In fact, courage and clearheadedness are admirable in themselves. And if they do not rank high among the moral virtues, we can see in some of the Soviet oppositionists something rather better. It is true that those who did not confess, and were shot secretly, demonstrated not merely a higher courage, but a better sense of values. In them, however touched by the demands of Party and revolutionary loyalty, loyalty to the truth and the idea of a more humane regime prevailed. But even among those who confessed, we can often see the struggle between Party habits and the old impulses to justice which had originally, in many cases at least, been one of the motives for joining the Party.
If the oppositionists were not spotless, it is at least true of their conduct during the Civil War that to have acted was different from planning the cold-blooded Terror shortly to be launched. Even the attempt to save Ryutin by those who had just decimated the Ukraine, absurd though it may appear to logical Stalinist and logical humanist alike, perhaps indicates not merely a wish to preserve privilege, but also a residuum of humane feeling.
right or wrong
Within that furious age
There is, after all, a moral difference between some restraint and none. Although indulgence in terrorist action against any section of the population may corrupt the entire personality, as it clearly had done in the cases of Yezhov and others, the contrary is also true: the preservation of more or less humanist attitudes, even if only in a limited field, may, when the particular motives for terror against others have lapsed, spread out again and rehumanize the rest.
Over the next few years, Stalin was to burn out the last roots of humanism. There was no longer to be a section of the community reserved from the operation of arbitrary rule. And, in itself, this was not unwelcome to the non—Party members. We often find in the prison and concentration-camp literature accounts of ordinary victims being cheered up at the sight of some notorious persecutor from the NKVD or the Party machine appearing in the same cell or barrack.
For the general objection to the Terror is not that it was to strike at the Party members as well as at the population, but that the sufferings of the population itself under it increased immeasurably. The true crux of the Ryutin dispute resides less in preserving the privileged sanctuary of Party membership than in the fact that it was the issue on which Stalin was to fight the battle with his own colleagues to decide if the country was or was not to submit unreservedly to his single will. In an oligarchical system, there is at lowest always the possibility of some members of the ruling elite taking moderate views, or at least acting as a brake on their more repressive fellows. In an autocracy, the question depends entirely on the will of one man. There have been comparatively mild autocrats. But Stalin was not one of them.
In this period when Stalin was the effective binding power of the State, the pressures he met penetrated his personal life as well. On 8 November 1932 his wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva, committed suicide. But neither personal loss nor public crisis broke his will. And this was widely understood as the decisive factor in the terrible struggle just concluded. He had met wavering and refused it countenance. We are told that “in 1932 Stalin was adamant against the proposal to surrender the positions already gained.”22 An official of the period comments,
Loyalty to Stalin at the time of which I am writing [1932] was based principally on the conviction that there was no one to take his place, that any change of leadership would be extremely dangerous, and that the country must continue in its present course, since to stop now or attempt a retreat would mean the loss of everything.23
Even a Trotskyite could comment, “If it were not for that so-and-so … everything would have fallen into pieces by now. It is he who keeps everything together….”24
By the beginning of 1933, many circles in the Party previously unconvinced about the possibility of success began to alter their attitude and to accept that Stalin had in fact won through. As Kamenev was made to remark at his trial in 1936, “Our banking on the insuperability of the difficulties which the country was experiencing, on the state of crisis of its economy, on the collapse of the economic policy of the Party leadership had obviously failed by the second half of 1932.”25 The “victory” did not amount to the creation of an efficient industry and agriculture. But the Party, which had staked its existence on winning the battle against the peasantry, had succeeded in crushing them, and a collective farm system was now firmly established.
By early summer, a certain relaxation took place in all fields. In May 1933, a decrease of peasant deportations to a figure of 12,000 households a year was ordered by a secret circular signed by Stalin and Molotov.26 In the same month, Zinoviev and Kamenev were brought back from Siberia to make another confession of error. Pravda published a piece by Kamenev, condemning his own mistakes and calling on the oppositionists to cease any resistance.27
The former theological students among them—and there were always a surprising number of these in the Party, from Stalin and Mikoyan down to men like Chernov—might have remembered the scenes which took place after the Council of Nicaea, when one of the more extreme Arians remarked to a colleague who had surrendered, “Thou hast subscribed to escape banishment, but within the year thou shalt be as I am.” But it is also true that even the opposition was often won over by the victory of Stalin’s line and the successes gained, at whatever cost, in industry.
Moreover, the rise of Nazism in Germany was a strong shock. Stalin had played on a quite implausible war scare in the late 1920s, trapping Trotsky in particular into implying that even in war he would oppose the leadership—a sure formula for accusations of “traitor.” But no serious figure had been shaken by the maneuver. Now Rakovsky and Sosnovsky, the last leading oppositionists in exile, finally made their peace with the regime, giving the war danger as their main motive. Rakovsky, who earlier seems to have been badly hurt in an attempt to escape, had pointed out that even Lenin had expressed qualms about the power of the Party, and that since his death it had become ten times more powerful. Getting to the heart of the dispute, he had said, “We have always based ourselves on the revolutionary initiative of the masses and not on the apparatus.” He had added that no more faith could be placed in “enlightened bureaucracy” than in “the enlightened despotism of the seventeenth century.”28 But now he was persuaded. He was welcomed back by Kaganovich in person.29 It was plain that an air of general reconciliation was prevalent.
Radek had long since become a shameless adulator of Stalin, detested by the less venal oppositionists. He pleased Stalin greatly by an article purporting to be a lecture delivered in 1967 at the School of Interplanetary Communications, on the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution. At this date (now far behind us) the World Revolution had evidently triumphed and looked back on Stalin as its most brilliant architect. Radek was put up early in 1934 to distinguish between the old oppositionists who merely lacked “proper understanding and will” and the “alien” Trotsky—a striking token of peace with the Zinovievs and Bukharins.30 (Trotsky himself had been meanwhile writing that the slogan “Down with Stalin” was wrong31 and that “at the present moment, the overthrow of the bureaucracy would surely serve counter-revolutionary forces.”)32
If Stalin’s special talents had been vital during the crisis, he now no longer seemed quite so essential to the Party’s survival. But if it had been impossible to remove Stalin at a time when the Party and the regime were engaged in a desperate struggle, it now became difficult for a different reason: he was the victor, the man who had won against all the odds. His prestige was higher than ever.