14. "Nor am I going to say that you dishonour them. It is not yet many days since you arrayed yourselves in the field against the descendants of those Barbarians, and defeated, with the help of the gods, a force many times more numerous than yourselves. 15. On that occasion you showed yourselves brave men to procure a throne for Cyrus; and now, when the struggle is for your own lives, it becomes you to be more valiant and resolute. 16. At present, too, you may justly feel greater confidence against your adversaries; for even then, when you had made no trial of them, and saw them in countless numbers before you, you yet dared, with the spirit of your fathers, to advance upon them, and now, when you have learned from experience of them, that, though many times your number, they shrink from receiving your charge, what reason have you any longer to fear them? 17. And do not consider it any disadvantage, that the troops of Cyrus, who were formerly arrayed on our side, have now left us; for they are far more cowardly than those who were defeated by you; at least[130] they deserted us to flee to them, and those who are so ready to commence flight it is better to see posted on the side of the enemy than in our own ranks.
18. "If, again, any of you are disheartened because we have no cavalry, and the enemy have a great number, consider that ten thousand cavalry are nothing more than ten thousand men; for no one ever perished in battle of being bitten or kicked by a horse; it is the men that do whatever is done in the encounter. 19. Doubtless we, too, rest upon a surer support than cavalry have, for they are raised upon horses, and are afraid, not only of us, but also of falling, while we, taking our steps upon the ground, shall strike such as approach us with far greater force, and hit much more surely the mark at which we may aim. In one point alone, indeed, have the cavalry the advantage, that it is safer for them to flee than for us.
20. "But if, though you have courage for battle, you are disquieted at the thought that Tissaphernes will no longer guide you, and that the king will no longer supply you with provisions, consider whether it is better to have Tissaphernes for our guide, who is manifestly plotting our destruction, or such persons as we ourselves may seize and compel to be our guides, who will be conscious that if they go wrong with regard to us, they go wrong with regard to their own lives and persons. 21. And as to provisions, whether is it better for us to purchase, in the markets which they provide, small measures of food for large sums of money, (no longer, indeed, having the money,) or, if we are successful in the field, to take supplies for ourselves, adopting whatever measure each of us may wish to use?
22. "Again, if you think, that this state of things will be better, but imagine that the rivers will be impassable, and that you were greatly misled when you came across them, reflect whether the Barbarians have not acted most unwisely also in this respect.[131] For all rivers, though they may be impassable at a distance from their sources, are easy to be forded by those who go to their springs, wetting them not even to the knees. 23. But even if the rivers shall not afford us a passage,[132] and no guide shall appear to conduct us, we still need not be in despair; for we know that the Mysians, whom we should not call more valiant than ourselves, have settled themselves, against the king's will, in many rich and large cities in the king's territory; we know that the Pisidians have acted similarly; and we have ourselves seen[133] that the Lycaonians, having seized on the strongholds in the plains, enjoy the produce of the land of these Barbarians; 24. and I should recommend that we, for the present, should not let it be seen that we are eager to start homewards, but should apparently make arrangements as if we thought of settling somewhere in these parts; for I am sure that the king would grant the Mysians many guides, and give them many hostages to send them out of the country safely, and even make roads for them, though they should desire to depart in four-horse chariots; and for ourselves, too, I am convinced that he would with thrice as much pleasure do the same, if he saw us making dispositions to remain here. 25. But I am afraid that if we should once learn to live in idleness, to revel in abundance, and to associate with the fair and stately wives and daughters of the Medes and Persians, we should, like the lotus-eaters,[134] think no more of the road homewards. 26. It seems to me, therefore, both reasonable and just, that we should first of all make an attempt to return to Greece, and to the members of our families, and let our countrymen see that they live in voluntary poverty, since they might see those, who are now living at home without due means of subsistence, enriched on betaking themselves hither. But I need say no more on this head, for it is plain, my fellow-soldiers, that all these advantages fall to the conquerors.
