After seven months of operation close to 9 kilograms of purified metallic U-233 had been produced with approximately one more kilogram currently being processed for extraction, purification and separation. This was below the goal of 500 grams a week but was a pretty good achievement considering the fact that they had some start-up problems and worked only in two shifts until the reinforcement from Greece arrived in mid-January. In addition they had to wait several weeks for the build-up of the U-233 from decay of the Pa-233. Ollie convened the two scientists and asked them once again about the minimal amount of the fissile material required to ensure a successful nuclear detonation. He emphasized that a fizzle, or partial detonation, was unacceptable. Furthermore, he said that in order to demonstrate how serious they were with their blackmail threats they would have to provide blueprints of the design and a sample of the fissile material. The scientists pointed out that in this case they did not really have to construct the complete device as they could already show the design blueprints and supply a sample of U-233. Ollie could not tell them that he needed a real operational device for his true objective, so he explained that they needed the real thing since the plan included bringing a representative of the government blindfolded to a secret location where he would verify that the device existed and was operational.
Ollie then contacted Andreas and brought him up to date on the situation and said that they urgently needed more funds as the deal with the North Korean official had completely exhausted their monetary reserves. He suggested that they reconvene all their European supporters and raise more contributions, promising them that construction of the device was on schedule and delivery was due in the summer. He further proposed that this time they only summon the representatives of the movements fervently dedicated to the cause and having the ability to contribute significant funding. Ollie emphasized the urgency of the meeting and proposed that they meet again in Umea, Sweden.
Once again the handpicked guests made their way to the small bed-and-breakfast place in Bjurholm, an hour's drive from Umea airport. After dinner they all gathered by the fireplace and Ollie gave a concise presentation in which he described the progress of the project, once again without disclosing the exact location of the laboratory. He discussed the timeline and the expenditures and told them that more funding was crucial for the rapid conclusion of the project since the chances of exposure increased with every passing day. The delegates applauded and congratulated Ollie and Andreas on a job well done and said that they should now start planning the order in which their respective governments would be notified of the nuclear device and blackmailed into passing laws for "cleansing" their countries of "unwanted foreign elements of inferior races". The delegates from the separation movements did not like this blatantly racist phrase and proposed something more moderate and ambiguous like "achievement of the declared goals of all the movements". Ollie could not be bothered with this semantic nitpicking as his own objective was completely different and he let Andreas chair the discussion while he himself tuned-out and thought about his own logistical problems. The heated debate came to an end without an agreement but they all realized that they were fighting about "dividing the bear's skin before she was taken", to quote a 17th Century Irish proverb. Then, with untypical consensus for such an opinionated gathering, they agreed that this discussion could wait a few months until the device was almost ready for deployment. As for contributing more funds they were all enthusiastic and agreed to double their contribution in order to expedite the production of the device. The next day they returned to their home countries and Ollie and Andreas headed back to Stockholm.
The first meeting of the international task force (ITF) with delegates from the US, Russia, the UK and France was chaired by David Avivi. The British representative, Colin Thomas, a senior member from MI6, said that they had a strong suspicion that a disgruntled former employee of the Aldermaston Atomic Weapon Establishment had disappeared from his home in London about six weeks earlier. He announced that Doctor Jason Smalley was fired from his job because of racist comments and unacceptable behavior toward his dark skinned colleagues of Muslim origin. He was also known as an avid supporter of the British National Socialist Party's cause and contributed funds to them for which he tried to claim tax deductions. Furthermore, he said that Dr. Smalley was a physicist with experience in the design and construction of nuclear devices and advanced warheads. David saw this as a highly relevant piece of information and asked if there was any evidence that Dr. Smalley may have left the UK but Thomas said that it was practically impossible to track travel within the European Union.
David asked if they could trace Dr. Smalley's credit card transactions and Thomas said that this had been done and the last known transaction was in January, after he was fired from his job, and Dr. Smalley withdrew a large amount in cash — 3200 pounds and 5000 Euros. The only other irregular use of the credit card was one day earlier on January 20th in a small café in the City of London, quite a way from his residence in Reading. MI6 followed up on this and showed his photo around to the café's staff. The owner did not remember anything and suggested that they show the photo to the waitresses who served customers. Surprisingly, one waitress saw the photo and told them that she remembered Dr. Smalley only because she noticed the handsome blond man who was with him. When asked to describe the other man she said that he had a typically Scandinavian look with blue eyes and blond hair but he had a deep tan that looked to her a bit strange for mid-winter in London. She also noted that when he gave his order he had a slight foreign accent. Thomas had then asked her to come over to construct a picture of him with the help of a police artist and showed them the image she had constructed. He said that running the image on Interpol's database produced no certain hits but there were several dozen people who resembled the image. The list was too long so it was impractical to try and locate each one, even after eliminating those who were known to be presently serving time in jail.
The other delegates had no useful information that would help locate the clandestine laboratory if it existed. David then asked the US and Russian delegates if they could provide some physical and engineering data on a possible design of a nuclear device based on uranium 233. They refused to provide classified information for reasons of "national security" but referred the participants to Professor Google, a nickname given to the know-all internet website. According to Dr. Wikipedia, it was believed that the US produced over 2 tons of U-233 at Hanford and Savannah River at a price estimated as 2–4 million US dollars per kilogram and that there was scant public information about its potential use in a nuclear weapon. The same source noted that the presence of uranium-232 complicates its use in nuclear devices as well as posing a health hazard, so that very high purity, freshly produced U-233 is needed for a construction of a nuclear device. They also estimated that producing 15 kg of U-233 would cost 30–60 million USD according to the estimate given above. However, if indeed Professor Modena has developed a different process for producing U-233 then these cost estimates might be irrelevant and there was no data regarding the level of U-232 in such a process.