The crisis came in February 1921, when a wave of strikes and demonstrations swept Petrograd, and culminated in the revolt in March of the Kronstadt naval base.
Kronstadt saw the Party aligned finally against the people. Even the Democratic Centralists and the Workers’ Opposition threw themselves into the battle against the sailors and workers. When it came to the point, Party loyalty revealed itself as the overriding motive.
War was openly waged on the idea of libertarian radical socialism, on proletarian democracy. On the other side there remained only the idea of the Party. The Party, cut off from its social justification, now rested on dogma alone. It had become, in the most classical way, an example of a sect, a fanaticism. It assumed that popular, or proletarian, support could be dispensed with and that mere integrity of motive would be adequate, would justify everything in the long run.
Thus the Party’s mystique developed as the Party became conscious of its isolation. At first, it had “represented” the Russian proletariat. Even when that proletariat showed signs of flagging, the Party still “represented” it as an outpost of a world proletariat with whose organizations it would shortly merge when the World Revolution or the European Revolution was completed. Only when the revolutions in the West failed to mature was the Party left quite evidently representing no one, or not many, in the actual world. It now felt that it represented not so much the Russian proletariat as it existed, but the future and real interests of that proletariat. Its justification came no longer from the politics of actuality, but from the politics of prophecy. From within itself, from the ideas in the minds of its leading members, stemmed the sources of its loyalty and solidarity.
Moreover, Lenin had established within the Party all the seeds of a centralized bureaucratic attitude. The Secretariat, long before Stalin took it over, was transferring Party officials for political reasons. Sapronov had noted that local Party committees were being transformed into appointed bodies, and he put the question firmly to Lenin: “Who will appoint the Central Committee? Perhaps things will not reach that stage, but if they did, the Revolution will have been gambled away.”11
In destroying the “democratic” tendency within the Communist Party, Lenin in effect threw the game to the manipulators of the Party machine. Henceforward, the apparatus was to be first the most powerful and later the only force within the Party. The answer to the question “Who will rule Russia?” became simply “Who will win a faction fight confined to a narrow section of the leadership?” Candidates for power had already shown their hands. As Lenin lay in the twilight of the long decline from his last stroke, striving to correct all this, they were already at grips in the first round of the struggle which was to culminate in the Great Purge.
STALIN CRUSHES THE LEFT
When one of the factions is extinguished, the remainder subdivideth.
FRANCIS BACON
It was in the Politburo that the decisive confrontations took place. Over the following years Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky were to meet death at the hands of the only survivor, Stalin. At the time, such a denouement seemed unlikely.
Trotsky was the first and, on the face of it, the most dangerous of Stalin’s opponents. On him Stalin was to concentrate, over the years, the whole power of his immense capacity for political malice. The personal roots of the Great Purge extend back to the earliest period of Soviet rule, when the most bitter of the various bitter rivalries which possessed Stalin was centered on the man who seemed, at least to the superficial observer, the main claimant to the Lenin succession, but who, for that reason, roused the united hostility of the remainder of the top leadership.
Trotsky’s revolutionary record, from the time he had returned from abroad to become President of the St. Petersburg Soviet during the 1905 Revolution, was outstanding. His fame was European. In the Party, however, he was not as strong as his repute suggested. Right up to 1917, he had stayed clear of Lenin’s tightly organized Bolshevik group and operated, with a few sympathizers, as an independent revolutionary, though in some ways closer to the Mensheviks. His own group had merged with the Bolsheviks in June 1917, and he had played a decisive role in the seizure of power in November of that year. But he was regarded as an outsider by most of the Old Bolsheviks. And at the same time, he was lacking in the experience of intrigue which they had picked up in the long and obscure inner-Party struggles in which he had tried to operate as a conciliator. They also thought of him as arrogant. The respect he won by his gifts and intellect was wrung from them reluctantly. Although he had a number of devoted adherents, on the whole he repelled as much as he attracted. With Lenin’s partial support, he was undoubtedly the second man in the Party and State. With Lenin dead, he became vulnerable. But in spite of the weakness of his position, it had its strength. He had powerful backing, not only from many able Bolsheviks, but also from the students and younger Communists. The “Left” associated with Trotsky had opposed Lenin on the great issues of the early 1920s. By the New Economic Policy, Lenin had saved the country from collapse, and at the same time had kept the Party’s grip on power, but at the expense of large concessions to “capitalism”: the rich peasant proprietor and the profiteering “NEP-man” flourished. All this was repulsive, even sinful, to the purists. They were often not particularly devoted to Trotsky in person, but rather held to the views—dogmatic or principled, depending on how one looks at it—which Trotsky had come to personify in the early 1920s, as Bukharin had in 1918. When Stalin himself went “Left” in 1928, most of them ceased to support Trotsky in his opposition.
This group included Pyatakov, one of the six men named by Lenin in his Testament; Lenin saw him, with Bukharin, as the ablest of the younger men. Pyatakov, a tall dignified man with a long, straight beard and a high domed forehead, had started his political career as an anarchist, becoming a Bolshevik in 1910. During the Civil War, his brother had been shot by the Whites in the Ukraine, and he had only just escaped the same fate. His modesty and lack of personal ambition were admired as much as his ability.
Other leading “Trotskyites” were Krestinsky, member of the first Politburo and original senior Secretary of the Central Committee until the Left were removed from administrative power by Lenin; Rakovsky, the handsome Bulgarian veteran who had virtually founded the Balkan revolutionary movement; Preobrazhensky, the great theorist of the creation of industry on the basis of squeezing the funds out of the peasantry, who has been described as the true leader of the Left in 1923 and 1924;12 and Radek, ugly and intelligent, who had come to the Bolsheviks from Rosa Luxemburg’s Polish Social Democratic Party and had also worked in the German Socialist Left. He had operated with great daring and skill in the revolutionary Berlin of 1919, where he had been imprisoned. But his element was very much that of underground intrigue and the political gamble, and as an able journalist, sharp and satirical. His image in the Party was that of an erratic, unreliable, and cynical talker rather than a serious politician.
Trotsky was, however, quite isolated in the Politburo itself. His greatest strength was his control of the War Commissariat. An old Trotskyite later took the view that Trotsky could have won in 1923 if he had held his base in the army and personally appealed to the Party workers in the great towns. Trotsky did not do so (this observer felt) because his victory would then have meant a sure split in the Central Committee, and he hoped to secure it by negotiation.13
But this was the wrong arena. Trotsky’s weaknesses as a politician were demonstrated: