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By 1367, Dmitrii Ivanovich had cemented his alliance with the prince of Suzdal', demoted the latter's princely supporters, and asserted his authority over them. He had also been accepted as prince of Novgorod. The strength of his political position was paralleledby stone fortifications hebegan to construct around Moscow.26 Grand Prince Dmitrii then turned against another potential challenger, Prince Mikhail Aleksandrovich of Tver'. The hostilities began just after an internecine conflict between two branches of the Tver' dynasty was resolved in favour of Mikhail Aleksandrovich. Dmitrii intervened to reverse that outcome and place Mikhail's rival on the Tver' throne. The conflict that began in 1367 lasted until 1375, when Dmitrii emphatically defeated Mikhail. Dmitrii was not able to unseat Mikhail from the Tver' throne. But neither were Mikhail and his powerful ally Ol'gerd of Lithuania able to defeat Dmitrii. Despite a three-day siege of Moscow (1368), they were unable to penetrate the stone walls protecting the city. Dmitrii's campaign into Tver' territory in i370 prompted Mikhail to appeal to Mamai, who transferred the patent for Vladimir to the Tver' prince that year.27 Dmitrii, however, won back the

23 PSRL, vol. x,pp. 233-4; PSRL, vol. xi,p. 2; Cherepnin, Obrazovanie,p. 554; Nasonov Mongoly i Rus', pp. 120,124; Ostrowski, 'Troop Mobilization', p. 28; Vernadsky, Mongols, p. 252.

24 PSRL, vol. xi, p. 2; Wladimir Vodoff,'A propos des "achats" (kupli) d'Ivan Ier de Moscou', Journaldes Savants (1974): 115; Martin, Treasure,p. 132; John Fennell, TheEmergence ofMoscow 1304-1359 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 182-3.

25 PSRL, vol. xi, p. 7; Cherepnin, Obrazovanie, pp. 554-5; Nasonov, Mongoly i Rus', pp. 120, 124-5; Vodoff, 'Achats', 115; A. I. Kopanev, 'O "kupliakh" Ivana Kality', IZ 20 (1946), 25; Ostrowski, 'Troop mobilization', pp. 28-30.

26 Lawrence N. Langer, 'The Medieval Russian Town', in Michael Hamm (ed.), The City in Russian History (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, i976), p. 26; Ostrowski, Muscovy and the Mongols, p. 129; David B. Miller, 'Monumental Building as an Indicator of Economic Trends in Northern Rus' in the Late Kievan and Mongol Periods, ii38-i462', American Historical Review 94 (1989): 370, 377, 379.

27 PSRL, vol. xi, p. 14; Kuchkin, 'Dmitrii Donskoi', 68; Presniakov, Formation, pp. 247-9; Borisov, Russkaia tserkov', pp. 84-5; Crummey, Formation of Muscovy, p. 46.

patent from Mamai, retained the support ofthe north-eastern Russian princes and Novgorod, and defeated Mikhail (1372).[107] Dmitrii and Mikhail reached an accord that lasted only until i375, when Mikhail once again obtained a patent for the Vladimir throne. But Dmitrii with the military support of his former rival, the prince of Suzdal', as well as numerous other north-eastern Russian princes and Novgorod, inflicted a decisive defeat on Mikhail.[108] In the subsequent peace treaty the two grand princes formally had equal status. But Mikhail acknowledged Dmitrii's seniority, renounced his claim to the throne of Novgorod, and agreed to refrain from conducting independent relations with Lithuania and the Golden Horde.[109]

Despite his youth and the turmoil within the horde that deprived him of the firm support from a powerful Mongol khan, Dmitrii Ivanovich did not lose the position of grand prince ofVladimir. On the contrary, he overcame challenges from the princes of Suzdal' and Tver', the last two rivals for the Vladimir throne. After the 1370s, no other branch of the dynasty disputed the Moscow princes' claim to the throne of Vladimir. By the end of his reign, Dmitrii Ivanovich was virtually able to name his own heir.

Dmitrii's strength rested on his ability to marshal the military support necessary to overcome his rivals. In the absence of assistance from the Mongol khan, whose forces had previously been used to enforce decisions regarding succession, Dmitrii relied even more heavily than his predeces­sors had on the military units supplied by his relatives and princely allies. The extension of his authority over some north-eastern Russian princes and conclusion of alliances with others thus had practical as well as symbolic significance. With their aid Dmitrii gained the capacity to raise substantial armies and to pursue even further and more successfully than his father Ivan and uncle Semen his grandfather's policy of extending the authority of the prince of Moscow. By 1360, Kostroma was attached to the Muscovite territo­ries, as was Galich.[110] By establishing Andrei Fedorovich as prince of Rostov in i364, Grand Prince Dmitrii gained not only his loyalty but also Rostov's military services, which in i360 had been used to support Prince Dmitrii Konstantinovich.[111]

As a result, when Dmitrii confronted Mikhail of Tver' in 1375, he was able to assemble an army consisting of forces of 'all the Russian princes', including the princes of Suzdal', Rostov, Iaroslavl', Beloozero and Starodub.[112] Similarly in i380, when he faced Mamai at the Battle ofKulikovo, Dmitrii's army was com­posed of forces collected from Beloozero, Iaroslavl', Rostov, Ustiug, Kostroma, Kolomna, Pereiaslavl' and other principalities as well.[113]

