The self-reliant NCO must be aware of his responsibility and the trust placed in him, and resolutely and deliberately carry out his mission.
Training and education were tightly connected in the German understanding of forming leaders (and soldiers too). While training should result in military competencies such as weapons handling or tactical understanding, education should infuse soldierly values in order for soldiers and officers to act intuitively in situations according to the common principles of the German army, without which the German command system would not function. In other words, education was the training of character. To give an idea what this meant for NCOs and how education should work, a further section of the Guidelines for the training of NCOs at the Field NCO Schools follows:[15]
The aim of the education is: a) Clear and serious concept of duty and profession, sense of responsibility and reliability. b) Confident and decided appearance as the basis for the teaching and leadership qualification. c) Crispness, determination and flexibility. d) Care for the subordinates. e) Good manners, tactful behaviour.
Means of education are: a) Tightly handled service. b) Accuracy in the performance of the service. c) Order and cleanliness. d) Cultivate good manners and comradeship in comradeship rooms and at dinner.
The high losses in leaders, however, made German efforts to provide leadership training increasingly futile. A few numbers should give an idea of the extent of these casualties: Losses on all fronts from autumn 1941–1944 totalled more than 54,000 army officers, of which the great majority occurred on the Eastern front. A further 7,000 army officers were lost in these years due to illness, accidents, suicides or death sentences.[16] The 18th Panzer Division entered the Soviet Union in June 1941 with 401 officers – at the end of July it had already lost 153. When the same division was sent into action on 11 July 1943 against the Soviet offensive to crack the Orel salient, it only had 157 officers available. After twelve days of intense fighting, only thirty officers were ready for duty. The 12th Infantry Division marched into the Soviet Union with 336 officers. In May 1942, cumulative loss of officers had risen to 341, as many as the division had possessed at the beginning of the invasion.[17]
In addition to the lack of officers and NCOs, a main problem of command was the means of communication. In the 1930s, Germany was among the world’s leaders in the use of radio equipment for the command of fast-moving motorized and armoured units. But the stocks of such equipment could not keep up with the massive expansion of the German army in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Following the doubling of armoured units in 1940/41 for the campaign in the east, the supply of radio equipment became a significant issue. Materials for the more conventional telephone communications were also lacking, especially cable. The production of communications material was always in competition with other items, be it for the use of rare raw materials such as copper, or for the special workers used for producing other electronic goods (radar equipment, searchlights for night air defence). The worker question also became important for the troops, since signal units needed specialists for operating and maintaining the radios and telephones. One has to keep in mind that electronic devices were not nearly as common then as today and the broad mass of the German population was unfamiliar with them. Exacerbating the lack of electronic equipment for communications were the shortages of men and vehicles for the signal troops. They were in need of all-terrain vehicles of military origin, specially designed to carry their communications equipment. Since there were never enough of these vehicles, be they half-tracks or wheeled, the communications troops had to rely more and more on improvised trucks that simply were not robust enough for the terrain in the east. This led to a vicious circle, as fewer and fewer operational communications vehicles were available. Even the spearhead Panzer divisions suffered from such shortages, as a late 1943 report by the divisional signal officer, typically the commander of the divisional signal battalion, from 8th Panzer Division indicates:[18]
[Divisional] Signal troops:
A) Telephony company
| Authorized strength | actual strength: |
|---|---|
| 8 large telephone-construction teams | 3 large telephone-construction teams |
| 6 small telephone-construction teams | 3 small telephone-construction teams |
| 2 [telephone]operations teams | 2 [telephone]operations teams |
Of these, two are in repair on average.
Cable length: authorized: 182 lengths; actuaclass="underline" 68 lengths
Considering the motor vehicle and cable situation, the company is still limited operationally. The requirements of the tactical leadership concerning telephone communication in the current organization of the division can still be essentially met. In limited attacks, the company is still capable of establishing and maintaining telephone communications to one battle group.
Main difficulties of the company: Motor vehicle situation, cable stock.
B) Radio company:
| Authorized strength | actual strength: |
|---|---|
| 1 medium command tank | 7 medium radio teams type b |
| 3 [light] command tanks | 3 medium radio teams type a |
| 2 [special-purpose motor vehicle] 267 (half-track) | 1 small radio teams type c |
| 1 [special-purpose motor vehicle] 268 (half-track) | |
| 10 medium radio teams type a | |
| 6 medium radio teams type a / f | |
| 5 medium radio teams type b | |
| 2 small radio teams type c |
By establishing the radio communications exclusively in ‘star’ traffic,[19] the company has until now been able to meet the requirements of the tactical leadership. The company does not have any reserves which allow for the establishment of new traffic connections during changes in the situation. A tactical connection must be cancelled if a radio station fails. Since there are no armoured radio stations available, the required intercommunication cannot be made. Main difficulty of the company: Motor vehicle situation and the obtaining of spare parts for electric generators (GG 400).
2) [Panzer] Grenadier Regiments
a) Telephone communication
With the grenadier regiments, only wire connections from the regiments to the battalions can be built due to lack of personnel and equipment. When the regiments change position, it is not possible at to dismantle and at the same time to connect both battalions by wire again. In the event of a further loss of personnel, the telephone connections to the battalions will also be called into question.
15
GenStdH/GendInf, Richtlinien für die Ausbildung der Unteroffiziere bei der Feld-Unteroffiziers-Schule, 24.3.42., BA-MA RH 53-7/v.234b.
16
Numbers according to OKW/AWA/WVW(V), Gesamtausfälle der Wehrmacht, Stand 31.12.1944, in: BA-MA, H. 6/737. The research of Rüdiger Overmans indicates even higher numbers as the German reporting system on losses had some defects.
17
Omer Bartov,
18
8. Panzer-Division/Divisions-Nachrichten-Führer, Betr.: Nachrichten-Lage der 8. Panzer-Division, 27.11.43, NARA T-315, Roll 504.
19
Radio net traffic in which several stations communicated one at a time with the net control station, while the other stations listened in.