23. Specifically, they stated: “But what failed earlier, when the Soviet state did not possess such powerful scientific, technical, and production potential as it does now, is all the more doomed to failure under modern conditions….The socialist countries counter imperialism’s economic aggression with the further deepening of fraternal cooperation, economic integration, and unbreakable cohesion….A resolution rebuff will continue to be dealt to the subversive actions of the ‘economic NATO.’”
24. See Caldicott speaking on “Reagan,” The American Experience, PBS.
25. To the best of my knowledge, this book is the first full examination and presentation of the Chebrikov document. The document came from the Central Committee Archives of the Communist Party of the former USSR. There are a number of different archives from the Soviet period, including, for example, the KGB Archives, the Comintern Archives, among others. The archives were opened in the early 1990s by the Boris Yeltsin government, whereupon scholars and journalists eagerly began digging into the documents. The Yeltsin government, for various reasons, closed many of the archives, including the Central Committee Archives, in the 1994–95 period.
The document that I cite here was apparently initially found by a London Times reporter in early 1992. The London Sunday Times subsequently published an article on the document, titled “Teddy, the KGB and the top secret file,” in the February 2, 1992 edition. The Times article, however, was brief and included only a few quotes from the document; the newspaper published only a photo of a small section from the upper left corner of page one of the fivepage document. Once the Times piece ran, a number of people scrambled to the archives to obtain their own copy of the document, which then began circulating in and around Moscow. Various individuals obtained copies. Shortly thereafter, the Russian government closed the file. Among those who obtained a full copy was Herb Romerstein, author of the seminal work on the Venona papers, The Venona Secrets. Romerstein is a former staff member of the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and a seasoned veteran of archival research from the Cold War period. Romerstein continues to do research from intelligence archives of former Communist countries. My copy was obtained through Marko Suprun, who got the copy from Herb Romerstein and Walter Zaryckyj. Romerstein provided details to me on the document’s origin in a number of discussions in June 2005.
26. Tunney won his seat by defeating close Reagan friend George Murphy in the 1970 race. He lost his reelection bid in 1976 to Republican Samuel Hayakawa.
27. They were classmates at the University of Virginia Law School. See the November 16, 1970 profile of Tunney in Time magazine, and Charles T. Powers, “Can John Tunney Make It as a Heavyweight?” West Magazine (Los Angeles Times), December 12, 1971. Both articles are posted on Tunney’s Web site.
28. Ibid. Tunney quote is taken from West Magazine piece.
29. Ibid.
30. When told about the Tunney-Kennedy effort two decades later, Bill Clark said that he and others in the Reagan administration had heard that certain leftist politicians were reaching out to Moscow, though Clark could not recall specific names, including Tunney and Kennedy, and never pursued the information. Interview with Clark, July 7, 2005.
31. Tunney was tracked down by the London Times, which obtained a copy of the memo in 1992. The Times’ translation makes Kennedy look even worse on the matter of personal political motivations; it says that Tunney informed the Soviets that Kennedy was “directing his efforts at becoming president of the US in 1988.” When asked about this specifically, Tunney dismissed Chebrikov’s interpretation as “bullshit.” See “Teddy, the KGB and the top secret file,” London Sunday Times, February 2, 1992.
32. I suspect that some will also claim that Kennedy’s overture was not completely unusual, since a number of liberal Democrats at the time (including the other Massachusetts senator, John F. Kerry) had gone so far as to openly meet with Communist enemies like Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega. The difference, however, is that Kennedy’s overture was to Moscow, to Yuri Andropov himself. That was quite unprecedented.
33. Vasiliy Mitrokhin, “The KGB in Afghanistan,” Working Paper No. 40, English edition, Christian F. Ostermann and Odd Arne Westad, eds., Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, February 2002. A full copy of the working paper, in PDF format, is available at the Web site of the Wilson Center. See Herbert Romerstein, “Ted Kennedy, ‘Collaborationist,’” Human Events, December 8, 2003.
34. Edward M. Kennedy, “A State of Disunion,” Rolling Stone magazine, March 15, 1984, 11–12. It is not clear whether Kennedy meant a “wider war” in Central America, which he mentioned in the previous sentence, or a “winnable nuclear conflict” generally, which he referred to in the next sentence.
35. Tim Weiner, “Lies and Rigged ‘Star Wars’ Test Fooled the Kremlin, and Congress,” New York Times, August 18, 1993, A1.
36. Interview with Peter Schweizer, September 19, 2005. In an e-mail exchange, Schweizer gave me the go-ahead to use this material and cite him as the source. Importantly, the Times article noted that the rigged test was intended to fool the Kremlin, and that it also (intentionally or not) fooled Congress. From what I could learn of the incident, the goal was not to mislead Congress. The goal was to mislead the Soviets.
37. The reporter added: “The total collapse of the European postwar order is being sought. To state it even more clearly: Socialism’s right to exist as a world system is disrupted. He [Reagan] will ‘not accept’ Yalta, he will ‘not accept’ socialism.” Hartmut Kohlmetz, “Attacks Against Yalta,” East Berlin Berliner Zeitung, August 21, 1984, published as “Reagan View of Yalta Could Disrupt Postwar Order,” FBIS, Eastern Europe, E1.
38. “Reagan Joke Echoes ‘Crusade’ Against Socialism,” Sofia BTA, August 17, 1984, published in FBIS, Eastern Europe, August 20, 1984, C1; and Yoan Mateev, “The Mistake,” Sofia Rabotnichesko Deo, August 18, 1984, published as “Reagan Joke Termed Technical, Political Mistake,” FBIS, Eastern Europe, August 22, 1984, C1.
39. Genrikh Borovik, Moscow Television Service, August 31, 1984, transcript published as “Parallels Between Reagan, Hitler Policies Posed,” in FBIS-4-SEP-84, September 4, 1984, DD4–5.
40. Reagan, “Remarks at a White House Luncheon Marking the 40th Anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising,” August 17, 1984.
41. Moscow TASS International Service, September 10, 1984, published as “Reagan Again Questions Yalta Conference Decisions,” in FBIS, FBIS-SOV-11-SEP-84, September 11, 1984, A4. 42. Valentin Zorin speaking on Moscow TV’s “The World Today” program, September 7, 1984. Text is published as “U.S. Attempts to Destabilize USSR Backfire,” in FBIS, FBIS-SOV11-SEP-84, September 11, 1984, A3–4.
43. Andrei Gromyko, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 307.
44. Both letters are contained in a folder at the Reagan Library. See: PHF, PR, RRL, Box 10, Folder 147.
socioeconomic development is also caused by serious external factors,” said Gorbachev, who thus pledged to hike Soviet defense spending in order to try to meet the heightened Reagan levels. He embarked on a new economic restructuring (perestroika) in part to provide the resources to handle that spending and to generally improve the Soviet economy. See Marc Landy and Sidney M. Milkis, Presidential Greatness (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2000), 226; Vladimir Kontorovich, “The Economic Fallacy,” The National Interest, Spring 1993, 44; and Russell Bova in Ellman and Kontorovich, eds., The Disintegration of the Soviet Economic System, 19, 43. 18. Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War, 225n.
19. Leebaert, The Fifty-Year Wound, 512.