29. Ibid., Nancy said that the pope told her this in a letter that he sent upon Reagan’s death in June 2004.
30. The individual said this to me personally. Obviously, he preferred to remain anonymous. I include the quote as a reflection of the harsh feelings. This person was one of Reagan’s very top aides.
31. This person also preferred anonymity. I include the words for the same reason cited in the previous note.
32. Agostino Bono, “Officials say pope, Reagan shared Cold War data, but lacked alliance,” Catholic News Service, November 17, 2004.
33. George Weigel, “The President and the Pope,” National Review, June 28, 2004.
34. Interview with Bill Clark, August 24, 2001.
35. Asked about Dolan’s and Reagan’s tough words, Ben Elliott, director of White House speechwriting, speaks to their larger motivation: “There is no doubting that it was implicitly understood by us that, unlike the ’70s under Nixon, Ford, and Carter, there was a new policy and it was: we win, they lose.” Interviews with Ben Elliott, October 13, 2004 and January 11, 2005.
36. The May 19 draft is located at the Reagan Library in PHF, PS, RRL, Box 5, Folder 83.
37. The phrase “ash heap of history” was a clever twist of Trotsky-speak. The phrase has also been attributed to Lenin, though it is more commonly credited to Trotsky.
38. The May 24 draft is located at the Reagan Library in PHF, PS, RRL, Box 5, Folder 85.
39. Cannon, “Reagan Radiated Happiness and Hope,” George magazine, August 2000, 58.
CHAPTER 11
40. Quoted by Steven Rottner, “Britons Reassured by Reagan’s Visit,” New York Times, June 10, 1982, A17.
41. Richard Pipes used these words. Pipes chronicled Soviet reactions to the speech for the NSC. When he reported the reactions to Reagan, the president responded; “So we touched a nerve.” Pipes, Vixi, 200.
42. S. Volovets, “Megaphone Diplomacy,” Sovetskaya Rossiya, June 17, 1987, 5, published as “Reagan Practices ‘Megaphone Diplomacy’ in W. Berlin,” in FBIS, FBIS-SOV-18-Jun-87, June 18, 1987, A1.
43. Statement by the Moscow Domestic Service, February 7, 1984, published as “U.S. ‘Democracy Campaign’ Increasing World Tension,” in FBIS, FBIS-8-FEB-84, February 8, 1984, A5. I’ve included here a small sample of similar reactions by Soviets in regard to the Westminster speech.
44. Vitaliy Korionov, “20th Century ‘Crusaders,’” Pravda, July 14, 1982, 4, published as “Pravda’s Korionov Denounces U.S. ‘Crusades,’” in FBIS, FBIS-26-JUL-82, July 26, 1982, A5–6.
45. Report language is quoted by Leonid Zamyatin in his article, “The Washington Crusaders: The ‘Ideological War’ Declared by Reagan Against Communism and Socialism…,” Literaturnaya Gazeta, June 30, 1982, 14, published as “Zamyatin Scores Reagan ‘Ideological War’ Plan,” in FBIS, FBIS-14-JUL-82, July 14, 1982, A1–8.
46. “Reagan Makes ‘Anti-Soviet’ Speech to UK MPs,” Warsaw Domestic Service, June 8, 1982, printed in FBIS, Eastern Europe, June 9, 1982, G1.
47. Editorial, “Another Anticommunist Fit,” Pravda, July 22, 1982, 4, published as “Reagan’s ‘Captive Nations’ Speech Slammed,” in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 34, no. 29 (1982): 10–11.
48. A review of 1982 by Pravda, published in the January 3, 1983 edition, sweepingly said that, “The year 1982 [was]…a year when the U.S. President publicly called for a ‘crusade’ against the USSR, that is, for a political, economic, and ideological offensive against real socialism.” Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, “International Review,” Pravda, January 3, 1983, 4. Text is published as “Pravda Views International Events of 1982,’” in FBIS-SOV-5-JAN-83, January 5, 1983, CC1.
1. In May, General Secretary Brezhnev said at a major KGB conference that Reagan was committed to “a further expansion of the arms race and….working to undermine the Soviet economy.” He said that Reagan wanted to “erase the gains of international socialism through provocations” and “economic warfare.” Minutes after Brezhnev’s statement, KGB head Yuri Andropov stepped to the podium to call the advent of the Reagan administration a sign of “dangerous times.” Schweizer, Victory, xi, 40–41.
2. The Clark quote from Dobrynin comes from: Bill Clark, “President Reagan and the Wall,” Address to the Council of National Policy, San Francisco, California, March 2000, 3–5. Clark does not recall the exact date.
3. Haig’s reaction is recounted in Pipes, Vixi, 179.
4. This is one of a number of examples offered by Cannon himself which undermine Cannon’s portrayal of Reagan in Role of a Lifetime as an easily manipulated leader led around by his advisers. The president with almost no ideas of his own, according to Cannon’s first edition of the book, who was controlled by his advisers, was yet again, by Cannon’s own account, in the same book where he alleged the lack of ideas and control by Reagan, was in fact himself the main obstacle. In other words, Reagan himself was in control of the decision and direction. Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: PublicAffairs Books, second edition, 2000), 167.
5. Reagan, “Interview With Julius Hunter of KMOX-TV,” St. Louis, Missouri, July 22, 1982.
6. Reagan, “Responses to Questions Submitted by Bunte Magazine,” April 25, 1983.
7. Reagan, “Interview With Julius Hunter of KMOX-TV,” St. Louis, Missouri, July 22, 1982.
8. The 70 percent estimate was provided by Roger Robinson. Interview with Roger Robinson, June 6, 2005. The 50 percent figure was provided by Richard Pipes, who says that it was Bill Casey’s estimate. Pipes, Vixi, 180.
9. Data provided by Roger Robinson. Interview with Roger Robinson, June 6, 2005.
10. Interviews with Roger Robinson, June 6 and 8, 2005.
11. Located in “Ronald Reagan: Pre-Presidential Papers: Selected Radio Broadcasts, 1975–1979,” October 31, 1978 to October 1979, Box 4, RRL. For transcript, see Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, eds., Reagan, In His Own Hand, 73–74. Alexander Solzhenitsyn was fond of making this same point. See Solzhenitsyn, Alexander Solzhenitsyn Speaks to the West, 69.
12. In a July 9, 1979 radio broadcast, Reagan said: “Several weeks ago a Commerce Department official whose job is to monitor the sale of advanced technology to the Soviet Union so as to guard against giving them something that would be used militarily, blew the whistle on his own department.” He continued: “He said our system of export controls is a ‘total shambles.’” Reagan spoke of the debate in the Carter administration over selling “advanced American products to the Soviets.” He took aim at the dovish Carter State Department and Secretary of State, who favored increased trade. He sided with the more hawkish Carter DOD and Zbigniew Brzezinski’s NSC: “Understandably aides in the Defense Department and the National Security Council are opposed.” He concluded with this dire warning: “Maybe we should remember World War II when a former trading partner returned tons of our scrap iron in the form of shrapnel that killed our young men. What we are talking about today isn’t scrap iron. Mr. [Lawrence] Brady [director of the Office of Export Administration] says that last year only a few hundred of the 7000 requests to sell our products to the Soviet-bloc nations were turned down. We are supposed to insure that nothing we sell can be diverted to military use but that is virtually impossible to do. Truck motors turning up in assault vehicles is proof of that.” Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, eds., Reagan: A Life in Letters, 73–74. This was the polar opposite of the sort of economic warfare Reagan wanted to pursue.