1) With the broad front sectors and vastness of the Ostraum, every leader must be educated to fight independently, to secure his flank and rear, and to fulfil his combat mission in the sense of the whole. A much more flexible training of the entire low-level leadership is therefore necessary. […]
3) The great carelessness, which manifests itself in the advance in concentrated clusters, in reckless movements at open points, lack of camouflage, rattling with equipment, loud chattering, etc., must be combated again and again, especially by the responsible leaders.
There is a need to put more emphasis on this – this is mainly the responsibility of the company commander – that the troops on the battlefield are not concentrated but moving in open order. If breaks occur, every man must necessarily take cover or lie down. Everything must be done to ensure that unnecessary losses are not caused by negligence and a certain amount of herd instinct.
Particularly the officer must here act as an example through warlike behaviour, coupled with a willingness to take responsibility and the drive of his own initiative.
4) […] The young company leaders lack a thorough training in leadership. This defect cannot be replaced by combat experience. Therefore, it is necessary for the company leaders to learn: a) tactical principles on the basis of manuals and based on the experience of the war, b) estimate of the situation and terrain c) formulation of decision and giving of commands, d) cooperation with heavy weapons, artillery and tanks, e) training of leaders for reconnaissance patrols and assault detachments f) organization, armament, equipment and training of reconnaissance patrols and assault detachments. […]
5) It has repeatedly been shown that the mass of officers and NCOs is not able to train properly when units are withdrawn for refreshment behind the front. […]
9) In the training of the officers, close combat training (with rifle, pistol, submachine gun, hand grenade and satchel charge), in conjunction with the training of reconnaissance patrols and assault detachments must be more stressed. The leader and subleader must learn to recognize each weakness of the opponent on the battlefield, and be educated to trigger the corresponding counter-measure in a flash-like manner. […]
24) The leader and the NCO must have a certain ability to acquaint themselves quickly with captured weapons and to get the most out of this weapon for battle. The officer must take a certain pleasure in dealing with weapons of all kinds and their capabilities. The officer and the NCO must be able to use all the weapons of his branch. Where there are gaps, they would have to be closed if applicable in combat. In officer training, it must be expressed that it is no shame if even the officer is not familiar with individual weapons, but the greater his effort must be to close such gaps in training. […]
25) The reports on the enemy and the situation must be formulated in such a way as to give a clear picture of the situation to the superior command level. Reports of the enemy must pay more attention to the impression of the enemy that the troops in the front have; therefore a critical assessment of the report and a corresponding forwarding. Education to check out the situation oneself as often as possible.
The directive demanded more care in preventing losses, better training in close combat and weapons handling, and an improvement in clarity and precision of messages. In addition, the order addressed issues typical to the German command system, such as an eye for the situation, independent command, and the will to take responsibility. The stress in point 5 on the general lack of command abilities of young company commanders is quite striking. A sufficient training of the low-level leadership was never fully achieved in the war, and the longer the war endured, the more low-level leaders became simple one-dimensional fighters, who electrified their men on the battlefield, but were not full-fledged leaders in the German sense. They still often matched their opponents in quality, but could not fully reach German leadership standards. This was also recognized by the German army and had organizational consequences, as discussed here in a presentation of Army Group South’s propositions to raise the combat power of the infantry in 1943:
Furthermore, it proved that the company leader was not able to orderly lead a strong company with numerous attached weapons, since he had increasingly transformed from a tactical leader to a standard-bearer as the war progressed. The tactical leadership fell to the battalion commander. Accordingly in some Panzer divisions even organizationally attached medium mortars and heavy machine guns were deployed by the battalion. However, due to the large width [of the company sectors], the machine guns must be again placed at the disposal of the companies in the defence.[8]
The problem was that the losses in the higher ranks made it necessary to promote neither fully-formed nor fully-prepared officers to the battalion and regimental levels. While special courses – including ones for divisional commanders beginning in 1943 – should have helped them, quality nonetheless suffered even with elite units, as a training order from Panzer Grenadier Division ‘Grossdeutschland’ in May 1943 reveals:
The proper conduct of combat: battalion commanders, company leaders, platoon leaders must be educated to fight with the most economical use of men and under the maximum use of machines. The favourite scheme of most battalion commanders with 1st company right, 2nd company left, and 3rd company in the centre behind must yield to a more intellectual approach.
In this context, one cannot emphasize enough a good training, with sufficient time, of low-level leaders of all ranks, particularly the lower ones. Special arrangements of training are necessary. With them, the troops stand and fall.[9]
The source also points out again the importance of low-level leadership for the combat power of the troops, but also the need for training of those leaders behind the front line. What would such training look like?
The following order originates from the 58th Infantry Division, whose commander, Generalmajor Friedrich Altrichter, one of Germany’s most prolific writers on military psychology and officer training, gives an idea about leadership training of frontline units.[10]
1) Objective of the leadership training
The training of the officers and NCOs is of decisive importance for the fighting power of the troops. The training of the officers and NCOs has the objective of raising their professional skills, strengthening their authority, providing them with uniform perceptions and convictions.
It is frequently noted that in front of their men, officers and NCOs stand their ground before the enemy, but are not capable of acting as tactical leaders, instructors, and educators of their men. In order to master these tasks, a certain amount of knowledge and insight is necessary, which can only be gained through proper special training.
2) Organization of Leadership Training
Leadership training is divided into:
A) Commander’s Course
B) Training of officers by regimental and battalion commanders
C) Training of NCOs
D) Map exercises
3) Execution of leadership training in detail
To point 2) A Commanders’ Course
Purpose: Instruction on the tasks as battalion commander, to deepen the knowledge of the service, to teach the principles of education and training of officers, uniform approach to the handling and organization of the individual service issues.
Head: Division commander
[…]
Participants: the regimental and battalion commanders as well as their deputies.
8
Auszüge aus den vom Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe Süd an O.K.H. eingereichten Berichten über die Hebung der Kampfkraft der Infanterie, 1943, BA-MA RH 11-I/44.
9
Panzer-Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland/Ia, Gliederung, Führung und Ausbildung unterster Einheiten der Panzergrenadiere, 24.5.1943, BA-MA RH 26-1005/41.
10
58. Infanterie-Division/Ia, Divisionsbefehl für die Führerausbildung Winter 1941/42, 14.11.41, BA-MA RH 26-8/37.