THE UTOPIAN IMPULSE
Stalin's projection of his own ideas as natural law was, however, the result of the structural challenges of utopia in power (adoption, fulfillment of ideals, and adaptation to the world). To follow Klaus-Georg Riegel, under Stalin Soviet rule became the “hierocratic domination of the church-dispensed grace.” In the physical absence of Lenin, the numinous leader incarnating the absolute power of the party, “the imagined community of Leninist disciples”10 had to reinvent itself by founding its charisma in the scriptures of the founding fathers. The invented tradition of Marxism-Leninism was then thrust upon the party ranks as a means of purification or, rather, to stabilize the unquestionable normative identity of the party. However, Stalin's obsession with strengthening the party was not far from Lenin's dictum that “a party becomes stronger by purging itself.”11 Indeed, to prevent diffuseness of dogma and weakness among the cadre, Stalin pronounced that “the more drastic the purge, the more likelihood is there of a strong and influential Party arising.”12
The climax of this mode of operation, its most glaring and outrageous consequence, involved the “dialectical confessions” during the Stalinist show trials, those abject self-flagellations meant to give the totalitarian political order moral legitimacy: if all opponents (real or invented) were nothing but scoundrels, loathsome agents of the West, despicable traitors, and infamous saboteurs, then the Stalinist leadership, benefiting from a perfect political purity, was entitled to invoke the alibi of an “objective” historical rationality.13 These “poetics of purge” regulated ideological space within the body social and politics of the Soviet-type polity, redefining the “elect” within the community and reemphasizing their messianic role. Accordingly, the sacred history of the movement was heroically rewritten by blood and exclusion. Conceived by its founding fathers as an antistatist philosophy, Marxism culminated in the Soviet apotheosis of the party and state machine (partolatry and statolatry). The legitimacy of the Bolshevik elite derived primarily from its relationship to Marxist doctrine. Arcane as they sounded to external observers, the squabbles of the 1920s touched on the most sensitive points of what Czesław Miłosz has called the New Faith, an ideology “based on the principle that good and evil are definable solely in terms of service or harm to the interests of the Revolution.”14 The revolution was hyperbolized as a cathartic event, the advent of a new age of social justice. Marxism's claims of scientific infallibility were added into the mix. The result was a gnostic vision that explained history and society in almost geometric formulas whose deep secrets were accessible only to a select group of ideological guardians. All these factors revealed the process of intellectuals being seduced by allegedly ironclad determinism in an age of political extremes. In other words, to quote from a highly influential book of the 1930s, The ABC of Communism, “what Marx prophesized is being fulfilled under our very eyes.”15
The social promises and regenerative spirit of Bolshevism were invoked as arguments against those who deplored violence by dictatorial power. Many intellectuals, including some famous names like Maxim Gorky, André Gide, Arthur Koestler, Manès Sperber, Romain Rolland, André Malraux, and Ignazio Silone, were fascinated by what seemed to be a heroic historical adventure. The Bolshevik revolution was, to use the words crafted by the socialist politician Jean Jaurès for the French one, “a monstrous cannon, which had to be maneuvered on its carriage with confidence, swiftness and decisiveness.”16 Moreover, the Soviet Union was, for them, clearly a model for ideas and institutions, the source of a new socialist ethos, of a novel humanism, at the time when liberal, representative democracy was perceived as having failed to rise to the challenges posed by modern societies. Some of them grew disappointed with the cynicism of the Communist commissars and left the Leninist chapels; others, like Pablo Neruda and Louis Aragon, refused to abjure their faith and remained attached to hackneyed Communist tenets. Moreover, upon the Sovietization of Eastern Europe, Leninism became an alternative for national rebirth. For example, Communist doctrinaire Václav Kopecký argued in January 1948 that “the ideology of the new Czechoslovakia will be the ideology of the new People's Democratic Republic and the ideology of transition on the road from capitalism to socialism.”17 Many such examples can be found in the newspapers of those years in each of the countries in the region.18 The Communist “moral elite” claimed an exclusive mandate of salvation and historical truth in fulfilling its world mission.19 Or, in the words of Jean-Paul Sartre in 1961, “Nothing is clearer; whatever its crimes, the USSR has over the bourgeois democracies this redoubtable privilege: the revolutionary objective…. [The Soviet Union was] incomparable with other nations; it is only possible to judge it if one accepts its cause and in the name of that cause.”20
STALINISM AS A POLITICAL MYTH
The Short Course of History of the CPSU, published in 1938, represented the paradigm of Bolshevik intellectual debasement: “It not only established a whole pattern of Bolshevik mythology linked to the cult of Lenin and Stalin, but prescribed a detailed ritual and liturgy…. The Short Course was not merely a work of falsified history but a powerful social institution—one of the party's most important instruments of mind control, a device for the destruction both of critical thought and of society's recollections of its own past.”21 Turned into a gospel for the international Communist movement, this parody of Marxism was extolled as the pinnacle of human wisdom. Stalinist ideology brought to fruition the pauperization of Marxist theoretical practice and actually functioned as an effective counterdoctrine to emasculate the originally emancipatory momentum of negative dialectics and to substitute for it an opportunist-positivistic sociology deliberately situated beyond traditional moral borders. Through the Short Course, Leninism became a “true book religion” (in the words of Riegel). This “Stalinist revolution of belief” provided unitary guidance and unity of will among the cadres involved in building socialism in one country, in the Soviet modernization project. It was the literary reflection of the “monopoly of the legitimate use of hierocratic coercion” (as Max Weber put it) exercised by Stalin in the show trials. To paraphrase Souvarine, the Short Course paradigm officially transformed Leninism into a religion d'état.22 The human being that Stalinism envisaged was supposed to repudiate the classical distinctions between good and evil, scornfully discredited as obsolete through exposure to another moral code, in many points suggestive of the Nazi Übermensch. Its ideology was rooted in hatred and resentment and developed into a logic of manipulation, domination, and survival. The main task of propaganda was to purify the mind; it was like an exorcising ritual through which the regime attempted to eliminate all the vestiges of Western culture and to create the human instrument of perfect social reproduction. Its content consisted in a few mechanically reiterated themes; its method was symbolic aggression, ideological violence. In 1929, Stalin had proclaimed the “year of the great break” (god velikogo pereloma), which, according to Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, connoted “the Marxist leap from ‘necessity’ to ‘freedom’ … a complete rupture with the accursed old world…. Under Stalin's leadership, the masses were building an earthly paradise.”23 What was really happening at the time was an annihilation of free will, total intoxication, moral dereliction, and thereby absolute identification with the system. It was the Soviet version of an individual Gleichschaltung.