The task force members discussed their next steps for quite a long time until a consensus about the priorities was reached. They agreed that the designs of nuclear weapons in themselves were useless unless fissile materials could be obtained. They also postulated that all nuclear materials in the US were well guarded and therefore the designs themselves did not pose an immediate threat to the security of the United States. The CIA representative, BB, raised the point that these designs would be worth a fortune to terrorist organizations that could get hold of fissile materials or to state entities that did have the necessary materials but could only produce the most primitive atomic weapons. He continued to name the three states that suited this profile: Iran, Pakistan and North Korea. He added that a fanatic Muslim would rule out North Korea, but that they had no evidence that Nagib was a devout Muslim and even had ample evidence to the contrary — he liked to consume alcohol and had never refrained from eating pork products. The senior officer from the Pentagon said that military intelligence believed that Pakistan had already produced an arsenal of nuclear weapons that included multiple Megaton hydrogen bombs. Iran was therefore the most likely state that would be willing to purchase the stolen designs. Iran had a diplomatic delegation at the United Nations in New York and several of its members used their diplomatic immunity to carry out industrial espionage, purchase sensitive items and export them illegally with the help of fake export licenses and front companies, as well as encourage people to convert to Shiite Islam and turn them into "sleeping agents" that could be called upon to carry out subversive acts. Eugene said that the NNSA was also concerned that Iran would try to obtain detailed designs of advanced nuclear weapons despite its commitment iterated in the nuclear deal that was signed in 2015 not to pursue a military nuclear program The State Department representative nodded and again said that he had "no comment".
When Eugene asked if anyone had practical suggestions the members of the task force unanimously agreed that there were only two operational items: find out more about Nagib and Alia in order to understand where they were heading and increase the surveillance on all Iranian diplomats that were involved in illegal activities on US soil. Eugene's determination to contact David and the Israelis grew stronger and he started thinking of covertly inviting David to the US to unofficially advise him unbeknownst to the committee.
Chapter 6
Nagib and Alia discussed their options. Unknowingly it was quite similar to the discussion that took place in the meeting of the second task force. Nagib said that the information they had on the stick memory was worthless unless they could find a suitable partner who will help them take revenge on Israel or its strongest supporter — the United States of America. Alia repeated her objection to do anything that would harm the USA as it was a haven for her parents. They were in agreement that the most likely buyers of the advanced designs were Iran, Pakistan and North Korea, but did not rule out powerful organizations like the Islamic State that may be able to get hold of the fissile materials. Nagib had read the scientific literature and knew that with the proper facilities a nuclear device could be constructed even with materials extracted from irradiated nuclear fuel. After some deliberation on the pros and cons of each of these options they decided to focus on Iran and the Islamic State as these two entities were considered as dire enemies of the Jewish state of Israel. Alia said that they should not rule out Pakistan because it had a strong incentive to improve its nuclear arsenal as a means of retaliation to its much bigger neighbor, India. She added that she had read somewhere that there were strong anti-American feelings in that country, and there were rumors that even inside the government there was a powerful anti-American faction. Nagib said he knew nothing about this but they should not rule out this possibility.
The simplest way to make contact would be to go to one of the many mosques or Islamic Community Centers, ICCs for short, in the Los Angeles area, but as Alia was a Christian and Nagib had drifted far away from his original religion and now saw himself as an atheist, this approach could be dangerous. Furthermore, like every American, and certainly every Muslim in America, they knew that these places were normally under surveillance by the DHS and FBI. They also realized that the religious institutions were riddled with informers and planted agents so they decided to stay away from anything that was identified as a conspicuous Islamic center. There was a large community of former Iranians in Los Angeles but some, especially those that arrived in the late 1970s and early 1980s, were sympathizers of the Shah, some were fully Americanized and some were even Jewish, so finding the right contact would not be easy and could even be dangerous. Alia suggested that they travel to New York and try to contact official members of the Iranian UN delegation but Nagib said that those would probably be under close surveillance. Then they considered crossing into Mexico on the way to Cuba or Venezuela where it would be easier to find Iranian representatives and where the US law enforcement agencies could not operate freely, if at all. They ruled out this option as they believed that the border crossing would be too risky because they were sure that extra precautions would be taken to block this route.
That evening, while watching the news on TV in their motel room they were glad to see that there was no mention of their action and their photos were not shown. During a commercial break a short advertisement promoting tourism to Turkey was shown. Alia excitedly told Nagib that this would be the ideal place to make contact with Iranians and with Islamic State operatives. In addition, many Americans travelled to Turkey so they would not stand out there. The problem then was getting out of the US without being apprehended. They knew that it would be impossible to get an airline ticket and board a plane in an American airport because their description and passport information would be flagged. They did not have the contacts or the cash needed to purchase forged passports, so they figured out that their most promising route would be to cross into Canada and try to make their way to Turkey, indirectly, from there.