While the campaign started successfully enough in late June, by the end of September the familiar problem of stiffening Soviet resistance, over-extended supply lines and a diminishing combat strength advancing in divergent directions made it clear that the campaign had already failed. A meeting between Generaloberst Hermann Hoth, commanding general of Fourth Panzer Army, and the commander of XXXXVIIIth Panzer Corps in early September detailed the superiority of German tactics and practices in 1942, as well as the increasing emphasis on the notion of will in the face of German material weakness.[28]
Everywhere that the Panzer forces have been deployed narrowly concentrated and with force, the attack has been successful. The new redeployment of the corps will and must lead to success. It is clear that the enemy – compressed into a narrow area – will offer considerable resistance.
Just as the great King before the battle of Leuthen[29] took the decision to attack and defeat the enemy from an apparently hopeless position, so now all commanders and every man must be imbued with this idea, that the attack will be successful, because it must be successful for us!
Commanders who cannot guarantee the carrying out of this difficult task are to be replaced by others.
The German attack on the city of Stalingrad – the culmination of the 1942 German summer offensive – was severely hindered from the outset by supply and manpower shortages; it also is rightfully seen as one of the important turning points, both militarily and psychologically, of the Second World War. Manpower deficiencies proved extremely detrimental to German attacks on the city. Most units that fought in Stalingrad had not reached their full complement of men even before the German summer offensive began at the end of June. By mid-September, the majority of the units had fought without respite for nearly two months and had received few replacements, and this manpower situation considerably worsened due to heavy combat within the city. The 71st Infantry Division, an experienced first-class infantry unit that carried out the primary thrust into the centre of the city, reported the following strength of its infantry units on 19 September 1942:[30]
The combat strength of a full rifle company was around 150 men; most companies were therefore reduced to between 10 to 30 per cent of their original combat strength. It is also clear that, even within the infantry, the risk of being killed varied widely. The companies normally not involved in close combat (the 4th, 8th and 12th with heavy machine guns and mortars, the 13th with infantry guns, and the 14th with anti-tank guns) suffered smaller losses than normal riflemen companies.
In the upcoming weeks, Stalingrad became a proper meat-grinder for both sides. In the second half of September alone the Soviets threw some 100,000 men over the Volga into the city. But even with these reinforcements, the defending 62nd Army had fewer men at hand at the end of the month than it had only two weeks prior.[31] The lack of men and material forced German forces to try to conquer Stalingrad piece by piece, with time-consuming breaks taken for regrouping and the building up of available stocks. In October, there were frequent breaks of up to one week between German attacks; clearly the German summer offensive had petered out in the ruins of Stalingrad. For every further attack, additional units needed to be scraped together, but every unit sent to Stalingrad was found only by weakening Sixth Army’s flanks. The practical meaning for the units there is clearly portrayed in a report of the XIth Army Corps, subordinated to Sixth Army and defending the area around the Soviet Don bridgehead by Kremenskaia.[32]
Through the use of all available strength, the troops work to build a continuous main battle line, an artillery protection position and blocking positions. […] Every man in the XIth Corps is aware that the main battle line has to be held to the outmost.
But I feel myself obliged to point out, that the demands in the order could not be completely fulfilled at this time in the area of XIth Corps.
I report in detaiclass="underline"
1) The front area of the Corps on 27.9. amounts to 77km, consisting in part of extremely confusing terrain, that provides the enemy with the ability to easily approach [our lines]. In this section are 3 weak and worn-out divisions with 22 battalions deployed at the front (5 strong, 3 medium-strength, 7 average, 7 weak). The artillery consists of 18 light batteries (64 guns), 9 heavy batteries (30 guns), 4 Nebelwerfer batteries (21 launchers). Additionally, 3 engineer battalions (1 strong, 2 weak), 3 anti-tank battalions (7 companies), 1 reconnaissance battalion, 1 flak battalion with 6 flak-machine guns set for land battle, and 2 weak construction battalions are available. A continuous manning of the practically 80km main battle line to stop the penetration of the enemy is impossible with these forces. […] It should be noted that the combat strength decreases daily. Over 600 men fell out of the 384th Infantry Division in just the time from 18.-22.9.1942.
2) The corps has absolutely no reserves, they are available to divisions only in an inadequate form. Generally, even in minor enemy combat operations, the valuable engineers must be used immediately. […]. The shifting of reserves on the long frontline is hindered; the corps has only one divisional reconnaissance battalion at hand that has the mobility to reach an endangered position in time. Once this unit is in action, infantry reserves must be shifted, and they often arrive too late. The availability of vehicles is hindered by the high demands for supplies and by the lack of fuel. Therefore, the demand for a swift counterthrust can only be rarely fulfilled.
3) The construction of the main battle line, the blocking positions, the artillery protection position and the absolutely necessary quarters have run into major difficulties and can only be completed before the beginning of the winter, if a considerable amount of labour, wood, construction material, and obstacles is delivered shortly. The troops are so weakened by the preceding tasks and through constant combat, and additionally by the continuous sentry duty, insufficient meals, inadequate quarters and hygienic shortcomings, that their work performance falls far below the normal rate.
4) The division’s level of training is extremely low. Due to the continuous fighting and the necessity of building positions, the carrying out of a training program is neither possible at this time, nor in the foreseeable future. An intensive, systematic training phase would be inevitably required, since the troops completely lack suitable junior leaders, the most recently arrived replacements are absolutely insufficiently trained and, in general, the front-line troops are heavily reinforced with less aggressive men drawn from the baggage train, which has been combed out to the limits. These men consist nearly exclusively of panje drivers, who in crisis situations could become a burden for the [frontline] troops.
5) The will to hold out and the recognition of the need to persevere fully exists for all higher and middle leaders. Physical and mental exhaustion, however, cannot be ignored and it causes some concern. It requires the particular influence of the higher leadership, to inspire the appreciation for the demands of the Führererlass.[33] A large section of the younger officers lack any combat experience, or understanding of the officer’s outlook and the handling of men. It is scarcely possible to change this situation in the foreseeable time. The NCO corps is severely decimated. It seems necessary to take accelerated and effective measures for its reconstruction. The men’s mental attitude has suffered from the considerable strain and the temporarily scarce provisions. The thin manning [of the frontline] that is visible even to him and the feeling that he is insufficiently trained impairs his will to fight. Worries about the Heimat threatened by bombing trouble him. Only a long period of quiet and training could restore the necessary fighting power.
29
On 5 December 1757, Frederick the Great’s small, yet more mobile and better-drilled army maneuvered around the flank of the much larger Austrian force near the town of Leuthen and decisively smashed the Hapsburg forces. The battle passed into Prussian and later German lore as the triumph of skill, determination, and will in the face of superior forces.
30
71. Infanterie-Division/Ia, Kampfstärken der 71. Div. am 19.9.1942 (Anlage), o.D., BA-MA RH 20-6/212.
31
For a detailed calculation, see Adrian Wettstein,
32
XI. Armeekorps/Kommandierender Generanl, Dem Oberbefehlshaber der 6. Armee, 27.9.1942, BA-MA RH 20-6/213.