At about this time, it appeared that General Cheremisov, in Petrograd for reassignment, was in close touch with moderate socialist leaders. Izvestiia, on August 4, carried accounts of the press conferences held the previous day by General Kornilov, following his meeting with the cabinet, and by General Cheremisov. In response to reporters' questions, Kornilov had once again emphasized the importance of immediate authorization by the government of broader repressive measures and deprecated the future role of democratic committees. In contrast, the burden of Cheremisov's comments was that repressive measures alone, "not even mass executions," could restore discipline—that it would be impossible to do so as long as the soldiers did not understand and accept the necessity, obligation, and duty of carrying on the war. In the task of raising the consciousness of the troops, Cheremisov attached great importance to joint efforts by officers and democratic committees. Izvestiia pointedly contrasted the two statements: "Today we bring you accounts of two conferences, with General Kornilov and with General Cheremisov, on the same subject. But just take note of how they differ. At the same time that the first stubbornly insists on all out repressive measures . . . and completely disregards the importance of army organizations, the second puts the center of gravity in the struggle with disintegration in the army on the joint work of the officer staff with organizations of soldiers. . . . The sympathy of the democracy is not on the side of Kornilov."49
By the second week in August, rumors, not without some foundation, were circulating in the capital that Kerensky had suggested to those around him that Kornilov would not work in the post of commander-in-chief and that Cheremisov might be a suitable replacement. When word of Kerensky's wavering reached Mogilev, Kornilov and his entourage were naturally alarmed. The campaign of liberal and conservative groups on Kornilov's behalf was intensified; nonsocialist papers featured daily pledges of support for Kornilov from organizations such as the Union of Officers, the Union of Cossack Troops, and the Union of Saint George Cavaliers.
Between August 8 and 10, Moscow was the scene of a widely publicized
Conference of Public Figures attended by several hundred specially invited leaders of business, industry, agriculture, the professions, the army, and liberal and conservative political groups. The primary purpose of the conference was the adoption of mutually acceptable positions on major issues for presentation to the broader Moscow State Conference, due to open on August 12.50 Among the delegates were the wealthy industrialists Riabushinsky, Tretiakov, Konovalov, and Vishnegradsky; a large group of Kadets, led by Miliukov; and a host of top military leaders, including Generals Alekseev, Brusilov, Kaledin, and Iudenich. On August 9 these dignitaries interrupted their consideration of broad political issues to adopt a pledge of confidence in Kornilov. This declaration, dispatched to Kornilov and widely circulated the same day, affirmed that all attacks on Kornilov's authority in the army and in Russia were "treachery" and that "all thinking Russia" looked to Kornilov with hope and faith." "May God help you," the resolution concluded, "in your great task of reconstructing a powerful army and saving Russia."51
While the public furor over Kornilov raged on, Filonenko busied himself with the revision of Kornilov's August 3 proposal for consideration by the cabinet on August 10. Not content merely to recast the document in more moderate language, he introduced some sweeping recommendations for drastic controls over rail lines and factories. Thus, he added a provision that all railroads be placed under martial law; failure on the part of rail workers to fulfill directives was to carry the same penalty as a soldier's refusal to obey orders at the front—that is, summary execution. To implement these measures, he recommended that military revolutionary courts be set up at major railway depots. A further provision added by Filonenko called for the country's coal mines and all factories engaged in defense work (practically speaking, this could be interpreted to include almost all factories) to be placed under military control. In these enterprises, strikes, lockouts, political meetings, and, in fact, assemblies of any kind were to be prohibited for the duration. Employees would be assigned minimum mandatory work quotas; workers not meeting their quotas would be dismissed summarily and dispatched to the front. "These measures," injected Filonenko at the end of the revised draft, "must be adopted and put into practice immediately with iron decisiveness and consistency."52
Savinkov, fully sympathetic to Filonenko's recommendations, pleaded with Kerensky to support them within the cabinet, and even resigned when the prime minister demurred. Kerensky initially rejected Savinkov's resignation, later accepted it, and ultimately, partly because of pressure from Kornilov, prevailed upon Savinkov to return to his post.53 Kerensky himself has acknowledged that to halt the slide of industry and transport into absolute chaos, he would gladly have taken the lead in implementing the steps envisioned by Filonenko. Within liberal and conservative circles, of course, and even among members of the cabinet, the need for such extreme measures had already been widely discussed. In view of the storm from the left that Kornilov's more limited August 3 program had provoked, however, Kerensky was understandably apprehensive about the probable impact of Filonenko's amendments on the leadership of the Soviet, not to mention the workers and soldiers. His conclusion seems to have been that such measures would have brought a decisive rupture with the Soviet, a bloody confrontation of uncertain outcome with the Bolshevik-led masses, and at the very best, the establishment of an authoritarian government completely at the mercy of the military. Unlike large numbers of former moderates, Kerensky paused, for the moment, on the brink of such a drastic course.
Kornilov, warned by members of his entourage in Mogilev of plots being hatched against him in Petrograd, tried to beg off coming to the capital on August 10. This was completely agreeable to Kerensky, who, although quite willing to use Kornilov to carry out repression at the front, was understandably nervous about the general's popularity with the right and his potential influence on national politics. Savinkov and Filonenko, to the contrary, were determined to employ pressure from Kornilov to force Kerensky's acceptance of the revised Kornilov program. They therefore persuaded the commander-in-chief not to cancel his trip. Kornilov remained wary, however, taking with him to Petrograd a bodyguard of Turkoman soldiers armed with machine guns. Shortly after Kornilov's train left Mogilev for the capital, a telegram from Kerensky reached Stavka informing the commander-in-chief that the government had not called him, did not insist on his coming, and, in view of the strategic situation, could not take responsibility for his departure from the front.54