BARBOUR. As he was creating general relativity, Einstein was convinced general covariance had deep physical significance. Two years later, correctly in my opinion, he completely abandoned that position. In my opinion, general covariance is an empty shell (I say something about this at the end of Chapter 10 and in the notes to it). I believe it is not possible to give any meaning to the objective content of general relativity without saying how the three-dimensional slices in space-time are related to each other. That is the very content of the theory. That is why I think the arguments for canonical quantum gravity are very strong indeed. The constraints of the canonical theory are its complete content.
DOWKER. Having made my basic points, let me now just say that I find it incredibly hard to understand how, as a solipsist of the moment, you must view science and the scientific enterprise.
BARBOUR. Answered above I think. Science should explain what we observe. We habitually observe and experience time capsules. Even granting the real difficulties with calling the square of a static amplitude a probability, should it turn out that the Wheeler-DeWitt equation does strongly concentrate the square of the amplitude on time capsules, I think that would be an incredibly strong and suggestive result.
DOWKER. Take the idea that a good scientific theory should be falsifiable.
BARBOUR. I think my idea is falsifiable in the following sense. There may well be configurations of the universe with records of my idea and mathematical proofs that the Wheeler-DeWitt equation most definitely does not concentrate the square of the amplitude on time capsules. If I too am in them, I would have to say my proposal for an explanation of why we think time flows has failed.
DOWKER. That presupposes that there will be a future in which we can try new experiments that test the theory and find that these experiments may be in contradiction to our predictions. The very word ‘prediction’, which I have used so many times in this letter, is laden with time-meaning. A prediction is a statement of expectation of something that will happen. Prediction is the lifeblood of science. How could we do science without it?
BARBOUR. I totally agree about the importance of prediction. But it does not necessarily have to involve time in the way you suggest. From observations of one side of the Moon, astronomers tried to predict what was on the other side. They got it wrong when the other side was seen. I do not think time comes into such predictions at all significantly. Consider, as Jim Hartle once did when he was quite close to my present position, geology. The rocks of the Earth hardly change. Suppose the idea of continental drift had been proposed before America had been discovered. It would have predicted the existence of America and the geology of its east coast (the west of Ireland exactly matches Newfoundland, I believe). Again, time is not essentially involved in this prediction. I think Bell puts my case very welclass="underline" ‘We have no access to the past. We have only our “memories” and “records”. But these memories and records are in fact present phenomena.’ The italics are Bell’s. Predictions are always verified in the present. That is my apologia.
As mentioned at the end of the Preface and at various places in the Notes, there have been some promising developments of the ideas presented in this book since it was sent to press in spring 1999. They are contained in two joint papers published electronically and available on the web: Julian Barbour and Niall Ó Murchadha, ‘Classical and quantum gravity on conformal superspace’, http//xxx.lanl.gov/abs/gr-qc/9911071 and Julian Barbour, Brendan Z. Foster, and Niall Ó Murchadha, ‘Relativity without relativity’, http//xxx.lanl.gov/abs/gr-qc/0012089 [the xxx is correct].
The potential significance of the first paper has already been explained on p. 349/350. At this stage, I do not wish to make any firm statements about this new work since it is incomplete and has not yet been exposed to scrutiny by other physicists, but I can at least give some idea of what is at stake. The basic issue is the status of the relativity principle. When Einstein and Minkowski created special relativity, they deliberately made no attempt to explain the remarkable structure that their work had brought to light: the existence of spacetime and its associated light cone, both being reflected in the Lorentz invariance of the laws of nature. They adopted Lorentz invariance, which assumes the existence of length, as the basis of physics. In small regions of spacetime, this still remains true in general relativity.
Taken together the two papers cited above suggest that all of the presently known facts of relativity and electromagnetism can be derived in a new and hitherto unsuspected manner from three assumptions: 1) an independent time plays no role in dynamics; 2) best matching (pp. 116/7) is the essential element in the action principle of the universe; 3) any theory satisfying these principles must have nontrivial solutions. It is the third assumption that makes a dramatic difference. Hitherto, in common with other colleagues, I had assumed (see p. 181) many different theories could satisfy the first two conditions, but, as my collaborator Niall Ó Murchadha discovered, this is not the case. The reasons for this and its remarkable potential consequences are spelled out in the second cited paper. It is frustrating not to be able to say more at the present moment, but at a time of uncertainty about the final outcome it is better to say less rather than too much. My website (julianbarbour.com) will carry more detailed information.
I conclude with some additional comments that have mostly already appeared in the UK paperback.
My website now carries an email dialogue between myself and Don Page (whom Hawking, in A Brief History of Time, credits with pointing out, with Raymond Laflamme, ‘his greatest blunder’). I think Don has made some interesting and valuable comments, including both valid criticism of some points but also reassurance on other issues on which I had doubts. Don is another person who takes the timelessness of physics utterly seriously, and, in fact, our views are very close. He has written several papers on the problem of consciousness and quantum mechanics (Sensible Quantum Mechanics). Full details can be found on my website. I should also like to mention here an idea that Dieter Zeh put forward in the meeting at Huelva in Spain at which I conducted my straw poll. This is that the universe must, of necessity, always be observed as expanding. I find this an intriguing idea and, if it is correct, it would fit beautifully with the open-ended, flowerlike structure of Platonia. I think Dieter’s idea, which I hope is correct though I have hedged my bets in this book, influenced me somewhat in the writing of Box 3 and parts of the Epilogue.
I regret that in the final chapter I made no mention of the idea of inflation, which is explained in a gripping and candid book by Alan Guth that I have at least now included in the books recommended for further reading. From reading Guth’s book I also learned that an interesting proposal of a mechanism for the ‘creation of the universe’ was made by Edward Tryon in 1973. I should also have mentioned that in 1982 Alexander Vilenkin proposed an influential alternative proposal to Hawking’s no-boundary idea (1981) and that Jim Hartle played a significant role in its development, which culminated the Hartle-Hawking wave function. My apologies to these authors (none of whom have registered any complaint). Details can be found in Guth’s book.