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In the aftermath of the war Prince Ivan of Mozhaisk fled to Lithuania. Vasilii confiscated his principality as well as Galich, which had belonged to Dmitrii Shemiaka. In 1456, Vasilii also arrested his former ally and supporter, Prince Vasilii of Serpukhov, sent him into exile at Uglich and seized his lands as well.

Only Prince Mikhail of Vereia among Vasilii's cousins retained a portion of the Muscovite territories as his own apanage principality.[139]

During and immediately after the war Vasilii II was also able to assert dominance over princes and lands beyond the territories attached to Vladimir and Moscow. In 1449, he concluded a treaty with the prince of Suzdal', in which the latter agreed not to seek or receive patents for their office from the Tatar khan.[140] His position became dependent upon the prince of Moscow, not the khan. When the prince of Riazan' died in 1456, Vasilii II brought his son into his own household and sent his governors to administer that principality. By that time Vasilii had also entered into new agreements with the prince of Tver', who while not acknowledging Vasilii's seniority, nevertheless pledged his co-operation in all ventures against the Tatars as well as their Western neighbours; Boris also recognised Vasilii as the rightful grand prince and as prince of Novgorod.[141]

Vasilii also asserted his authority over Novgorod. In 1431, Novgorod had concluded a treaty with the prince of Lithuania, Svidrigailo, and accepted his nephew as its prince. But even though Svidrigailo was the brother-in-law of Iurii of Galich, Novgorod had been neutral during Iurii's conflict with Vasilii II.[142]When Vasilii II was engaged against Vasilii Kosoi (the Cross-Eyed), he nego­tiated with Novgorod to enlist its support; he indicated a willingness to set­tle outstanding disputes over Novgorod's eastern frontier. But after he had defeated Kosoi, he reneged on his agreement. He sent his officers to collect tribute and in 1440-1, after the Lithuanian prince had left the city, he launched a military campaign against Novgorod and forced it to make an additional payment and promise to continue to pay taxes and fees regularly.[143] During the 1440s, however, Novgorod was at war with both of its major Western trading partners, the Hanseatic League and the Teutonic Order. The Hansa blockaded Novgorod and closed its own commercial operations in the city for six years. Novgorod lost commercial revenue. It suffered from high prices and also from a famine. In the midst of these crises Novgorod accepted another prince from

Lithuania (1444).[144] When Vasilii II and Dmitrii Shemiaka took their conflict to the north and disrupted Novgorod's northern trade routes, Novgorod gave support and sanctuary to Shemiaka.

In 1456, as Vasilii II was asserting his authority over other Russian principal­ities, he also launched a major military campaign against Novgorod and once again defeated it. Novgorod was obliged to accept the Treaty of Iazhelbitsii. According to its terms, it had to cut off its connections with Shemiaka's family as well as with any other enemies of the grand prince. It was to pay taxes and the Tatar tribute to the grand prince; it was to accept the grand prince's judicial officials in the city; and it was to conclude agreements with foreign powers only with the approval of the grand prince. It was obliged, furthermore, to cede key sectors of its northern territorial possessions to the grand prince.[145]

The dynastic war ended in victory for Vasilii II. It resolved in his favour the issues of succession and of the prerogatives of the grand prince. The outcome of the war left Vasilii II with undisputed control over the grand principality and its possessions as well as the territories attached to the principality ofMoscow. His relatives, who had shared the familial domain when he took office, had all died or gone into exile or been subordinated. Only one cousin, Mikhail of Vereia, retained an apanage principality. The remainder of the apanage principalities, which had been the territories of Vasilii's Iurevich cousins, of Ivan Andreevich of Mozhaisk, and of Vasilii Iaroslavich of Serpukhov, along with their economic resources and revenues had reverted to the grand prince.

Vasilii's post-war policies towards his relatives and neighbouringprinces also provided the grand prince with more secure military power. Although he still relied on them to supply military forces, they had become subordinate to him or had committed themselves by treaty to support him. Vasilii, furthermore, established his Tatar ally, Kasim, on the Oka River. The Tatars of the khanate of Kasimov became available to participate in the military ventures of the Muscovite grand princes. Vasilii II thus ensured that the grand prince would not be as militarily vulnerable as he had been when the wars began. His policies gave him access to larger forces than potential competitors within north-eastern Russia without being dependent on support from independent princes and the khans of the Great Horde and emerging khanates of Kazan'

and Crimea.[146]

