July 1943 witnessed the last gasp of German offensive warfare during the Battle of Kursk. The scaling down of German goals for this offensive clearly indicated that the army had severely bled during the preceding years of war. Instead of an offensive designed to destroy the entirety of the Red Army and Soviet state, as in 1941, or one predicated on seizing the Caucasus oil fields and hopefully smashing the remaining Soviet power sent to defend the southern wing in 1942, the objective in 1943 was much more modest. It centred on ironing out a Soviet bulge in the line and destroying Soviet offensive capabilities, thus freeing German troops for use as a reserve both in the East and for deployment in other threatened theatres. Postponed several times due to the desire to introduce the Panther and Tiger tanks to the battlefield, the Germans lost any element of surprise and the battle closely resembled the attritional warfare of the First World War, albeit fought with the primary weapons of the Second World War – tanks, planes in the role of tank hunters, and ATGs.[44] While the decisive engagement of the battle was fought on the southern wing, it was the failure of Ninth Army’s attack on the northern wing that ultimately doomed the offensive. The 7th Infantry Division, located on the far left shoulder of Ninth Army’s advance, went onto the attack on 5 July and, though it reached its goals on the first day, subsequent attacks in the following days made very limited progress; by 16 July, the division had been withdrawn from the offensive in order to meet a major Soviet counterattack launched against the Orel bulge. For the next three and a half weeks, the division participated in costly defensive fighting against the Red Army until it took up positions in the Hagen Line in mid-August. The following monthly status divisional report was sent to its superior corps on 1 August 1943 and details the effects of such heavy fighting on the unit and its combat efficiency.[45]
1. Personnel Situation on cut-off date of report: 1.8.43
a) Missing ranks: 95 officers (of which 14 are medics, 3 veterinarians, 9 officials)
492 NCOs
2,822 Men
180 Hiwi[46]
b) casualties and other departures in the reporting period from 1.7.43 to 31.7.43
officers: 23 dead, 100 wounded, 3 missing, 4 sick, 6 left for other reasons
NCOs and men: 518 dead, 2,997 wounded, 165 missing, 194 sick, 111 left for other reasons
c) replacements who arrived during the reporting period
officers: 11 replacements, 4 convalescents
NCOs and men: 780 replacements, 196 convalescents. […]
3. Value Judgement of the Commander
1) Combat Value
The division has been in large-scale fighting for one month. The hard fighting during Operation Citadel, the extremely difficult actions of the division in defending the enemy’s major offensive and the beginnings of the Hagen-movement carried out under the most difficult combat conditions with the highest physical and mental stress for the combatants have considerably reduced the division’s high combat value. The division has suffered very high numbers of casualties and an extraordinary number of weapon and equipment losses.
The troops, who can scarcely get any rest, are completely exhausted physically, have reached the edge of their effectiveness and are no longer capable of offensive actions.
On the defensive, the front only holds when the artillery is the decided bearer of the defence and the man in the trench knows that tanks or a mobile panzer defence is behind him. The troops can only move forward for counterthrusts through extraordinarily spirited leaders under the accompaniment of tanks or assault guns. The high losses of precisely the best leaders and soldiers have left hardly any such leaders. In case of enemy breakthroughs, continual crisis situations are the result. The ceaseless large-scale combat, without any possibility for sufficient sleep or the necessary quiet and care, has taken its toll on the troops so that even the strongest wills can no longer muster the strength to resist or for the simplest tasks of daily life. A long period of rest is urgently required for refreshment and training in order to cover the missing leaders, NCOs and specialists and to train the replacements (partially older year age group, men rated as indispensible, men from Alsace) who are in no way sufficient for the demands of the war in the east.
The loss of artillery observers, signal personnel of all units and drivers and medical personnel is threatening. Therefore, crisis situations that arose could only be mastered through the mobilization of all strength. It must again be started here through systematic training.
In line with the high casualties are the division’s losses of weapons. Without assault guns, panzer security is no longer available due to the very high losses of weapons in the anti-tank battalion and the 14th Companies. The equipping of the division with self-propelled ATGs has proven itself to be absolutely necessary […]
Mobility:
Due to the high losses in horses and vehicles, mobility has considerably sunk from that of the previous month.
Infantry is on average 75% mobile.
Artillery with the light battalions is about 60%, with the heavy battalion, 55%.
During a march movement, numerous vehicles can only move in shuttle traffic.
Mobility of the heavy ATGs have sunk to 50% due to the losses of towing vehicles.
2) Morale and Mood
With its deprivations and stresses, the large-scale battle depressed the attitudes of the overburdened troops, without leading one to characterize their attitude as bad.
Political events, the continual attacks on the cities of the Heimat shake the heart and mind of the soldiers. All of these events together cripple the confident mood.
When the soldiers can again properly rest and sleep, the attitude will quickly reach its old high level. […]
Concluding Judgement:
Due to its present combat strength, the condition of each individual soldier, [and] the weapon and equipment outfitting, the division is not capable of an attack. With support from assault guns or tanks, after the feeding of the necessary number of officers, and when it is freshly rested, it can defend a sector appropriate to its strength.
The various issues that afflicted German combat efficiency during the war in the east all emerge in this document. Heavy casualties were simply not made up for by newly arriving replacements and, perhaps even more importantly, those killed and wounded were the experienced officers, NCOs and veterans of the rank and file desperately required by the unit during a period of such high-intensity combat. Losses of specialists were similarly detrimental to the divisions as the incoming soldiers from the rear did not possess the necessary training to fill these vital roles. Material deficiencies – ranging from shortages of horses and vehicles to ATGs and assault guns – significantly limited both the division’s mobility and its defensive capabilities against Soviet armour. Finally, the battle itself cannot be separated from the larger context of the war: while the men struggled against a more powerful and mobile foe, they were also aware of the bombing of their homes and the developing situation in Italy. Morale in 1943 increasingly became an issue that worried German authorities. In sum, these various issues led to the formation – a first-wave, elite infantry division – being classified as not only incapable of attack, but also able to mount a strong defence only after certain conditions had been met. This exemplified the ‘infantry crisis’ that plagued the German army from mid-1943 on, one further discussed in chapters 3 and 6.
44
For recent examinations of the Kursk battle, see Karl-Heinz Frieser, ‘Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,’ in
46