Following the defeat at Kursk, the pendulum of war permanently swung in favour of the Red Army, as it maintained the initiative for the remainder of the conflict. While the Soviet offensive to the north of the Kursk salient sparked the end of Operation Citadel, it was the counter-offensives to the south in the second half of 1943 that put real pressure on the German army in the east. The following report issued by the 306th Infantry Division highlighted the experiences of a German unit during this period of combat and retreat.[47]
1) The attached report of an experienced regimental commander proven in heavy fighting accurately portrays the condition of the troops known to me for weeks.
Under strictest application of Führer order No.6 with pistol in the hand, Oberstleutnant Wittmüss had [again] personally led companies to the front, whose officers had fallen. He has again proven the necessary hardness for large-scale, intensive fighting.
He has been instructed by me, that an extraction of the 306th Infantry Division or even parts of it seems impossible in the actual operational and tactical situation.
2) After consultation with the divisional doctor, I report on the health condition of the fighting troops:
a) All cases of non-communicable diseases remain with the troops.
b) Since the troops had no opportunity for bathing or washing for 2½ months, they are completely full of lice.
c) 60% suffered from scabies, 20% have lower-leg ulcers or extensive periarthritis.
d) Under normal circumstances, around 25% of the fighting troops had to be treated for 3-4 weeks in a military hospital.
e) The combat power suffers from complete physical exhaustion. It was found several times that individual soldiers were no longer responsive or that their will to survive had fully disappeared.
Appendix: Grenadier-Regiment[48] 579/Cdr., Value judgement on the combat power of the regiment, 1.12.43
In its current condition, the regiment as a unit cannot cope with offensive or defensive tasks.
Through uninterrupted action lasting for weeks, combat morale and the state of training have decreased to a point, which can only be termed as deficient.
Its causes lay in the following:
1) A welding together of the Kampfgemeinschaft has been largely hampered by disproportionately numerous changes in command and fluctuations of rank and file through casualties. For example the I. battalion has changed its battalion leader ten times since the last Mius battle. In the period from the beginning of October until now, 28 company and battalion leaders have been withdrawn due to injuries, with an average of 6 companies in action. In the same period, while 48 NCOs were sent as replacements, 76 NCOs were wounded, and with 525 men sent as replacements, 586 fell out. The balance between replacements and losses has been covered by the combing-out of the baggage train. Losses were nearly completely men from the [regiment’s] combat strength.
2) The physical demands of officers, NCOs and rank and file have reached a dimension in the last weeks that exceed the soldiers’ strength. The rank and file’s state of exhaustion, which leads to indifference towards all events and disinterest in one’s own fate, has up to now been balanced out only to a certain percentage by the unparalleled example and ruthless severity of officers and the few remaining NCOs, who in many cases forced the will to resist in the frontline with pistols in hand.
3) The increase of demands in the last 3 weeks combined with the losses of 30.11. (from 7 [officers]: 28 [NCOs]: 201 [men] attacking soldiers, 6:6:61 have become casualties, which means 60 per cent of officers, 20 per cent of NCOs and 30 per cent of the men) has caused the troops’ resistance power to drop to the minimum, especially since the designated and urgently needed authorized day of rest on 11.11. as well as on 26.11. could not be executed, but rather in its place a night movement under most difficult road conditions had to be carried out. Alertness at night could only be achieved by forcing the soldiers to stand next to their foxholes. Lack of trust in themselves and in their ability to use their weapons is widespread and this is caused by the fact that machine guns generally only fire, when a NCO or an offices himself mans the weapon.
Despite the circumstances described above, I believe the troops to be good in their substance and the condition is caused by overstrain, and is not a phenomenon of the fifth war year. A short period of relaxation is necessary, in which NCOs and officers could again influence their men; raising of morale and physical refreshment are inevitable. Then, in a short time, the will to resist will increase, the combat power will strengthen and the value of the troops which had proven itself many times in numerous hard fights in the past again will be achieved.
