We may also note here the rise of future Politburo members. Andrei Zhdanov, First Secretary of the important Nizhni-Novgorod (later Gorky) province, was typical of the younger Stalinist generation. In him we find an ideological fanaticism much more dominant than in most of his generation. To him is due one of the few benefits of the Stalin epoch as compared with the 1920s—the reestablishment of an educational system which, though narrow and sycophantic, at least restored in the nonpolitical subjects the rigor and effectiveness of Russian education, which had deteriorated in the experimental interlude. Georgi Malenkov, an equally ruthless and intelligent young man, worked in the Party apparatus. His mind ran less in the channels of ideological conviction and political fanaticism than in the skills and details of political maneuver, the apparatus and its personalities. Lavrenti Beria, a former OGPU operative, was appointed by Stalin in 1931 to head the Party organization in Transcaucasia, against the objections of local leaders. These four were to combine some political capacity with satisfactory ruthlessness and to rise high in the State. Their roles in the Purge were particularly murderous.
One view commonly held at the time was that the essential struggle of the early 1930s was waged between the Stalinist “moderates” and men of the Kaganovich type, for “priority of influence over Stalin.” In fact, Stalin himself was occasionally giving in with apparent good grace to hostile majorities while leaving Kaganovich and company the task of overtly putting the extreme case. As a result, the moderates seem to have thought that Stalin might have been induced to accept compromise and make shift with less than autocratic power. This mistake weakened them, as it had weakened all the previous opponents of Stalin.
There seems, indeed, no doubt that Kaganovich and others identified with terrorism did their best to dissuade Stalin from any policy of relaxation. For the Party would have forgiven Stalin, but a change in line would certainly have led to the fall of this cabal. That Stalin needed their encouragement is a more dubious proposition: his suspicions and ambitions were so strong as not to be notably affected by the efforts of these advisers. Khrushchev probably had the hierarchy of influence right when he commented, “Arbitrary behavior by one person encouraged and permitted arbitrariness in others.”31
Apart from the true politicians operating the overt machinery of Party and State, Stalin began from the 1920s to build up a personal group of agents, chosen for their lack of scruple and totally dependent on and devoted to himself. There is a Russian proverb, “Out of filth you can make a prince,” which, Trotsky says, Stalin was fond of quoting.32 These men were truly disgusting characters by any standards, a cadre which had abandoned all normal political or even Communist standards and which may be regarded as in effect a personal group of hatchet men, ready for any violence or falsification at the orders of their leader. At the same time, the political mechanism—containing comparatively reputable figures—continued to exist and was held to the front, just as Al Capone’s rule over Cicero was fronted for by civic officials, and employed the usual quota of economic and administrative cadres.
The “bloodthirsty dwarf” Yezhov—he was only about five feet tall—joined the Party in March 1917. Stalin found him in provincial posts and brought him into the Secretariat. He became a member of the Central Committee in 1927. An old Communist remarks, “In the whole of my long life I have never seen a more repellent personality than Yezhov’s.”33 He was reminded of one of those slum children whose favorite occupation was to tie paraffin-soaked paper to a cat’s tail and set fire to it—and this was long before Yezhov had shown his full potential. On one view, Yezhov was merely a typical apparatchik: if so, the level implied is deplorable. A recent Soviet account speaks of his “low moral qualities” and “sadistic inclinations”; “women working in the NKVD were frightened of meeting him even in the corridors”; he “lacked any trace of conscience or moral principles.”34
The intelligence of Yezhov himself has universally been described as low. But that is not to say that he, and the others, did not have adequate organizational and “political” capacities. Such have been found also in leading gangsters, who have, indeed, also been known to nourish a sense of allegiance to the mystique of an organization in much the same way as Yezhov and his colleagues. For such men, the Party was indeed cosa nostra—“our thing.”
Another such character, even closer to Stalin, was his secretary Poskrebyshev—bald, slightly humpbacked, heavily pockmarked. He was accustomed to speak quietly, but in the coarsest possible language, and gave a general impression of being almost totally uneducated. As head of the “Special Sector” of the Central Committee for many years, he was Stalin’s closest confidant until 1952.
Similar men, who were to play important roles in the Terror, were Mekhlis and Shchadenko, who destroyed the Army; Shkiryatov, Yezhov’s chief Purge assistant; and a dozen others of lesser note.
A last figure, more important than most, was Andrei Vyshinsky. Educated, intelligent, cowardly, and servile, he had been a Menshevik until 1921 and had joined the Bolshevik Party only after it established itself as victor. He was thus vulnerable to pressures and threats, and soon sought the protection of the faction best able to provide it. He made a quasi-academic career for himself in the Faculty of Law at Moscow University, and rapidly became its Rector on the intervention of the Party apparatus. Later he was a high official in the Commissariat for Education and was deeply involved in the purge of the academic world.
Vyshinsky was originally only on the fringe of the Purges, like a gangland lawyer. He was despised, and often openly snubbed, by the police and Party operatives. He was to survive them, after a career of unrelieved falsification and slander. He struck the present writer, who spoke with him in the last years of his life when he was Foreign Minister, as both physically and spiritually a creature who gave life to the worn image of a “rat in human form.”
Machiavelli mentions several instances of actual criminals rising to control the State—Agathocles of Syracuse, for example. Georgian Communists used to refer to Stalin as a kinto, the old Tiflis equivalent of the Neapolitian lazzaroni. This tendency in his character is most clearly seen in his selection of followers. In the 1937 Trial, Vyshinsky was to say of the oppositionists, “This gang of murderers, incendiaries and bandits can only be compared with the medieval camorra which united the Italian nobility, vagabonds and brigands.”35 There is a sense in which this analysis is not inappropriate to the victors.
DEFEAT OF THE RIGHT
With the promotion of his own allies into the Politburo, Stalin had a clear potential majority. There remained one further group to defeat: the Rightists Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky, with whom he had hitherto allied himself.
The Bolsheviks had taken power in a country which was not, even in their own theory, ready for their “proletarian” and “socialist” rule. For the first few years, it was maintained that though this was true, they had broken capitalist sway in a “weak link” and revolutions would soon follow in the Western world. Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks should maintain their advanced position in the hope, or rather certainty, of support from revolutions in, as Lenin put it, Berlin and London. This view lasted after the end of Lenin’s active political life. As late as 1923, the attempted coup in Germany was expected to regularize the situation.
When this failed, Stalin’s theory of Socialism in One Country was propounded. It had the obvious advantage that the alternative of giving up power, or even sharing power, on theoretical grounds was naturally unattractive to those who now held all the positions of power.