d) Guidance in the handling and arrangement of the different service areas. Instruction on that in the commanders’ course.
e) Principles for the establishment of training plans. The leader must learn how to organize the different training issues by subject matter and in time. The frequently observed idle time of training is mainly due to the fact that the NCOs are not able to do this. Pyramid-like training process, i.e. from the parts to the whole. Gradually increase the difficulty of the exercise and the speed of its execution.
C) Training as a leader
The training is divided into: map exercises (map 1:25,000 as a field substitute), tactical walks, instruction demonstrations, officer classes for firing at the artillery arm.
Leadership training must always be carried out by means of practical tasks. Purely theoretical instructions are pointless. The theory is to be deduced from practice. The resulting knowledge will finally be proven in the regulations.
Carrying out of the map exercises and tactical walks:
Mistakes in the map exercises and tactical walks: Unit level too high. Principle: Train leaders in the command of their units. Gain certainty here first, then the next higher level.
Mistake in artillery map exercises: too much firing technique, too little artillery tactics.
The tasks have to be introduced straightforwardly into the situation, which must be as simple as possible. Principle: the tactical framework is the next higher unit level. Everything superfluous in the situation is to be omitted.
The tasks must include the subject areas of our ‘daily bread’, i.e.:
a) Advance of the reinforced platoon that has already deployed into a skirmishing line (reinforced company). (Select terrain which causes change of the formation).
b) Behaviour of the reinforced platoon (reinforced company) when deploying into a skirmish line and receiving enemy artillery fire or machine-gun fire from long distances,
c) Advance of the reinforced platoon (reinforced company) under covering fire of light and heavy weapons (especially to practice: precise orders for mortars and subordinate heavy machine guns and ATGs)
d) Deployment of the reinforced platoon (reinforced company) behind a cover aa) for the further advance, bb) for the assault
e) Break-in and fight in the depth of the enemy’s zone. To be practiced in conjunction with this: taking nests by pincer attack, advance past flanking nests, either with the whole reinforced platoon (reinforced company), or only with parts, as other parts must suppress the nest. (Procedure depends on position and condition [of the nest].) Combating flanking nests, which block further progress with fire, defence against enemy counterattacks in own sector or neighbouring sector, behaviour after taking a nest. All these tasks are to be practiced as decision-making tasks.
f) Agility tasks: quick occupation of a height, rapid deployment on the flank, rapid deployment to defend against a surprise attack.
g) Defence against enemy tanks. Proper and rapid use of the anti-tank rifle and ATG, conduct of the weapons firing armour-piercing bullets, of the other riflemen.
h) Orders to subordinate heavy machine-gun groups for the covering of deployment (when to open fire?), support of the attack (always indicate clear targets. When to open fire?)
i) Orders to subordinate mortar groups to support the attack (when to open fire?).
Procedure of training
The instructor must fight the inclination of the leaders to tell what they would do. Right from the beginning pay attention to command language. This is facilitated by integrating persons to which the commands actually are directed. […]
4) Indications for the external form of the leadership training:
Outer form informal. As little as possible military drill-like. Smoking, coffee-drinking etc. No harshness of the superior. Frank discussions. The commander and his officers must look forward to it in the same way.
The training of German command personnel aimed to create a leader who could carry out three roles: to be an educator of his subordinates, an instructor, and a tactical leader. As a rule, all officers and NCOs had to carry out all three tasks. The emphasis on the areas of educator and instructor became especially necessary under the conditions of war in the East. The education of soldiers – which included stressing the duties of soldiers, infusing the will to win, spiritual care, and creating a combat community – played an important role in keeping German units fighting even under the most unfavourable circumstances and even after a string of defeats. During the course of the war, many of those educational issues were increasingly understood from a National Socialist perspective, so that the lines demarcating traditional army education and National Socialist indoctrination frequently blurred.[12] On the flip side, instructor abilities were necessary as training became an essential task for the field units due to the permanence of the war, as well as with the need to adapt to geographical regions and Soviet combat methods. As chapter 6 will show, the field training of German troops was an essential factor for the high combat power of German units. But this required officers and NCOs to be able to train troops effectively.
Looking at the training of tactical leadership, it aimed at basic forms of attack – and exclusively attack. Even in the defensive situation of 1941/42, German troops tended to train offensively. This was an expression of the already mentioned traditional conviction that only the offensive will bring a decision, but it also reflected the long-standing experience that attack is the more difficult tactical form. But the lack of defensive training, especially when it came to positional warfare, proved to be a problem that the army never fully solved.
Altrichter’s recommendations on training are rather surprising, as they do not correspond to the common perception that the German army consisted of disciplined and stalwart officers in perfect uniforms. But the point here was about creating an esprit de corps, which was essential for the German command system, and which needed a unified understanding, as well as mutual confidence between superiors and subordinates, to work smoothly. This could be created by frank discussions in free and light-hearted situations. The German officer’s mess, or the Kasino, had the same aim, as described in another document written by the 58th Infantry Division’s commander:[13]
Kasino: Necessary institution to educate the [officers] community. Place for the exchange of thoughts, education for the care of camaraderie, of training. Model for the kasino [were] English clubs. Only introduced since the beginning of the 18th century. Food is service. No cliques.
A last thing to stress from this order was the position of the NCO in the German army, which differed from most armies of the time. Since the turn of the century, and in accordance with the idea of decentralized command, NCOs formed an essential part of German low-level leadership, normally leading platoons, groups, and individual heavy weapons. This is clearly pointed out in the ‘Guidelines for the training of the NCOs at the Field NCO Schools’:[14]
The modern method of combat has increased the importance of the NCOs. The fragmented combat method in the attack, the holding of wide sections by group-wise deployment, by strongpoints and nests, as well as by detachments kept ready for the immediate counter-thrust against an intruding enemy, places high demands on bold decision-making power and leadership. The cooperation of different weapons in a combat group requires tactical understanding and high practical abilities of the NCO.
13
58. Infanterie-Division, Anleitung als Ausbilder etc., Winter 41/42 , BA-MA RH 26-58/37.
14
Generalstab des Heeres/General der Infanterie, Richtlinien für die Ausbildung der Unteroffiziere bei der Feld-Unteroffiziers-Schule, 24.3.42, BA-MA RH 53-7/v.234b.