After being ground down by such urban fighting, the German Sixth Army was encircled and destroyed by Red Army forces, finally surrendering on 2 February 1943. Unlike the defeat in front of Moscow in 1941, which forced the Germans back several hundred kilometres but which failed to remove large formations from the German order of battle, the destruction of Sixth Army and the loss of four Axis armies completely unhinged German forces in the southern part of the Soviet Union. Due to the shift in initiative across the entire front as result of the battle of Stalingrad, scorched earth retreats became part of the German army’s arsenal on the battlefield. In spring 1943, two nearly simultaneous retreats of this nature took place. In late February/early March, elements of Army Group North’s Sixteenth Army cleared the Demiansk Pocket, while Army Group Centre’s Ninth Army carried out a similar retreat from the Rzhev salient.[35] The following order from IXth Army Corps provides a glimpse at how such retreats were understood and planned for by the German army in early 1943.[36]
I. In General
1) Every opportunity to do harm to the enemy, to slow down his movement, [and] to disrupt his supply is to be exploited.
The divisions are responsible for the destruction in their movement corridors.
The engineer commanders are commissioned for the scouting, preparation and carrying out.
2) The carrying-out of the destruction is to be arranged according to an exact plan of destruction.
3) All destruction is to be brought into harmony with the troop’s tactical movements.
Preparations for the destruction on the highway, rail road, and the Via’zma area takes place through the corps. The commander of Engineer Regimental Staff 517 is tasked with its preparation (Special Order).
The carrying-out of the destruction occurs on the order of the troop commander, in general the rear-guard (rear-guards) commander.
Orders for the demolition of especially important objects are to be given in writing to the explosive groups.
II. Destruction in the Main Defensive Area and in the Movement Corridors
1) With the beginning of the movement, the existing gaps in the obstacles in the main defensive area are to be closed, and the communication trenches and supply roads are to be blocked.
As long as they cannot be inconspicuously mined, pillboxes and combat installations are to be strewn with booby traps and mines.
2) To be destroyed in the movement corridors:
a) fountains
b) all larger and important bridging objects, especially those vitally important for supply traffic of the enemy in the muddy time. […]
c) heated halls, garages for vehicles, workshops.
d) command posts and troop camps, especially in the vicinity of the rail stations […]
e) supply installations including equipment and vehicles
f) other objects important for combat (hospitals, warehouses, etc)
Mines need to be scattered on all bridge by-passes of demolition objects and on all fords against tanks and trucks. […]
3) Destruction of Shelters
It begins with the withdrawal from the Ia-Line and is to be correspondingly carried out with the march movements.
The still remaining civilian population is to be consolidated into individual houses; that which is necessary for life is to be left for them.
Special commandos (ski troops off the street) are to be assigned for the carrying out of this destruction. The troops are to be correspondingly equipped with the necessary materials (matches, Molotov cocktails, etc). That is to be organized now.
4) Destruction of Material and Supply Goods
No weapon, no equipment, no supply goods can fall in the hands of the enemy.
The first principle is that all weapons (including captured weapons), all ammunition, especially scare munitions, are to be saved and sent away.
As long as ammunition cannot be evacuated, it is to be shot-off on enemy artillery, previously known assembly areas, etc. beginning immediately or to be used for the demolition of objects in the main defensive area.
As long as food stocks, fodder, etc. cannot be evacuated, a timely destruction is to be guaranteed (open potato clamps).
Ovens and stove pipes as well as windows are to be saved and delivered to the new position. There will be no new deliveries. […]
III. Destruction in front of ‘Buffalo’
A 15km deep desert zone is to be created forward of the ‘Buffalo’ position.
The population necessary for keeping the roads clear is to be consolidated in towns and villages during the course of the march. All remaining towns and villages are to be destroyed, beginning now (windows and wood for bunker construction). The burning down can be carried out with the beginning of the movement. The failure to do so in order that the troops marching through can secure shelter is forbidden.
The commanders of the fortification construction staffs are responsible for the destruction. They are to personally report in writing the complete destruction (with maps). […]
As the order indicated, scorched earth retreats were based on the notion of military necessity or, in other words, trying to ensure that the German army remained superior in the field to its Soviet counterpart. Anything that could benefit the on-coming Red Army was either to be destroyed – such as shelters, bridges, or installations – or dragged to the rear – such as weapons, food, and ammunition. Of particular note, the order made no mention of forcibly evacuating the civilian population, which later became an important component of scorched earth retreats; instead, it explicitly stated that civilians were to be left with enough food to live. How this was enforced is of course an entirely different issue, and depended on how the officer or NCO in charge interpreted how much food was needed for civilians’ survival and how much was required by the army for its tasks and even its perceived survival.
The defensive and positional warfare posture adopted by the army in the northern and central sections of the front is well captured by an entry in the 126th Infantry Division’s war diary from March 1943.[37]
I visited the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and sections of the 13th and 14th companies of [Infantry Regiment] 426 and the deployed battalions of the 1st and 2nd [Mobile Battalion], the mounted rifle platoon 426, flak and the reconnaissance squadron. The combat position here lies in the middle of a swamp. With every step, one breaks through the thin covering of ice up to the knee. Elements of the men have absolutely no shelter and, wrapped in blankets, sleep during the day next to the machine gun as long as they do not have fatigue duty. At any moment, one must be prepared for a heavy artillery attack, which has repeatedly come on previous days. The battalion, which has repelled heavy Russian attacks and is well supported with anti-tank weapons, confidently looks forward to the coming weeks. The spring sun gives a new optimism despite the difficult circumstances.
35
For further discussion of the former, see Rutherford,
36
IX. Armeekorps/Ia, Betr.: Zerstörung im Falle ‘Büffel,’, 20.2.1943, NARA T-315, Roll 388.