But it is not sufficient that in this point of view these measures may have been defensible. In judging of their statesmanship, it is almost equally to be considered whether they were expedient and politic, whether the emergency or necessity were such as to justify such rigorous methods of repression. It was fairly open to doubt whether some of them, and especially the Traitorous Correspondence and the Seditious Meetings Bills, did not treat as treasonable acts which did not go beyond sedition, and whether so to treat them were not to invest them with an importance which did not belong to them. And on this part of the question the general judgment has, we think, been unfavorable to the government; and it has been commonly allowed that the Chancellor, whose advice on legal subjects the Prime-minister naturally took for his guide, gave him impolitic counsel. In fact, it is well known that these two acts, to a great extent, failed in their object through their excessive severity, several juries having refused to convict persons who were prosecuted for treason, who would certainly not have escaped had they only been indicted for sedition; and it is deserving of remark that these two bills were not regarded with favor by the King himself, if the anecdote-which seems to rest on undeniable authority-be true, that he expressed satisfaction at the acquittal of some prisoners, on the ground that almost any evil would be more tolerable than that of putting men to death "for constructive treason." It must therefore, probably, be affirmed that these two acts, the Treason Act and the Seditious Meetings Act, went beyond the necessity of the case; that they were not only violations of the constitution-which, when the measures are temporary, as these were, are not always indefensible-but that they were superfluous, unjust, and impolitic; superfluous, when they proposed to deal with acts already visitable with punishment by the ancient laws of the kingdom; unjust, when they created new classes of offences; and impolitic, as exciting that kind of disapproval of the acts of government which in many minds has a tendency to excite a spirit of discontent with and resistance to legitimate authority. And, indeed, it must be inferred that such was the light in which these measures were regarded by a statesman who in his general policy was proud to acknowledge himself Mr. Pitt's pupil, as he was also the most skilful and successful of his more immediate successors. Twenty-five years afterward the distress caused by the reaction inevitably consequent on the termination of twenty years of war produced a political excitement scarcely inferior to that with which Pitt had now to deal, and seditious societies and meetings scarcely less formidable; but, as we shall see, Lord Liverpool, taking warning, perhaps, from the mistake into which Mr. Pitt was led on this occasion, though compelled to bring forward new and stern measures of repression, and even to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act for a time, kept strictly within the lines of constitutional precedent, and was careful to avoid confounding sedition with treason.
Notes:
[Footnote 73: He had been Lord-chamberlain in Lord Rockingham's administration of 1765. He was now Lord-lieutenant of Ireland.]
[Footnote 74: In Lord Chatham's or the Duke of Grafton's ministry of 1766, and in the later administration of Lord Rockingham.]
[Footnote 75: It may be convenient to take this opportunity of pointing out that, in this administration, Lord Shelburne altered the old, most unreasonable, and inconvenient arrangement by which the departments of the two Secretaries of State were distinguished by the latitude, and called Northern and Southern. By a new division, one took charge of the home affairs, the other of the foreign affairs. And in 1794 a third Secretary was added for War, who, by a very singular arrangement, which continued till very recently, had charge also of the colonies. But, in the year 1855, the Colonial-office was intrusted to a separate minister; and in 1858 a fifth Secretary of State, that for India, was added, on the transfer of the government of that country from the East India Company to the Crown. When there were only two Secretaries of State, the rule was that one should sit in each House. At present it is not necessary that more than one should be a peer, though it is more usual for two to be members of the Upper House. And it is usual also for the Under-secretaries to be members of the House to which the Chief-secretaries do not belong, though this rule is not invariably observed.]
[Footnote 76: "Parliamentary History," xxiii., 163.]
[Footnote 77: The divisions were: 224 to 208, and 207 to 190.]
[Footnote 78: Lord Stanhope, quoting from an unpublished "Life of Lord Barrington," compiled by the Bishop of Durham (meaning, I suppose, Bishop Shute Barrington).-History of England, v., 174.]
[Footnote 79: Even with the first flush of triumph, the night after the second defeat of Lord Shelburne in the House of Commons, Fox's great friend, Mr. Fitzpatrick, writes to his brother, Lord Ossory: "To the administration it is cila mors, but not victoria loeta to us. The apparent juncture with Lord North is universally cried out against."-Lord J. Russell's Memorials and Correspondence of C.J. Fox, ii., 18.]
[Footnote 80: Lord J. Russell's "Memorials and Correspondence of C.J. Fox," ii., 90.]
[Footnote 81: Ibid., p. 118.]
[Footnote 82: In one division (161 to 137) they had only a majority of twenty-four.]
[Footnote 83: In a letter to Lord Northington (Lord-lieutenant of Ireland), dated July 17, Fox himself mentions that not one of his colleagues, except the Duke of Portland and Lord Keppel (First Lord of the Admiralty), approved of it.-Memoirs of Fox, ii., 116.]
[Footnote 84: November 22 he writes to the Duke of Rutland: "The bill ... is, I really think, the boldest and most unconstitutional measure ever attempted, transferring at one stroke, in spite of all charters and compacts, the immense patronage and influence of the East to Charles Fox, in or out of office."-Stanhope's Life of Pitt, i., 140.]
[Footnote 85: The whole paper is given by the Duke of Buckingham, "Courts and Cabinets of George III," i., 288, and quoted by Lord Russell in his "Memorials and Correspondence of C. J. Fox," ii., 251. It is endorsed, "Delivered by Lord Thurlow, December 1, 1783. Nugent Temple."]
[Footnote 86: "Life of Pitt," i., 148. Lord Stanhope does not pledge himself to these being "the exact words of this commission, but as to its purport and meaning there is no doubt." They are, however, the exact words quoted by Fox in his speech in support of Mr. Baker's resolutions on the 17th.-Parliamentary History, xxiv., 207.]
[Footnote 87: "Parliamentary History," xxiv., 151-154.]
[Footnote 88: 95 to 76. "Strange to say, one of the cabinet ministers, Lord Stormont, president of the council, formed part of the final majority against the bill."-Life of Pitt, ii., 154.]
[Footnote 89: "Life of Pitt," i., 155.]
[Footnote 90: "Lives of the Chancellors," c. clix. Lord Thurlow.]
[Footnote 91: "The Grenville Papers," iii., 374. It may, however, be remarked, as tending to throw some doubt on Mr. Grenville's statement, that Lord Campbell asserts that "Lord Mansfield, without entering into systematic opposition, had been much alienated from the court during Lord Rockingham's first administration."-Lives of the Chief-justices, ii., 468.]
[Footnote 92: Vol. ii., pp. 229-232.]
[Footnote 93: It will be seen hereafter that this doctrine was admitted in the fullest degree by Sir Robert Peel in the winter of 1884, when he admitted that his acceptance of office made him alone responsible for the dismissal of Lord Melbourne, though, in fact, he was taken entirely by surprise by the King's act, being in Italy at the time.]