Susan was all business, as usual. “Okay — let’s begin.”
They went around the room, each person responsible for a different part of the weekly update. This group contained a Chinese military expert, an NSA analyst, a representative who specialized in South America, and a nuclear weapons expert.
“We still haven’t seen any change in Ecuador.”
“Still? What the hell?”
“Yup. The Chinese troops have not returned to China, as promised. The planes have stopped bringing in more of them. So at least the numbers aren’t growing. But the troop strength is still around two thousand.”
David said, “What are they doing?”
“They’re still training, as far as we can tell. Rifle shoots. Field exercises with the local military units.”
Susan said, “Remind me. The State Department put that in the terms of our agreement with China, right? Full withdrawal of all military forces in Ecuador. I’m not making that up?”
The South America specialist nodded. “That’s correct.”
“Is State aware that they aren’t yet in compliance?”
“We’ve made sure to share this information with our State Department rep on the SILVERSMITH team.”
“Good. Let me know what happens there, please. What’s the status of their naval vessels?”
“We got the name of the one that was completely sunk. It was…”—he checked his computer screen—“the Lanzhou. The other three ships have either sailed under their own power or been towed to Panama City for repairs. They’re there right now.”
The naval battle in the Eastern Pacific was only two weeks old. The resulting diplomatic chaos was expected.
Jinshan and Song were in jail, and China was retreating, begging forgiveness from allied nations in private, and spinning an acceptable story to their citizens on state media. Chinese citizens were told that the sunken ships had resulted from a tragic and unauthorized international training accident, with a jailed politician (Cheng Jinshan) and a navy admiral (Song) solely responsible.
Full details of new Chinese reparations and punishments were still being worked out by the diplomats. But the United States had announced certain requirements on Chinese military units in the Eastern Pacific immediately.
“Our inspectors are in Panama?”
“They are. They arrived last weekend. As stipulated, US State Department and DoD personnel are overseeing the Chinese naval vessels while they are in port. No Chinese sailors are allowed off the pier, except to go to the airport as they are flown back to China.”
The door opened and a uniformed General Schwartz walked in. “Good morning, team.”
Susan rose from her seat at the head of the table. “General, I didn’t realize you were going to make it this morning. Would you like to sit here?”
“Canceled meeting. And no. I’ll humbly accept the chair closest to the screen so that my old man eyes can actually see what we’re discussing.”
General Chester Schwartz was a US Army three-star, a Ranger, and now Associate Director of the CIA for Military Affairs. Director Buckingham had asked him to be the SILVERSMITH team’s “sponsor.” He was supposed to be informed of everything they knew and to empower them to cut through any bureaucratic barriers as they arose.
Over the past few weeks, he had also sent Chase Manning to several brand-new military commands to hand-deliver their orders. General Schwartz had worked with the Pentagon to preemptively deploy several special operations teams and high-tech military units in case they were needed for an immediate response to Chinese activity.
It was a good thing he had done so. Chase had ended up working closely with a MARSOC unit in Ecuador to steal a Chinese crypto key. This turned out to be the crucial piece of evidence that helped convince the Chinese president that Jinshan was really maneuvering PLA military units without his consent. Other military units that General Schwartz helped to activate included the newly formed Ford Carrier Strike Group. The Ford CSG proved instrumental in helping to defend the USS Farragut against the four Chinese warships in the Eastern Pacific.
Susan smiled and sat down. “We were talking about Chinese military status in Latin America.”
General Schwartz said, “I read a report yesterday saying that the PLA numbers in Manta are unchanged. Is that still the case?”
“Yes, General. The Chinese are bringing back naval personnel from their wounded ships, now docked in Panama City. But there’s no change to the ground troops in Ecuador.”
The general frowned. “So why would they be following the agreement with regard to the PLA Navy ships, but not be recalling their troops in Manta?”
David said, “Those Navy ships are worthless now. They’ve suffered severe damage. And there are US inspectors monitoring everything in Panama. That isn’t the case in Ecuador. Those PLA troops are still training. And their effectiveness hasn’t changed over the past two weeks.”
“What are you suggesting?” asked the NSA analyst. “That they are still up to something? The whistle’s been blown, David. There’s no element of surprise anymore.”
Susan didn’t look happy. “What level of readiness are we seeing across the rest of the Chinese military?”
The Chinese military expert said, “The coastal naval activity has subsided. Submarines and ships have been called into port. It’s the lowest PLA Navy activity level we’ve seen in the past five years. Army and air force units on the coast have also hunkered down. Air force flights have all but stopped. We have noticed more strategic bomber activity further inland, near Chengdu. Some exercise, we think.”
“Don’t forget to tell her about the 41s,” said the nuclear weapons expert.
“What’s he talking about?” said Susan.
The Chinese military analyst said, “Before you got here, we were going over the Chinese land-based nuclear weapons movements. The Dongfeng-41 is their newest ICBM. They’ve recently started deploying them along the Russian border.”
David said, “Isn’t that a good thing? They’re keeping Russia in check, and the nukes are farther away from us, right?”
The nuclear weapons expert shook his head. “That’s not the way it works.”
The Chinese military analyst said, “The Chinese have had ICBMs that were capable of reaching all of Russia for more than a decade. But these Dongfeng-41s are new. And the fact that they are stuck up there against the Russian border actually makes them more vulnerable to a Russian strike. But it does make it a lot harder for an American unit to attack it. Oh, and what makes the 41s special? The 41s are able to hit anywhere in the United States.”
“Haven’t the Chinese already had this capability?”
General Schwartz said, “The Dongfeng-5, right? Isn’t that the name of the Chinese ICBM that could hit anywhere in the US?”
The analyst replied, “The Dongfeng-5 has been around since the 1980s, and yes, it could reach the US. But it was liquid-fueled. So that means it would have to go through a long fueling process before they could launch it. We would see that and respond accordingly. So the Dongfeng-5 wasn’t a good first-strike weapon. Then they came up with the Dongfeng-31 in the 2000s, and its alpha version could hit the US. But it had a poor payload capability. Most of the members of my assessment team believe that the 41 is the first real game changer for them. It puts their land-based ICBMs on par with US missiles. Now they can finally hit anything in the US, and execute the attack on short notice.”
General Schwartz turned to look at the map on the screen. It showed a flat display of the earth, with winding lines to show the different missile ranges launched from China. “So, you’re saying that the recent deployment of this Dongfeng-41 to the Russian border represents an increased nuclear threat to the United States.”