27. "I must also suggest to you, however, in what manner we may proceed on our way with the greatest safety, and how we may fight, if it should be necessary to fight, to the greatest possible advantage. First of all, then," he continued, "it seems to me that we ought to burn whatever carriages we have, that our cattle may not influence our movements, but that we may march whithersoever it may be convenient for the army; and then that we should burn our tents with them, for tents are troublesome to carry, and of no service either for fighting or in getting provisions. 28. I think also that we ought to rid ourselves of whatever is superfluous in the rest of our baggage, reserving only what we have for war, or for meat and drink, that as many of us as possible may be under arms, and as few as possible baggage-bearers; for you are aware that whatever belongs to the conquered becomes the property of others; and, if we are victorious, we ought to look upon the enemy as our baggage-carriers.
29. "It only remains for me to mention a particular which I consider to be of the greatest importance. You see that the enemy did not venture openly to commence war against us, until they had seized our generals, thinking that as long as we had commanders, and were obedient to them, we should be in a condition to gain the advantage over them in the field, but, on making prisoners of our generals, they expected that we should perish from want of direction and order. 30. It is incumbent, therefore, on our present commanders to be far more vigilant than our former ones, and on those under command to be far more orderly, and more obedient to their officers, at present than they were before. 31. And if you were also to pass a resolution, that, should any one be disobedient, whoever of you chances to light upon him is to join with his officer in punishing him, the enemy would by that means be most effectually disappointed in their expectations, for, on the very day that such resolution is passed, they will see before them ten thousand Clearchuses instead of one, who will not allow a single soldier to play the coward. 32. But it is now time for me to conclude my speech;[135] for in an instant perhaps the enemy will be upon us. Whosoever, therefore, thinks these suggestions reasonable, let him give his sanction to them at once, that they may be carried into execution. But if any other course, in any one's opinion, be better than this,[136] let him, even though he be a private soldier, boldly give us his sentiments; for the safety, which we all seek, is a general concern."
33. Cheirisophus then said, "Should there be need of any other measure in addition to what Xenophon proposes, it will be in our power to bring it forward by and by; what he has now suggested we ought, I think, to vote at once to be the best course that we can adopt; and to whomsoever this seems proper, let him hold up his hand;" and they all held them up. 34. Xenophon then, rising again, said, "Hear, soldiers, what appears to me to be necessary in addition to what I have laid before you. It is plain that we must march to some place from which we may get provisions; and I hear that there are some good-looking villages not more than twenty stadia distant; 35. but I should not wonder if the enemy, (like cowardly dogs that run after such as pass by them, and bite them if they can, but flee from those who pursue them,) I should not wonder, I say, if the enemy were to follow close upon us when we begin to march. 36. It will, perhaps, be the safer way for us to march, therefore, forming a hollow square of the heavy-armed troops, in order that the baggage and the large number of camp-followers, may be in greater security within it; and if it be now settled who is to lead the square, and regulate the movements in front, who are to be on each flank, and who to have charge of the rear, we shall not have to consider of these things when the enemy approach, but may at once act according to what has been arranged. 37. If, then, any one else sees anything better to recommend, let it be settled otherwise; if not, let Cheirisophus lead, since he is also a Lacedæmonian;[137] let two of the oldest generals take the command on each of the flanks; and let Timasion and myself, the youngest of the officers, take charge, at least for the present, of the rear. 38. After a time, when we have tried this arrangement, we will consider, as occasion may require, what may seem best to be done. If any one thinks of any better plan than this, let him speak." As nobody made any objection, he said, "Whosoever likes these proposals, let him hold up his hand." The proposals were approved. 39. "And now," he added, "it belongs to you to go and carry into execution what has been decided upon; and whosoever of you wishes to see his friends and relations, let him prove himself a man of valour, for by no other means can he succeed in attaining that object; whoever of you desires to preserve his life, let him strive to conquer, for it is the part of conquerors to kill, but of the conquered to die; and if any one of you covets spoil, let him endeavour to secure victory for us, for it is the privilege of victors at once to save their own property and to seize on that of the vanquished."