The following numbers are symptomatic of the present strength of the 18th Panzer Division:
From an authorized strength = 42 3.7cm and 9 5cm anti-tank guns are as of now 22 3.7cm and 8 5cm anti-tank guns combat-ready guns available. The 52nd Rifle Regiment alone has altogether 1,000 casualties from a combat strength of 2,359 men on 22.6.41, and what has to be considered here is that the disproportionally largest share of the casualties fall upon the dismounted elements that fight the battle. The division now has only 47 battle-worthy tanks against the 276 it had on 22.6. In addition, the division has a total loss of 1,300 vehicles. A further 1,000 vehicles are under repair, of which 500 can again be made operational. The French vehicles, with which the 18th Panzer Division is predominantly equipped, have proven to be cumbersome and therefore of limited use off-road.
The dramatic decrease in operational tanks significantly damaged the 18th Panzer Division’s striking power, but the loss of vehicles should not be overlooked. Without the necessary trucks, cars, and motorcycles, the mobility of the division as a whole greatly suffered, as did its ability to bring much-needed supplies of food, ammunition and fuel to the front, an issue further discussed in chapter 4. So, even during the summer months when the Germans enjoyed some of their most spectacular successes of the war, the chances of German victory became increasingly fleeting as the panzer divisions’ combat power slowly dissipated.
As the German attack lost momentum during the late summer due to heavy casualties (especially among officers and NCOs – a topic examined in chapter 2), supply difficulties and the attrition of armour strength, some units found themselves temporarily forced onto the defensive. This was especially true for infantry divisions operating in Army Group Centre during the battle for Smolensk. While German armour divisions were able to ensnare another large number of Soviet formations in a cauldron in this area, Red Army forces from outside of the pocket pounded the thin German cordon. As infantry divisions finally caught up to the exposed panzer divisions and replaced them in the line in hopes of the latter being able to refresh before the next stage of the advance, the war in the centre of the front temporarily shifted to positional warfare. While this was most pronounced during the fighting around the Yel’nya salient from late August through the end of September, Army Group Centre’s panzer divisions had already been forced onto the defensive in early August. Due to the army’s nearly exclusive emphasis on offensive warfare, it was not entirely prepared for fighting on the defensive and, as the following document relates, the commander of the 7th Infantry Division believed that his commanders needed to rethink how they approached this type of warfare.[14]
I reject the type of defence which is frequently carried out.
All depth is missing along the colossal breadth. Therefore, the defence was linear, which as we have learned, is incorrect. I can therefore not agree with the view that one or another commander had, who wouldn’t or couldn’t comply with my thought process and wishes – leading the battle out of strongpoints.
The linear deployment, without reserves behind it, must lead to critical situations, because no one was in the position to influence the battle in anyway. Solely because of this, a locally strong attack on one position had an effect on the breadth [of the line].[15]
Maintaining the initiative [das Gesetzt des Handelns] – active defence – can only be managed out of strongpoints. Actually, everywhere too much was done with men and too little with [the use of] weapons.
With the breadth of the front sections to be secured, our personnel weakness can only be bridged over through a well-considered use of weapons. The conduct of battle must therefore be led from strongpoints that can mutually support each other with flanking fire. The gaps between the individual strongpoints must not only be accepted, but rather they should be accepted since they are the only way to make possible the concentration of strength in an individual sector. Only in this way were the troops in the position to attack an attacking opponent on the flanks even if he had pushed through a gap and then throw them out again through the concentration of men on specific points. This is the only way that command of battle was possible, this is the only way that leaders could intervene and the individual man was not left all alone against the onrushing masses of men.
The 7th Infantry Division moved into the Yel’nya salient on 28 August and began its month-long participation in what, to all intents and purposes, developed into a battle of attrition, a type of combat antithetical to German goals in summer 1941. Developments in the centre of the front caused the first command crisis of the campaign for the army; while the OKH wanted to continue the drive on Moscow, which it believed was the strategic goal, Hitler was determined to seize the economically and ideologically important areas of Leningrad and Ukraine. The stalling of Army Group Centre only reinforced Hitler’s proclivities and he detached the Army Group Centre’s Panzer Groups and diverted them to the flanks. So, while the infantry forces of Army Group Centre fought defensive battles of attrition, its former Panzer Groups fanned out to the north and south. Simultaneous to the fighting in the Yel’nya salient, German forces, including Panzer Group 2, carried out a major encirclement at the battle of Kiev – one which ‘utterly destroyed’ the Soviet South-Western Front, with ‘four Soviet armies and roughly three-quarters of a million men… removed from the Red Army’s order of battle.’[16] This textbook example of mobile warfare existed in stark contrast to the 7th Infantry Division’s experiences during the Yel’nya battle, as its after-action report on the battle clearly indicated.[17]
On 28 [August] the division was subordinated to the XXth Army Corps and brought forward for an intended deployment in the Yel’nya bend in the vicinity of Cholm. On 30.8., the division was supposed to continue its march in order to relieve a division in its position on the eastern bank of the Yel’nya bend in the night of 31.8. to 1.9. However, this did not take place, because the Russians broke through on 30.8. in the northern section and with tanks further in the south. The planned relief had to be abandoned for the time being.
1 September again brought a change. The Russians attacked the Yel’nya bend on its narrowest position simultaneously from the north and south in order to pinch it off.
Most exposed to these attacks were the left wing of Infantry Regiment 62 near Kukujewa and the adjacent division. Already in the early morning of 1.9., a recognized enemy assembly was smashed by artillery fire. At 8.20 the report arrived that the enemy had broken through in the northern Yel’nya bend. Infantry Regiment 61 was alerted. During the night, an important order was taken off a dead commissar from which could be gathered that an attack by one division was planned for on 1 September. 10:00 1 regiment against Kukujewa, 11:20 1 regiment against Stragina, 11:50 again 1 regiment against Kukujewa. The Russians attacked exactly according to the program and were caught and destroyed by our already waiting artillery. Since the situation in front of the neighbouring division on the left gradually became difficult, the I./Infantry Regiment 61 was subordinated to it and this battalion was deployed in the hot spot near Leonowa. Despite the bloody rebuff that the enemy got in the morning, he again attacked the left wing of Infantry Regiment 62 at Ssoliwenja and Kukujewa at 19:00, but was again repulsed. Since the continuation of the attack had to be expected and the left wing appeared to be threatened due to weak manning of the area, the division brought forward the III./Infantry Regiment 19 to the Barakssina area.
15
The commander was stating that a linear defence necessarily concentrated the men at the front, leaving very few in reserve. Without a reserve that could eliminate any enemy penetration of the defensive front, any breakthrough threatened the position as a whole.
17
[7. Infanterie-Division/Ia], Betr.: Kurzbericht über die Kämpfe im Jelnja-Abschnitt, 29.9.1941, NARA T-315, Roll 397.