On the whole, it is hardly too much to say that no more statesman-like, and (if sentiment may be allowed a share in influencing the conduct of governments) no more amiable spirit animates any act of our modern legislation than is displayed in these arrangements for the management of our colonies. They are a practical exemplification of the idea embodied in the expression, "the mother country." A hundred years ago, Burke sought to impress on the existing ministers and Parliament the conviction that, "so long as our Colonies kept the idea of their civil rights associated with our government, they would cling and grapple to us, and no force under heaven would be of power to tear them from their allegiance." In the case of which he was speaking his warning, as we have seen, fell on deaf ears; but the policy of the present reign is a willing and full adoption of them, on a far larger scale than even his farseeing vision could then contemplate. Within the century which has elapsed since his time the enterprise of Britain has sent forth her sons to people another hemisphere; and they, her children still, cling to the parent state with filial affection, because they feel that, though parted from her by thousands of miles and more than one ocean, they are still indissolubly united to her by their participation in all the blessings of her constitution, her generous toleration, her equal laws, her universal freedom.
On one transaction of these years the leaders of the Opposition were found acting in close agreement with the ministers. We have seen how, in the early part of the reign of George III., the House of Commons threw the sheriffs of London into prison, on account of their performance of what they conceived to be their duty as magistrates; and in 1840 it subjected the same officials to the same treatment on a question of the same character-the extent of the privilege of the House of Commons to overrule the authority of the courts of law. The question was in appearance complicated by the institution of several suits at law, and by the fact that the House was not consistent in its conduct, but allowed its servants to plead to the first action, and refused the same permission in the second, when the result of the first trial had proved adverse to them. The case was this: some inspectors of prisons has presented a report to Parliament, in which they alleged that they had found in Newgate a book of disgusting and obscene character, published by a London publisher named Stockdale. The House of Commons had ordered the report to be printed and sold by Messrs. Hansard, the Parliamentary publishers, and Stockdale brought an action against Messrs. Hansard for libel. Chief-justice Denman charged the jury that "the fact of the House of Commons having directed Messrs. Hansard to publish their reports was no justification to them for publishing a Parliamentary report containing a libel;" and Stockdale obtained damages, which were duly paid. Stockdale, encouraged by this success, when, in spite of the result of the late trial, Hansard continued to sell the report, brought a fresh action; but now the House forbade the publishers to plead to it; and, as they obeyed the prohibition, and forbore to plead, the case eventually came before the Sheriff's Court; fresh damages were given, and, in obedience to the writ of the Queen's Bench, the sheriffs seized Hansard's goods, and sold them to satisfy the judgment. Lord John Russell, as leader of the House, moved to bring to the Bar of the House all the parties concerned in the action-the plaintiff, his attorney, the sheriffs, and the under-sheriffs. He was opposed by nearly all the legal members of the House except the crown lawyers, Sir Edward Sugden especially warning the House that "a resolution of the House was of no avail in a court of justice;" while others taunted the House with want of courage in not proceeding against the judges themselves, rather than against their officers, which in this case the sheriffs were.
There could be no doubt of the importance of the question, since it was no less, as the Attorney-general, Sir J. Campbell, put it, than a question whether Parliament or the courts of law had the superiority; and now Sir Robert Peel, as leader of the Opposition, came to the support of Lord John Russell, declaring his opinion to be, first, that "the House possessed every privilege necessary for the proper and effectual discharge of its functions;" secondly, that "the publication of evidence which had led the House to adopt any course was frequently essential to justify that course to the nation;" and thirdly, that "to judge of the extent of their privileges, and to vindicate them by their own laws, belonged to the House alone." And he pressed strongly on the House that it was "the duty of the House to fight the battle to the last," though he confessed that "it was with pain that he had come to the determination of entering into a contest with the courts of law." On one point the judges agreed with the House of Commons. The House committed the sheriffs; but, when they sued out their habeas corpus, the judges decided that the return of the Sergeant-at-arms that they were committed by the House for breach of privilege was a sufficient return. Stockdale brought fresh actions. But meantime the case was arousing a strong excitement in the country.[257] The singular hardship of the position of the sheriffs excited general sympathy: if they obeyed the House of Commons, which prohibited them from paying over to Stockdale the damages which they had received for him, the Court of Queen's Bench would be bound to attach them for disobedience to its order. If they obeyed the Queen's Bench, the House would imprison them for breach of privilege. And the national feeling is always in favor of the strictly defined authority of the courts of law, rather than of the somewhat indefinite claims of Parliament to interpret, and even to make, privilege. Another consideration, probably, weighed a little with the champions of the House-that their power of imprisonment ended with the session. As matters went on, it was found that even the Attorney and Solicitor-general differed as to the course to be pursued; and eventually Lord John Russell consented to adopt the advice which had been given by a former Attorney-general, Sir F. Pollock, and to bring in a bill to legalize all similar proceedings of Parliament in future, by enacting that a certificate that the publication of any document had been ordered by either House should be a sufficient defence against any action. The introduction of such a bill was in some degree an acknowledgment of defeat; but it can hardly be denied to have been not only a judicious step, but the only one practicable, if the contest between Parliament and the courts of law were not to be everlasting; and it met with general approval. If it was a compromise, it was one that satisfied both parties and both ends. It upheld the authority of the courts of law, and at the same time it practically asserted the reasonableness of the claim advanced by the House of Commons, by giving it for the future the power which it had claimed. Nor were people in this day inclined to be jealous of the privileges of Parliament, so long as they were accurately defined. They felt that it was for the advantage and dignity of the nation that its powers and privileges should be large; what they regarded with distrust was, a claim of power of which no one knew the precise bounds, and which might, therefore, be expanded as the occasion served.