As this report notes, continual Soviet offensives had an extremely deleterious effect on the German army’s combat efficiency. As pointed or in previous documents, the losses of experienced commanders and men fell disproportionately on the combat units and, while their numbers could at least be partially made up for by putting rear-area soldiers into the front lines, their training, knowledge and abilities were simply lost. Constant combat meant that soldiers had no time to tend to their hygienic needs and this inevitably resulted in lice infestation and a series of debilitating diseases. The combination of sickness, a leadership vacuum and simple physical and mental exhaustion culminated in a situation in which a frontline German infantry regiment was assessed as incapable of mounting either a successful offensive or defensive operation. According to the regimental commander, only a period of sustained rest would allow for the unit to return to its previous state; for the German army in late 1943, however, the scarcity of reserves meant that rest was a luxury it could not afford.
The infantry crisis that permeated the German army in 1943 and 1944 was starkly described in the following letter sent by the first general staff officer (Ia) in the elite Grossdeutschland Division to a superior in December 1943.[49]
I used today’s thick fog to somewhat more closely inspect the present main combat line and to speak with the regimental commanders, the battalion leaders and the NCOs leading the companies. The following brief description comes out of this information.
1) The present main combat line (or MCL) is even significantly less favourable than it appears on the map; nearly the entire section of the Fusilier Regiment can be seen from a long distance on all sides and therefore it receives extraordinarily high casualties through enemy fire. The enemy himself has his numerous ATGs so superbly built into his line that in general, they have not been detected and combated by our Panzers. A shifting of the MCL into the prepared line on both sides of Wyssokij would therefore be especially desirable.
2) I myself looked at the just brought-in prisoners of the newly deployed independent 31st Guard Panzer Brigade, namely of the Motorized Rifle Battalion. They were again for the most part briefly trained Ukrainians, who, however, made a good impression. The sending in of this brigade shows that the enemy still has his main point of emphasis in this sector and therefore will again pursue his goal of a breakthrough in the next few days. This will give us no quiet in the next few days.
3) The following is to be said about our own troops:
Such a degree of exhaustion, which cannot be exceeded, has now occurred in all parts [of the regiments] up to the regimental staffs. As far as I know, we are indeed the sole division that has been constantly deployed at the point of emphasis and almost daily in combat without a day’s rest since the beginning of July (start of [Operation] Citadel). The result of this constant combat is that the greater part of the officers and almost all NCOs have become casualties and also a cadre of veteran men no longer exists. The few remaining officers found at the front are the only ones who can master the situation that now exists there, but they are no longer supported by NCOs because they are no longer available. Almost all of the men are apathetic to such an extent, that they are fully indifferent to being shot dead by their own officers or by the Russians. It is already sufficient for the Russians to stand up in their trenches and shout ‘Hurra’ to prompt everyone getting up out of our fox holes and retreating. This is the moment when even the most able officer no longer has any influence over the troops. The retreating men don’t even react to threats made with weapons any more. Any art of persuasion or appealing to their honour is likewise fruitless. One therefore needs to take into consideration that the men of these battalions are the best that there are in the German army because they constitute a carefully chosen group of replacements from the entirety of the Reich. The recruits, the majority of which unfortunately have already fallen, of course first and foremost look to the veterans and they retreat just as older men do, when they see the poor example. I have had details described to me on the spot that I will spare you, but which are really sad enough. That we are still successful in holding a position and ironing out smaller mishaps is either that sometimes an officer is successful in utterly forcing it through or the carefully maintained 16-man assault detachment of the regimental commander is thrown into the hot spot and will take those retreating forward again.
47
306. Infanterie-Division/Kdr, An Gruppe Schwerin mit der Bitte um Weitergabe an Gen.Kdo. LVII. Pz.Korps und 1. Panzer-Armee, 4.12.43, BA-MA RH 21-1/120a.
48
German infantry units up to the level of regiments were renamed as “Grenadier” units in October 1942. The term is French, but it had a long tradition in the German army going back to Frederick the Great.
49
Schreiben von [Oldwig von] Natzmer, Oberst i.G [Ia PzGrenDiv GD] an [Oberst Hellmuth] Laegeler, 1.12.1943, BA-MA RH 21-1/120.