40. For instance, Polish state television as early as November 1980 had broadcast ominous film of joint Polish-Soviet military maneuvers, using what was likely old video footage (the trees in the video had leaves suggestive of summertime). The point of these broadcasts was to directly suggest Soviet military intervention, even if many Poles were uncertain about the seriousness of the suggestion. Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, 88.
41. Jerrold Schecter and Leona Schecter, Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002), 305.
42. December 16, 1980 letter in George Weigel, Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John Paul II (New York: Harper Perennial, 2001), 406–7.
43. Richard Pipes, Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-Belonger (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 168–69.
44. This information was reported and presented by Mark Kramer, director of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies, in a number of his papers and bulletins, including the Cold War International History Project Bulletin, specifically issue no. 5 (Spring 1995) and issue no. 11 (Winter 1999).
Some Soviet officials insisted on an invasion while others, like Mikhail A. Suslov, asserted: “There is no way that we are going to use force in Poland.” Edward Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 121.
45. Shevardnaze, The Future Belongs to Freedom. Edward Shevardnadze said Jaruzelski probably spared his country an invasion. See Pipes, Vixi, 169. That said, the latest research on this is quite interesting and much more complicated: Mark Kramer reports that as the decisive moment approached in December 1981, Jaruzelski “lost his nerve” and began urging Moscow to send Soviet troops to Poland to help him introduce martial law. By that point, Moscow was firmly against sending troops and, writes Kramer, “tersely brushed aside [Jaruzelski’s] repeated pleas.” Kramer’s findings completely alter the accepted view on Jaruzelski.
46. In illuminating this extraordinary consideration, a clarification is essentiaclass="underline" Aside from NSDD-32, there were other formal Reagan directives that addressed the Poland issue, such as NSDD-75, released January 17, 1983, which (as noted) explicitly aimed to undermine the Soviet empire. Among the most dramatic wording in all of the NSDDs was this line on the middle of page three of NSDD-75: “In the longer term, should Soviet behavior worsen, for example, an invasion of Poland, we would need to consider extreme measures.” (NSDD is on file at Reagan Library.) NSDD-75 was safely declassified on July 16, 1994, five years after the end of the Soviet grip on Poland and three years after the end of the USSR itself. The directive does not specify what those “extreme measures” might be. Could such measures include U.S. military force in Poland? Those interviewed on the “extreme measures” phrase offered mixed, puzzled reactions, with most claiming ignorance. Some did not recall that seemingly provocative line, including no less than Richard Pipes, regarded as the primary author. This is confusing, until one reads the little known, thirty-five page “support paper” to NSDD-75, which was released on December 6, 1982 with the simple title, “U.S. Relations with the USSR,” declassified in 1997. On page thirty is the reference to “extreme measures.” Unlike NSDD-75, however, the support paper explains what is meant by “extreme measures.” It states: “the West would need to consider extreme measures such as a total trade boycott, including grain.” In other words, “extreme measures” refers to trade, not war.
47. Interview with Richard Pipes, September 9, 2002.
48. Interview with Richard V. Allen, September 18, 2002.
49. Interview with Caspar Weinberger, October 10, 2002.
50. In his memoirs, Weinberger used almost verbatim language, saying that at this particular meeting, Reagan told him: “Cap, I know that, and we must never be in this position again. We must regain our military strength quickly if we want to secure any kind of peace.” Caspar Weinberger, In the Arena (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2001), 280.
51. Interview with Caspar Weinberger, October 10, 2002. Weinberger used some of this same language in very vaguely recalling this incident a month later at a conference in Washington. His statement was quite unclear, to the point that I was probably the only one in the room to fully comprehend what he was alluding to. Weinberger speaking at the conference, “Reagan’s War and the War on Terrorism,” hosted by the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, November 13, 2002.
52. Interview with Caspar Weinberger, October 10, 2002.
53. Interview with Caspar Weinberger, October 10, 2002.
54. “The Pope and the President: A key adviser reflects on the Reagan Administration,” interview with Bill Clark, Catholic World Reporter, November 1999.
55. Bill Clark, “President Reagan and the Wall,” Address to the Council of National Policy, San Francisco, California, March 2000, 7–8.
56. Interview with Bill Clark, August 24, 2001.
57. Interview with Bill Clark, July 17, 2003.
58. Alas, in April 2005, immediately after the death of Pope John Paul II, Clark talked to one media source. He gave an exclusive interview to Newsmax, which was totally ignored by the mainstream press. In promoting the exclusive, Newsmax said that Clark had revealed for the first time that “Reagan told the pope he would use military force and go to war if Russia attempted to invade Poland.” I contacted Clark to discuss the article; he offered what he noted was a key clarification: “We hadn’t actually prepared to go to war. That stretches it. More accurately, we were prepared to recommend the use of force. There’s an important difference.” Interview with Bill Clark, April 6, 2005. Newsmax reporter Phil Brennan quoted Clark accurately in the article; it was the promotional material that went a bit beyond what Clark said he intended. The promotional material appeared at Newsmax.com on April 5, 2005. It ran with an accompanying article by Brennan, titled, “Adviser: Reagan Threatened War Over Poland,” April 5, 2005, Newsmax.com.
59. Interview with Ed Meese, September 9, 2002.
60. Reagan, “Excerpts From a Telephone Conversation With Pope John Paul II About the Situation in Poland,” December 14, 1981.
61. Documents located in ES, NSC, HSF: Records, Vatican: Pope John Paul II, RRL, Box 41, Folders “Cables 1 of 2” and 8107378–8200051.
62. December 29, 1981 letter from Ronald Reagan to Pope John Paul II. Document is located at Reagan Library, ES, NSC, HSF: Records, Vatican: Pope John Paul II, RRL, Box 41, Folder 8107378–820051. Document was declassified on July 18, 2000.
63. Reagan, An American Life, 303.
64. Ibid., 301.
65. Pipes, Vixi, 170–72.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Genrikh Borovik, “Plot Against Poland,” Literaturnaya Gazeta, December 23, 1981, 14, published as “U.S. ‘Lies, Hypocrisy,’” in FBIS, FBIS-SOV-7-JAN-82, January 7, 1982, F11–12.
69. Pipes, Vixi, 172–73.
70. Reagan, “Interview With the President,” December 23, 1981.
71. Among other examples, see Reagan, “Proclamation 4891—Solidarity Day,” January 20, 1982.
72. Reagan, “Address to the Nation About Christmas and the Situation in Poland,” December 23, 1981.
73. Michael Deaver, Behind the Scenes (New York: William Morrow, 1988), 142–43.
74. Y. Nilov, “No Scruples…,” Novoye Vremya, January 1, 1982, 8–9, published as “Weinberger’s Remarks on Poland, Church Assailed,” in FBIS, FBIS-SOV-19-JAN-82, January 19, 1982, F1–3.