Invading Chechnya again
Just as the political crisis in Moscow began to subside in the summer of 1999, a new crisis of even greater proportions ignited again in the Caucasus.[110] In early August, a multi-ethnic force headed by Chechen commander Shamil Basaev invaded the Russian republic of Dagestan, claiming Dagestan's liberation from Russian imperialism as their cause. Russian armed forces responded by launching a major counter-offensive against the Chechen-led 'liberation' movement.[111]On 1 September, the war came to Moscow, when an explosion in downtown Moscow wounded forty-one people.[112] Further terrorist attacks in Moscow and elsewhere killed more than 300 Russian civilians in one month. Russians understood the terrorist attacks to be acts of war committed by Chechnya and its foreign supporters. Society demanded a response, and the Russian government responded.[113] In October Russian troops crossed into Chechen territory for the second time that decade.[114] Chechnya was to be liberated from the bandits and terrorists by any means necessary. Over 100,000 troops were sent to the theatre to accomplish this objective.
Initially, Russian armed forces were more successful in this second war.[115]More methodical and relying to a greater extent on air power, Russian forces eventually recaptured Groznyi and most of Chechnya's cities by the beginning of 2000, while the Chechen fighters remained in the mountains. The nature of human rights violations in this second war increased dramatically (or they were better documented).[116] Western experts estimate that 400,000 people have been displaced.[117] But final victory proved elusive. Resistance continued. In September 2004 Chechens held hundreds of children hostage in a school in Beslan, North Osetia. Russian troops stormed the school, and over 340 people died in the assault.
The end of Yeltsin's Russia and the beginning of Putin's Russia
The combination of a massive economic crisis, a new war and an ailing and unpopular president created real uncertainty about the 1999-2000 electoral cycle. In the run-up to the 1999 parliamentary elections, a newpolitical coalition called Fatherland-All Russia seemed poised to compete with the Communist Party for the highest vote totals. Led by former Prime Minister Primakov, Fatherland-All Russia looked at the 1999 parliamentary vote as a primary for the 2000 presidential vote - the real prize in Russia's political system. In the summer of 1999, Primakov polled well ahead of all other presidential hopefuls. A changing of the guard - a final test of Russia's democratic institutions - looked
imminent. [118]
For Yeltsin, allowing Primakov to replace him would have signalled defeat for reform. So he anointed an alternative, Vladimir Putin. By selecting Putin to become his new prime minister in August 1999, Yeltsin made it clear that he considered this former KGB agent his heir apparent.69 Few others believed that Putin had a chance. He displayed little charisma, had no political party or other interest groups behind him and had never run for office. In his first month in office, his approval rating hovered in the single digits. By the end of the year, however, his popularity had soared to well above 70 per cent.70 In the 1999 parliamentary election, a new pro-Kremlin electoral bloc, Unity, rode Putin's coat-tails to a surprising second-place finish, just behind the Communist Party.71 As the result of a major negative campaign launched by media outlets friendly to the Kremlin, Fatherland-All Russia suffered a devastating defeat in the 1999 vote, winning only 13 per cent of the popular vote. Primakov subsequently decided not to compete against Putin in the presidential election the following year, guaranteeing a Putin landslide in the first round of the 2000 vote.72
Putin's popularity exploded in the autumn of 1999 due first and foremost to his handling of the Chechen war. It was an odd formula for gaining popularity. After all, Yeltsin's first war with Chechnya was extremely unpopular and had to be ended before he could win re-election in 1996. In this second intervention, the Russian people believed that the rationale for this war was self-defence. Second, relying more on air power, the Russian military appeared to be more successful in the second war. Consequently, this second Chechen war was initially very popular. During the 2000 presidential campaign, public support remained steady at roughly 60 per cent; it did not waver, as many had predicted, when Russian casualties increased. Opinion polls conducted in the autumn of 1999 demonstrated that people were grateful to Putin for accepting responsibility for the security of the Russian people. He looked like a leader who had taken charge during an uncertain, insecure time and had delivered on his promise to provide stability and security.
In addition to Chechnya, Putin benefited from several other factors. He was young, energetic and new while his competitors were the opposite. Putin
69 Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries, p. 337.
70 Agentstvo regional'nykh politcheskikh issledovanii (ARPI), Regional'nyi Sotsiologicheskii Monitoring 49 (10-12 Dec. 1999): 39. Sample size: 3,000 respondents in 52 Federation subjects.
71 On how, see Timothy Colton and Michael McFaul, 'Reinventing Russia's Party of Power: Unity and the 1999 Duma Election', Post-Soviet Affairs 16, 3 (Summer 2000): 201-24.
72 For details on the campaign, see Timothy Colton and Michael McFaul, Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: The Russian Elections in 1999 and 2000 (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).
also positioned himself as a candidate different from Yeltsin. Putin's youth and energy provided a striking contrast to his old and sick predecessor. He was also unknown, allowing people to project into his candidacy all sorts of images and orientations. With the exception of his policy towards Chechnya, he was a tabula rasa on which voters could write what they wanted. In addition the economy had begun to turn around as devaluation from the August 1998 crisis and rising oil prices had helped to make 1999 Russia's first year of economic growth in a decade. Finally, Putin benefited from extensive positive coverage in the Russian media, most of which was still owned by the state or was friendly to the Kremlin (see Plate 25).
Conclusion
In leaving office on 31 December 1999, Yeltsin bequeathed to his successors several serious political and economic conundrums. Russian democratic institutions were weak, the economy was growing but still in need of further reforms and corruption and crime remained rampant. Most tragically, the war in Chechnya continued with little prospect for genuine resolution. Yeltsin already has earned his place in history as one of Russia's most important leaders. What kind of adjectives will modify his legacy, however, will only become clear after the resolution ofthese lingering issues. He could be remembered as the father of Russian democracy and the initiator of Russia's market economy and sustained economic growth. Or he could be remembered as the first post- Communist leader who squandered Russia's first chance of becoming a liberal democracy and a capitalist economy. Yeltsin's last important decision - his appointment of Vladimir Putin as prime minister and then as acting president - will have a profound effect on how the Yeltsin legacy is finally judged. To date, Putin has pressed forward with furthering economic reforms, but at the same time has undermined Russia's already fragile democratic institutions.[119]
110
For accounts of the second Chechen war, Matthew Evangelista,
111
ITAR-TASS, 'Operatsiia nachalas', goriachaiakhronika',
p. 3.
112
Vladimir Zainetdinov, Aleksei Siviv, Maria Beloklova, 'Vchera v shkolakh ot Chukhotki do Kaliningrada prozvenel pervyi zvonok. A v Okhotnom riadu poslednii zvonok',
113
David Hoffman, 'Russian Premier Pins Bombing on Chechens',
114
'Goriachaia Khronika: Konechnaia tsel' unichtozhit' banditov',
115
Mark Kramer, 'Civil-Military Relations in Russia and the Chechnya Conflict',
116
Human Rights Watch, 'Now Happiness Remains: Civilian Killings, Pillage, and Rape in Alkhan-Yurt', Chechnya,
117
This figure is cited in Sarah Mendelson, 'Russia, Chechnya, and International Norms: The Power and Paucity of Human Rights?
118
See Michael McFaul, Andrei Ryabov and Nikolai Petrov (eds.),
119
See the articles on political and economic developments under Putin in Herspring,