Looking at the strict law of the question, few lawyers doubt that the expression "this kingdom" in the Bill of Rights includes the entire dominions of the crown, or that that great statute was undoubtedly intended to protect the privileges of all their inhabitants, whether within the four seas or in foreign settlements. But it also seems that the clause against raising and keeping on foot a standing army without the consent of Parliament was not more violated by keeping a mixed garrison in Gibraltar and Port Mahon than garrisons consisting of native soldiers only; and undoubtedly the keeping of an armed force in both these fortresses had been sanctioned by Parliament. Nor could the colonel of a foreign regiment in garrison under the command of a British governor be fairly said to be in an office of great military trust. So far, therefore, the charge against the ministry may be thought to have failed. But the accusation of having transgressed the clause which prohibits "the introduction of foreign troops into this kingdom without the previous consent of Parliament on any pretence whatever," must, on the other hand, be regarded as proved. And, indeed, Lord North himself may be taken to have shown some consciousness that it was so, since he justified his conduct in omitting to procure that previous consent by the necessity of the case, by the plea that, as Parliament was in vacation, the time which would have been consumed in waiting for its sanction would have neutralized the advantage desired from the employment of the Hanoverians, since the regiments which they were to replace at Gibraltar and Port Mahon could not, after such delay, have reached America in time to be of service; and since he also consented eventually to ask Parliament for an Act of Indemnity, the preamble of which affirmed the existence of doubts as to the legality of the step which had been taken. And the fate of this act afforded a still more striking proof of the divisions in the ministry, since, after Lord North himself had proposed it in the House of Commons, and it had been passed there by a large majority, it was rejected in the House of Lords, where his own colleagues, Lord Gower, Lord Suffolk, and Lord Weymouth, spoke and voted against it as needless, because, in their judgment, no doubt of the state of the law on the subject could exist.
From a statesman-like point of view, the employment of the Hanoverians seems abundantly defensible, if force were still to be employed to bring back the Colonists to their obedience. The circumstance of their being subjects of our sovereign in his other character of Elector of Hanover, clearly distinguished it from the hiring of the Hessian and Brunswick mercenaries, which has been deservedly condemned. And, as the entire number fell short of two thousand,[55] Lord Shelburne's expression of fear for the liberties and religion of Englishmen was an absurd exaggeration. Moreover, the warm approval which, less than twenty years before, Parliament had given to the introduction of a far larger body of the same troops into England itself, justified the anticipation that a similar sanction would now be cheerfully given. That sanction-which, indeed, might have been thought to be invited by the announcement of the measure in the King's speech-was undoubtedly requisite. And, if it was, a Bill of Indemnity for having acted without it was equally necessary. But, as has been seen in the last chapter, for an administration, on urgent occasions, to take action on its own responsibility, and then to apply for indemnity, is a course in strict harmony with the practice of the constitution; and if in this instance the ministers are in any respect blamable, their error would seem to have been limited to their abstaining from instantly calling Parliament together to sanction their act, and being contented to wait for the ordinary time of the Houses meeting.
The war, therefore, went on. The assertion of their independence by the Colonies divided, and, so far, weakened, the advocates of their cause in Parliament, one section of whom, led by Lord Chatham, regarded any diminution of our dominion as not only treasonable, but ruinous; on the other hand, it procured them the alliance of France and Spain. But it cannot be said that either of these incidents produced any practical effect on the result of the war. Lord Chatham's refusal to contemplate their independence could not retard its establishment; and the alliance of France and Spain, which brought nothing but disaster to those countries, could not accelerate it by a single moment. For nearly six years the war continued with alternations of success, the victories gained by the British arms being the more numerous, the triumphs of the Americans being incomparably the more important, involving as they did the surrender of two entire armies, the latter of which, that of Lord Cornwallis, in 1781, did, in fact, terminate the war, and with the war the existence of the ministry which had conducted it. A singularly rapid succession of new administrations ensued-so rapid that the negotiations for peace which the first, that of Lord Rockingham, opened, were not formally completed till the third,[56] known as the Coalition Ministry, was on the point of dismissal. It would be beside our purpose to enter into the details of the treaty which constituted the United States, as they were now called, a nation by our formal recognition of their independence. Even in that recognition, which was the most important article of the treaty, no constitutional principle was involved, though it affords the only instance in our history which can seem to throw a doubt on our inheritance of that capacity for government which the Roman poet claimed as, in ancient times, the peculiar attribute of his own countrymen. It presents the only instance of a loss of territory peopled by men who came of our blood, and who still spoke our language. It was a stern and severe lesson; and yet, fraught with discredit and disaster as it was, it nevertheless bore fruit in a later age which we may be excused for regarding as an example of the generally predominating influence of sober practical sense in our countrymen, when not led away by the temporary excitement of passion, as shown in our capacity to take home to ourselves and profit by the teachings of experience. The loss of the American Colonies was caused by the submission of the Parliament and nation to men of theory rather than of practice; ideologists, as Napoleon called them; doctrinaires, to use the modern expression; men who, because Parliament had an abstract right of universal legislation, regarded it as a full justification for insisting on its exercise, without giving a thought to the feelings, or prejudices, or habits of those who might be affected by their measures. Abstractedly considered, Lord Chatham and Lord Camden were undoubtedly wrong in denying the power of Parliament to tax the Colonies; but there was better judgment in their counsels, though founded on false premises, than in those of Grenville and Townsend, though theirs was the more correct view of the constitutional power of legislation. The two peers were wrong in their principle; the two Chancellors of the Exchequer were unwise in their application of their principle; and the practical error was the more disastrous one.
It is now generally admitted that the true statesman-like course toward the Colonies was that adopted by Lord Rockingham and his colleagues in 1765-to avoid weakening the supreme power of Parliament by any disavowal of the right to tax but to avoid imperilling the sovereign authority of the King by a novel exertion of it. As much of our common English law is made up of precedent, so, in a still greater degree, are our feelings and ideas of our rights and privileges regulated by precedent. And we lost America because in 1764 and 1767 neither minister nor Parliament took men's feelings and prejudices into account. The loss of the United States, therefore, was a lesson not undeserved; and by our statesmen since that day it has been taken in the right spirit of profiting by its teaching as a guide to their own conduct. Since that day the enterprise of our people has planted our flag in regions far more distant, and has extended the dominion of our sovereign over provinces far more extensive than those which we then lost. And on some of the administrations of the present reign the duty has fallen of framing schemes of government for those new acquisitions, as also for some of those previously possessed. In how different a spirit from that which actuated the early ministers of George III.[57] those to whom the task was committed by Queen Victoria applied themselves to their task may be seen in a maxim laid down by the present Lord Grey, when he presided at the Colonial Office (1846-1852), that "the success of free institutions in any country depends far less upon the particular form of those institutions than upon the character of the people on whom they are conferred." But how he and others in the same office carried out that principle must be reserved for a later chapter.