Professional German military understanding of leadership was based on an image of war founded, respectively, by Clausewitz and Moltke the Elder. War was seen as a phenomenon of contingency, in which chaos, coincidence and friction reigned, as well as an arena of moral powers, in which the character of the general and the military spirit of the army were vital factors. To command in the uncertain field of war and battle, virtues such as boldness and tenacity were an absolute necessity for a leader. Only those who had a strong will and an eye for the situation could influence battle by using the elusive chances of the moment. As the modern battle had become very complex, it was not possible for a commander to overview and control all things and actions – decentralizing responsibility of command and initiative were seen as appropriate ways to reduce this complexity. This was accompanied by the conviction that the value of an army depended on the ability of individual soldiers and the initiative of low-level leaders and even enlisted men. Staffs – not an idea of German origin, but strongly emphasized by the German military between the mid-nineteenth century and the Second World War – to support the commanders and thus free them from more technical aspects of command were another path to reduce complexity.
Based on the views and convictions described above, the German military developed over the decades an idea of command that is not easily grasped and which is too often misleadingly termed Auftragstaktik. Mission command is popularly described as a superior ordering a mission, allocating forces and defining boundaries, but then leaving the subordinate free as how to fulfil his mission. By examining German regulations, discussions and training papers, Marco Sigg has shown that mission command was part of German understanding of leadership, but it was embedded in a wider understanding than is often portrayed in the literature. The resulting system of command was founded on seven elements. The key factor – based on the image of war presented above – was a commander’s character, which must include determination, courage, boldness, drive, and willingness to accept responsibility. Closely connected as a second foundation was offensive thinking; attacking would keep the Gesetz des Handelns, or initiative, on one’s own side and thus force the enemy to react to it. Likewise, troops on the offensive were seen as the force possessing the stronger combat morale. Offensive thinking was accompanied by independence, the most controversial part of German command as it included initiative, but this could also develop into arbitrary acts on the part of the commander. A closer look at regulations and training papers reveals that independent action should happen mainly within the framework of a given mission and only against a given mission order in a clearly defined exception, i.e., when the fulfilling of the mission was endangered or an opportunity was seen, but urgent necessity or lack of communication with superior command levels did not allow for consultation. But while this is the very heart of German Auftragstaktik – the leader on the spot decides and possibly even against orders from his superior – training documents indicate that this was viewed as a rare occurrence. The Replacement Army’s Chief of Training Issues noted in a leaflet on command in 1944: ‘Deviate from mission 5%, hold on: 95%.’[2] Regulating independent action and initiative were the fourth and fifth elements of German command: obedience and discipline, which were important components of the unity of action, or Moltke’s ordre de bataille. The latter meant the coordination and cooperation of arms and branches as a whole. This was achieved by tight command and functioning communication. The ability to judge – the sixth element – describes the creative part of leadership. This included the need to evaluate situations, but also the ability to not be fatalistically locked into any schema in command, such as rigid battle plans. Content was always more important than form. Finally, the German command system included the ‘command process’, which consisted of evaluating the situation, formulating a decision and giving orders. This also included formulating the intention of the commander and the mission for the subordinate. Mission command in the German understanding would only work if these elements were brought together and balanced situationally. To be clear: success was by no means something built into the definition of Auftragstaktik. Many German successes were achieved by arbitrary acts, and German mission command inherently contained the idea of failure, as one of the central German norms was that inactivity was worse than acting incorrectly. Such a complex model of leadership could only work with leaders well trained and educated to follow intuitively the norms and values inherent to the system.
Many of the issues discussed above can be seen in the following account of Oberst Richard Wolf, CO of Infantry Regiment 208, 79th Infantry Division, describing the first attack of that regiment on the Red October complex in Stalingrad, including loss of control by the higher command levels, problems in coordinating the different arms, or delays in tactical communication:
Then [1.30pm] the well-known crisis of the attack occurred. No message at all came from the front. […] One heard only sporadic small arms fire and the detonation of hand grenades and satchel charges from the attack area. […] All communication lines to the front were broken. All wires were shot up. An elimination of the jamming was nearly impossible. Both radio lines failed. The ultra-high frequency radio was still working, but the station received no new messages. Only by going through significant trouble was it possible to communicate by messengers after hours. […] These were anxious hours for the command. The higher levels of command demanded new situation reports nearly every half an hour. The liaison officers of the heavy weapons asked for new missions. Minutes passed incredibly slowly, they became torturous hours. It was not easy to stay calm. […] Then, around 4pm, came the liberating message [that the Volga was reached].
A clear mission, independent action, and initiative should allow frontline units to act even without any further orders from the superior command levels to keep the attack flowing. What this meant in practice could be seen from the after-action report from 7./Infantry Regiment 211, 71st Infantry Division, as it approached Kiev from the west in August 1941.[3] It indicated how much could be achieved by educating the last soldier to maintain the initiative:
8.8.41: The night has been calm. In pouring rain at 10 o’clock we attack again after a short artillery preparation. A Russian machine gun group at the edge of the forest offered considerable resistance. A part of the company attacked that machine gun in a spirited advance. The company commander, Oberleutnant Westphal, fell at the head of the company. Obergefreiter Weber, leader of the company troop, took the command of the company on his own initiative without any specific order, and carried the attack forward and destroyed the machine gun. In this way, he created the prerequisite for the company’s further advance. The company now had the mission to comb through the very dense municipal woods of Kiev and to reach the northern edge. It encountered considerable resistance, essentially from the right flank where all contact with the 3rd battalion was lost.
The battalion’s adjutant, Leutnant Pastor, now took command of the company. During a violent surprise artillery attack, however, he found the hero’s death after only leading the company for half an hour. Again the company troop leader took command of the company on his own initiative. A fortified and occupied kolkhoz blocked the further advance of the company. Now a short halt occurred. The company had now to repel some strong counterattacks out of the open right flank. Through ruthless action, these were repelled and the kolkhoz overrun.
2
Cited in Marco Sigg,
3
7./I.R. 211, Schilderung der Kämpfe um Kiew in den Tagen vom 6.-9.8.41, 28.9.41, BA-MA RH 24-29/29.