Vasilii II emerged from the war as the strongest prince in north-eastern Russia. Shortly after he recovered Moscow, Vasilii asserted his sovereignty by using the title 'sovereign of all Rus" on newly minted coins. In late 1447 or early 1448, he also named his young son, Ivan, his co-ruler; coins then appeared with the inscription 'sovereigns of all Rus".[147] While thereby making it more difficult for co-lateral relatives to challenge his son's succession, Vasilii II also confirmed a vertical pattern of succession for the princes of Moscow. When Ivan III assumed his father's throne in 1462, no other prince within the house of Moscow had the resources or the status to mount a military challenge for the throne, as Iurii Dmitr'evich and his sons had done. The Tatar khans also lost their decisive influence over succession. Vasilii II had appealed to Khan Ulu-Muhammed for a patent to hold the throne ofVladimir. But it was his own military victory over his uncle and cousins that confirmed the replacement of the traditional lateral pattern of succession with a vertical one. Vasilii II was able to leave the grand principality as well as his Muscovite possessions to his son without acquiring prior approval of a Tatar khan. Ivan III, followed by his son and grandson, would expand those core territories to build the state of Muscovy.[148]

The Daniilovichi and the Church

When the Daniilovichi became grand princes of Vladimir during the first half of the fourteenth century, they lacked legitimacy rooted in the dynastic traditions of seniority and succession. They depended upon the authority and favour of the khans of the Golden Horde to hold their position. When the Golden Horde entered a period of internal strife that began with the succession crises of the 1360s, continued with the invasion by Timur, and ultimately resulted in its fragmentation into several khanates during the second quarter of the fifteenth century, the princes of Moscow could no longer rely on the khans' power as a substitute for domestic legitimacy. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries they, therefore, sought to overcome or neutralise their dynastic opponents. They also expanded their own territorial domain and thus increased their economic and military power to become the strongest power in northern Russia. It was the ideological concepts developed by the hierarchs of the Church and the moral authority of the charismatic monastic leaders, however, that conferred a legitimacy on the princes who were shaping a new state of Muscovy.

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139

Vernadsky, Mongols, pp. 327-8; Kollmann, KinshipandPolitics, p. 157; Zimin, Vitiaz', p. 176; Presniakov, Formation, pp. 337-8, 341-2.

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140

Dukhovnye i dogovornye gramoty, no. 52, pp. 156, 158; Ostrowski, 'Troop Mobilization', p. 34; Zimin, Vitiaz', p. 133.

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141

Presniakov, Formation, p. 344; Vernadsky, Mongols, p. 325.

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142

Gramoty Velikogo Novgoroda i Pskova, ed. S. N. Valk (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1949; reprinted Dusseldorf:Brucken Verlag and Vaduz: Europe Printing, 1970), no. 63, pp. 105-6; PSRL, vol. iii, p. 416; Presniakov, Formation, pp. 325, 330.

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143

PSRL, vol. iii, pp. 418-21; Presniakov Formation, pp. 330-1; Zimin, Vitiaz', p. 80.

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144

PSRL, vol. iii, p. 423; PSRL, vol. xii, p. 61; Martin, Treasure, p. 82; Phillippe Dollinger, The German Hansa, trans. D. S. Ault and S. H. Steinberg (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1970), p. 295; Rybina, Torgovlia srednevekogo Novgoroda, pp. 158-60; N. A. Kazakova, Russko-livonskie i russko-ganzeiskie otnosheniia(Leningrad: Nauka, 1975), pp. 120-6; Cherepnin, Obrazovanie, p. 784.

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145

PSRL, vol. xii, pp. 110-11; V N. Bernadskii, Novgorod i Novgorodskaia zemlia (Moscow and Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1961), pp. 254-9; Cherepnin, Obrazovanie, pp. 817-22; Presniakov Formation, p. 343; Zimin, Vitiaz', pp. 173-5; Martin, Treasure, p. 138.

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146

Ostrowski, 'Troop Mobilization', p. 26.

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147

Gustave Alef,'Muscovy and the Council of Florence', SR 20 (1961); reprinted in his Rulers and Nobles in Fifteenth-Century Muscovy (London: Variorum Reprints, 1983), 399; Gustave Alef,'The Political Significance of the Inscriptions of Muscovite Coinage in the Reign of Vasilii II', Speculum 34 (1959); reprinted in his Rulers and Nobles in Fifteenth-Century Muscovy (London: Variorum Reprints, 1983), 6,11; Alef, 'Origins', 42; Noonan, 'Forging a National Identity', p. 505; Zimin, Vitiaz', p. 133.

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148

Alef,'Origins', 40; Presniakov, Formation, p. 322.