There were practically no spokesmen for the extreme left. The Bolshevik Central Committee initially had planned that party representatives in the All-Russian Executive Committees would accompany their colleagues to Moscow; the Bolshevik delegates would formally repudiate the conference
at the first opportunity and then stage a walkout.4 When this intention became known, however, the majority socialist Soviet leadership required that all members of the Soviet conference delegation agree in advance not to speak out at the conference without specific authorization; for practical purposes, Bolsheviks going to the Moscow Conference with the Soviet delegation were given the choice of accepting the positions of the majority or risking expulsion from the Executive Committees.5 Given these circumstances, the party elected to absent itself from the conference altogether.
The Moscow State Conference convened in an atmosphere of tension. For several days prior to August 12, Moscow had been rife with rumors that troops loyal to Kornilov were converging on the city and that Kornilov and his supporters were about to make a move against the government. Conference delegates arrived in Moscow to find the streets plastered with posters hailing Kornilov; a publicity brochure lauding the "first people's commander-in-chief" circulated widely.6 Kornilov himself was not scheduled to make an appearance at the conference until August 14. Nonetheless, so great was the fear of a rightist coup as the conferees assembled that on August 12 the Moscow Soviet formed a six-man Provisional Revolutionary Committee to help assure proper protection for the government and the Soviet. The seriousness with which the possibility of an attack by the right was taken at this time is indicated by the fact that the Moscow Bolsheviks Viktor Nogin and Nikolai Muralov, along with two Mensheviks and two SRs, took an active part in the Provisional Revolutionary Committee's work.7
In anticipation of the conference the extreme left-oriented Bolshevik Moscow Regional Bureau took the lead in organizing a wildcat protest strike for August 12, the opening day; the strike was subsequently endorsed by trade union leaders, by the more conservative Bolshevik Moscow Committee, and by representatives of Moscow district soviets and district Bolshevik committees.8 By a vote of 312 to 284, however, a joint meeting of the Moscow Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets opposed such action.9 Nonetheless, on the appointed day employees in most Moscow factories did not report for work; many congregated instead at protest meetings. Restaurants and coffeehouses were shut down, streetcars ceased operation, and, for the most part, cab drivers were nowhere about.10 Even employees at the buffets in the Bolshoi Theater, where the conference met, went out on strike, forcing conference delegates to serve their own refreshments. That evening all Moscow was dark as employees of the gas works stayed away from their jobs.11
The impact of the strike bore witness to the power and sentiment of the working classes and the resurgence of Bolshevik influence. A writer in the Izvestiia of the Moscow Soviet, whose editorial line reflected the views of the majority socialists, conceded with embarrassment that it was "time to realize that the Bolsheviks are not irresponsible groups but one of the ele-
The Bolshoi Theater, scene of the Moscow State Conference.
ments of the organized revolutionary democracy behind whom stand the broad masses, not always disciplined but, on the other hand, wholly committed to the cause of the revolution."12
To judge by formal deliberations at the conference, this message was lost on most delegates. At one of the early sessions, when Miliukov cautioned that the demands outlined by Kornilov should not serve as cause for suspicion and voiced great fear that the government was not making sufficient provision for the restoration of order and the security of property,13 the Bolshoi exploded with shouts of "Right you are!," loud bravos, and waves of applause. A similar outburst of unrestrained enthusiasm occurred in the right half of the hall when the cossack leader General Aleksei Kaledin declared that "the survival of the state requires the continuation of the war to a victorious conclusion above all," and that "the entire life of the country and all the actions of the Provisional Government must be subordinated to this fundamental assumption." Kaledin outlined a series of basic principles upon which the government should act which, in essence, paralleled Kornilov's program. Amid shouts of "Exactly!" from the right and agonized cries of "No!" from the left, Kaledin declared that "the usurpation of state power by central and local committees and by the soviets must be brought to an end immediately and abruptly."14
When the brilliant orator Vasilii Maklakov, one of the founders of the Kadet Party, took the podium and implored the government "to rely and believe in those at the front" and "to find the courage to take the daring steps necessary to lead the country forward [because] the judgment day is approaching," the right delegates again stood and cheered.15 But when Chkheidze read aloud the All-Russian Executive Committees' platform,16 which went a long way toward meeting liberal and conservative demands
for emphasis on law and order and universal sacrifice in the interest of national defense, and embodied only the most modest concessions to mass demands,17 these delegates sat scowling in their seats.
Trying to walk a tightrope between the left and right, Kerensky in his opening address refrained from commitment to a specific program of action and, typically sought salvation in strong words. Turning to the left, he thundered: "Let everyone who has already tried to use force of arms against the power of the people know that such attempts will be crushed with blood and iron." Turning next to the right, he roared with equal vigor (in obvious reference to Kornilov and his supporters): "At the same time let those who think the time is ripe to overthrow the revolutionary government with bayonets, be even more careful. I can make anyone serving me with ultimatums obey the will of the supreme power and myself as its head."18 Kerensky's frenzied address, at times seemingly uncontrolled and uncomfortably theatrical, lasted close to two hours. Miliukov later described the event: "By the expression of his eyes, which he focused on the imagined enemy, by the tense gesturing of his arms, by the intonation of his voice which rose to a scream for extended periods of time, then subsided to a tragic whisper, by his measured phrases and calculated pauses, he appeared to want to scare somebody and to create an impression of force and power. . . . In actuality he only engendered pity."19
Kornilov arrived in Moscow by train on the afternoon of August 13. At the Alexandrovsky (now the Belorussian) Station his followers staged a carefully orchestrated welcome which contrasted sharply with the cool reception accorded government ministers upon their arrival in Moscow two days earlier.20 As the moment for Kornilov's arrival approached, an honor guard and band from the Alexandrovsky Military Academy and a detachment from the Women's Cadet Academy posted themselves on the platform. Also on hand to greet the "first people's commander-in-chief" were a throng of "ladies in gaily colored dresses," bemedaled officers by the dozen, conservative and liberal leaders participating in the state conference, a coterie of municipal authorities, and enthusiastic official deputations from all the patriotic organizations supporting Kornilov. The Moscow Women's Battalion of Death stood at attention on a viaduct overlooking the station, while a mounted cossack detachment was arrayed on the square outside.