However, when they saw that the calculated yield of the small nuke was as large as the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki but its weight was in the range of 25 kg and not several tons they fell silent. Each one silently contemplated the implications of having such a weapon, or the repercussions if such a device fell into the wrong hands recalling that Pakistan had many enemies. As more detailed schematics of the small nuke were shown, one of the physicists interrupted the presentation pointing out the requirements of the plutonium core and saying that Pakistan had never produced such a high grade of plutonium-239, with less than 1 % of all other plutonium isotopes. The professor was pleased with the comment and said that one of the objectives of this respectable committee was to assess what would happen if the super-grade plutonium in the design was replaced by the type of material they had produced for the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. One of the physicists said that they should also discuss how the performance of the device would be affected if high enriched uranium would be used instead of plutonium, but this suggestion was immediately discounted by all other members of the committee from basic physical considerations. Another member asked if they could use uranium-233 that had relevant nuclear properties that were quite similar to plutonium but Dr. Ansari said that Pakistan had not produced this material and only half jokingly added that perhaps India could test that hypothesis as it was known that they had experimented with uranium-233 that was produced in thorium fueled reactors.
Rahman did his best to follow the discussion but was soon lost in a quagmire of physical data, arguments about cross-sections, implosion velocity, critical mass, initiators, assembly speed and other things he could only vaguely understand. The debate became heated and he noticed that there were two factions — those that believed that even lower-grade plutonium would work and those that claimed that the super-grade material was essential. There was a consensus that all the other components of the small nuke could be manufactured in-house, or were even part of the stockpile of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.
The discussion went on and on with no side convincing the other side and Rahman felt that even after three hours the committee could not reach a unanimous agreement, so he suggested that they break for lunch and continue afterwards. Professor Malick supported the motion and a light lunch was brought into the conference room. Rahman noticed that after the appetites were sated and tea was served with some sweet pastries the discussion continued in a more relaxed atmosphere. One of the physicists suggested that the debate could be settled by a field test of a device that would be constructed according to the blueprints with the highest grade Pakistani plutonium that could be made available for the test. Rahman said that this was a political issue and would involve matters of national security as Pakistan had agreed not to carry out any further nuclear tests unless India did so first. He didn't add that even if a small scale test could go undetected by satellites, seismographs, the International Monitoring System that used gamma-detection stations and all foreign intelligence services it could not hidden from the government of Pakistan. The officials would probably understand that there was a strong faction in the midst of the Pakistani administration that was undermining the legally elected government for reasons of national pride. He knew that all the scientists on the committee were members of that faction but felt that some things were best not mentioned. To his surprise, all the members of the committee nodded in approval that a clandestine nuclear test was out of the question. Prof. Malick concluded the meeting by saying that he would present both points of view to General Masood and thanked the members of the committee for their time and repeated the warning that they were not to discuss the matter with anyone outside the committee and certainly not communicate by phone, e-mail or other electronic media with any other committee member. Before departing the professor said that they should all ponder the problem and that they shall meet again three days later on July 4th.
Dr. Anwar Usman was one of the physicists that participated in the meeting. They did not know that Anwar was targeted by the CIA as a source of information and was given the codename Jairo. Anwar himself was also blissfully unaware of that. He was only in his mid-thirties but was considered as a brilliant scientist with great potential both in carrying out groundbreaking research and even as a future director of PINSTECH (Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science & Technology). He was tall and thin, with a clean shaven face that in Pakistan made a statement that he was not a follower of radical Islam, and had been a supporter of the movement that believed that Pakistan deserved respect from the world as a nuclear power and should not be treated as another backward third world country. He had graduated from Pakistan's top university at the top of his class and had published several scientific articles in leading journals that received hundreds of citations. He spent a couple of years as a post-doctoral fellow at Trinity College, at Cambridge University in the UK (not to be confused with Dublin's Trinity College) and was offered a position as a Senior Research Fellow that he declined saying that his country needed him. Upon his return to Pakistan he joined PINSTECH and soon became a leading figure in the research community. It was not surprising that he was summoned by Prof. Malick to join the committee. As a young reasonably attractive man he had many admirers among his female co-workers but his scientific career left him little time for personal life. When Alma, a good-looking female engineer who was working with him on a classified project, invited him for dinner he was glad because it was very convenient for him and saved him the trouble of dating. The relationship developed quickly and before long they became lovers, but as both were focused on their work they did not meet openly and kept the affair from their colleagues. They usually met only on weekends and spent the night together in what for him was exciting sex and for her nice and satisfying but not enough to fulfill her secret fantasies.
That changed when Alma met Linda, whom she considered to be a secretary at the US embassy. They literally met by accident when Alma failed to stop in time as a traffic light turned red, while Linda who all her life was used to respect traffic regulations, stopped promptly. The front of Alma's car suffered more damage than Linda's back fender but they only saw that after they got out of their cars. Alma was very embarrassed about the accident because she always considered herself as an excellent driver but Linda saw that the damage was minor and gently tried to get her to calm down. When she saw how distressed Alma still was she felt sorry for her and invited her for tea at a nearby café. Alma kept apologizing again and again until Linda told her to relax and enjoy her tea. They exchanged details of the car insurance and also cellphone numbers. A few days later, Alma called Linda and said that she still felt guilty about the accident and invited her for dinner. Linda said that the insurance covered the cost of the minor repair and that Alma needn't feel bad about it, but Alma insisted that the least she could do was to cook dinner for her. Linda, who as a CIA agent was encouraged to try and enlist local people, gladly accepted the invitation.