The efforts of Dmitrii's son and successor, Vasilii I, to continue his father's policies were tempered by the expansionist drive of his father-in-law, Vitovt of Lithuania. Vasilii did nothing to prevent Vitovt from seizing the western Russian principality of Smolensk in 1395, and he was unable to curb the exten­sion of Lithuanian influence in the northern Russian centres of Tver' and Novgorod.[114] Vasilii, nevertheless, acquired Nizhnii Novgorod, which in 1391, with the agreement of Tokhtamysh, was detached from Suzdal' and attached to Moscow.[115] He also acquired Murom and Gorodets. Although he failed, despite repeated attempts at the turn ofthe century and during the first quar­ter of the fifteenth century, to seize Novgorod's northern territory known as the Dvina land, in the process he did replace the prince of Ustiug with his gov­ernor.[116] Vasilii thus added Ustiug, Nizhnii Novgorod, Murom and Gorodets to his father's acquisitions of Galich, Beloozero, Starodub and Uglich. In his will Dmitrii had claimed possession of Vladimir, Pereiaslavl', Kostroma and Iur'ev, all of which he left to Vasilii I.[117]

In addition to military strength the extension of Muscovite domination over north-eastern Russian principalities afforded the grand prince access to greater economic resources. The demands for tribute by the Mongol khans and emirs imposed pressure on the grand prince. The tribute that has been estimated to have been 5,000 roubles per year in 1389, rose to 7,000 roubles by 1401 and remained at that level through the reign of Vasilii I.[118] Despite the pressures, which took the form of military campaigns in 1380 and with devastating results in 1382 and 1408, the princes of Moscow were able to use their responsibility to collect taxes and tribute levied by the Mongols to their economic advantage. Although they sent the required amount oftribute, they managed to keep various taxes, such as customs and transport fees, in their own treasuries.[119] The establishment of Muscovite hegemony over the Rostov principalities in 1364 involved the acquisition of the right to collect tribute from Rostov, Ustiug and portions of the north-eastern region known as Perm'. In i367, according to one chronicle account, the grand prince acquired similar rights over Novgorod's possessions in the extreme north-east. When Stefan of Perm' converted the inhabitants of Vychegda Perm' to Christianity and a new bishopric was carved out of the Novgorod eparchy for them (1383), Moscow consolidated its tenuous command over tribute and trade in luxury fur from their territory.[120]

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107

PSRL, vol. xi, pp. 16,19; Presniakov, Formation, pp. 249-50.

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108

PSRL, vol. xi, p. 22; Presniakov, Formation, pp. 250-1.

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109

Dukhovnyeidogovornyegramotyvelikikhiudel'nykhkniazeiXIV-XVIvv., ed. L.V Cherepnin (Moscow and Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1950), no. 9, pp. 25-8; Presniakov, Formation, pp. 251­2; Wladimir Vodoff, 'La Place du grand-prince de Tver' dans les structures politiques russes de la fin du XIVe et du XVe siecle', FOG 27 (1980): 33.

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110

Ostrowski, 'Troop Mobilization', p. 30; Fennell, Emergence, pp. 67,112.

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111

Martin, Treasure, pp. 132, 234 n. 80.

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112

PSRL, vol. xi, pp. 22-3.

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113

PSRL, vol. xi, pp. 52, 54; Alef,'Origins', 18.

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114

PSRL, vol. iii, p. 400; PSRL, vol. xi, pp. 162, 204; Presniakov, Formation, p. 280; Vernadsky, Mongols, pp. 280, 284.

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115

Nasonov Mongoly i Rus', pp. 138-9; Alef,'Origins', 19, 152; Presniakov Formation, pp. 226-7; Noonan, 'Forging a National Identity', 511.

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116

Martin, Treasure, pp. 134-5; Cherepnin, Obrazovanie, pp. 697-702.

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117

Dukhovnye i dogovornyegramoty,no. i2,p. 34; PSRL, vol. xi,p. 2;V A. Kuchkin, Formirovanie gosudarstvennoi territoriisevero-vostochnoiRusivX-XVvv. (Moscow: Nauka, 1984), pp. 143-4, 232, 239, 242, 305-6, 308; Vodoff, 'Achats', 107; Presniakov, Formation, p. 274.

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118

Michel Roublev, 'The Mongol Tribute According to the Wills and Agreements of the Russian Princes', in Michael Cherniavsky(ed.), The Structure ofRussianHistory. Interpretive Essays (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 526.

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119

Ostrowski, Muscovy and the Mongols, pp. 119-21; Dukhovnye i dogovornye gramoty, no. 4, p. 15 and no. 12, p. 33; S. M. Kashtanov, 'Finansovoe ustroistvo moskovskogo kniazhestva v seredine XIV v. po dannym dukhovnykh gramot', in Issledovaniiapo istorii i istoriografii feodalizma. K 100-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia akademika B. D. Grekova (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), p. i78.

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120

P. Doronin, 'Dokumenty po istorii Komi', Istoriko-filologicheskii sbornik KomifilialaAN SSSR 4 (1958), 257-8; Martin, Treasure, pp. 132-3; Ostrowski, Muscovy and the Mongols, p. 125; Crummey Formation, p. 121; John Meyendorff, Byzantium and the Rise of Russia.. A Study ofByzantino-Russian Relations in the Fourteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, i98i), pp. i36-7.