanimous vote of the congress with four abstentions on August 3 was a compromise between the two contending sides.25 Apart from omitting some particularly hostile references to the Mensheviks and SRs, the first half of this resolution, which defined the course of the revolution through the July days, followed Stalin's draft resolution almost verbatim. The committee resolution affirmed that the peaceful transfer of power to the soviets had become an impossibility and substituted the slogan "Complete Liquidation of the Dictatorship of the Counterrevolutionary Bourgeoisie" for the slogan "All Power to the Soviets."